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All my writings may be considered tasks imposed 
from within; their source was a fateful compulsion. 
What I wrote were things that assailed me from 
within myself. I permitted the spirit that moved me 
to speak out. I have never counted upon any strong 
response, any powerful resonance, to my writings. 
They represent a compensation for our times, and I 
have been impelled to say what no one wants to 
hear…I have the feeling that I have done all that it 
was possible for me to do. Without a doubt that life 
work could have been larger, and could have been 
done better; but more was not within my power. 
           
C.G. Jung 	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Introduction 
 
Treading Old Paths and Plotting New Ones:  
Framing Our Project 
 
There is only one way and that is your way. You seek the 
path? I warn you away from my own. It can also be the 
wrong way for you. May each go his own way. I will be no 
savior, no law giver, no master teacher unto you.1 
          C.G. Jung 
 
Having dedicated much of his life to exploring and making sense of the world’s 
many mythologies, it is only fitting that Carl Jung’s life and work have taken on a mythic 
quality in their own right. Despite his exhortations against such deification, Jung’s voice 
has, for better or for worse, authoritatively resounded in both academic and popular 
discourse. His wide variety of pursuits have led to him being understood as a man poised 
between worlds, living as a psychoanalyst and a psychonaut, a scientist and an alchemist, 
a scholar of comparative religion and a mystic.  
As a builder of bridges between disparate disciplines and cultures, Jung occupied 
a position of special privilege during a period in which vast stores of Asian religious texts 
were being translated into English and other European languages for the first time. 
Standing at this liminal intersection, Jung played a key role mediating and introducing 
Asian religious practices and conceptions to his European and American audiences, as 
well as in bringing the work of contemporary Indologists and Sinologists to a wider 
audience.2 His authority is both demonstrated and reproduced through his authorship of 
prefaces to the translations of several of the most widely known Eastern texts among 
Westerners, such as the Tibetan Book of the Dead3 and the I-Ching.4 Jung’s participation 
in the Eranos lecturesa, a forum dedicated to creating a dialogue between Eastern and 
Western systems of thought, further cemented his inseparable ties with Asia. 
As one of the earliest scholars attempting to render Asian religions in terms 
intelligible to Westerners, Jung established analytical precedents that have carried into 
contemporary discussions about appropriating Asian cultures. Whether or not Jung 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  a	  The	  Eranos	  conferences	  began	  in	  1933	  and	  occur	  annually	  in	  Switzerland	  up	  to	  this	  day.	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intended for this to be the case, his authority and influence have grown far greater than 
the man himself. Even though Jung himself advised others against treading the same path 
that he laid forth,5 it has nevertheless become a road well worn over the course of the past 
century, and a reappraisal of this path seems particularly timely. Given the tremendous 
proliferation of interest in Asian religions, particularly Buddhism, over the past several 
decades in America, a closer look at one of the forerunners of this movement will prove 
highly beneficial. 
Although it was not the only Eastern religion on which Jung wrote, or even the 
first,b Tibetan Buddhism was certainly the one that received his greatest attention and 
most extensive commentaries. In addition to contributing a psychological commentary to 
the Tibetan Book of the Dead, he also wrote an extensive introduction to the Tibetan 
Book of Great Liberation and performed detailed analyses of mandala symbolism. Jung’s 
analyses of these three distinct artifacts of Tibetan Buddhism have established him as a 
key mediator in the transmission of Tibetan Buddhism to both academic and general 
audiences in Europe and America. 
In light of Jung’s significance in the construction of Tibetan Buddhism in the 
West we must now raise the obvious questions: How should we understand Jung’s 
encounter with Tibetan Buddhism and what should we do with his psychological 
interpretations? This is the query that will guide this entire thesis and that will shape our 
appraisals of Jung, his psychological commentaries, and his extended influence on 
contemporary conceptions of Tibetan Buddhism in the popular Western imagination. 
I first attempted to tackle this question nearly two years ago in a work entitled 
Vajrayana Buddhist Psychological Transformation: Going Beyond Sonic Frequencies. I 
had just discovered Jung’s analytical psychology, as well as Tibetan Buddhism, and my 
mind was flooded with possible points of comparison between the two systems of 
thought. Considering that Jung himself had viewed Tibetan Buddhism as a system 
analogous to his own, I was eager to follow in the psychologist’s footsteps by laying out 
a series of connections between the theories of analytical psychology and those of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  b	  In	  1912,	  Jung	  provided	  psychological	  interpretations	  of	  passages	  from	  the	  Indian	  
Upanishads	  and	  the	  Rig	  Veda	  in	  his	  Transformation	  and	  Symbols	  of	  Libido.	  (Shamdasani,	  2012,	  xix)	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Tibetan Buddhism. I became so caught up in the legitimacy of these comparisons that I 
ultimately lamented the degree to which Jung had been ridiculed for his ideas and 
advanced the ambitious claim that his works are “a light shining through a world of 
intellectual darkness,” applauding their tremendous potential for illuminating the foreign 
ideas of Tibetan Buddhism to European and American audiences. 
As I have further explored Jung’s thought and its relation to Tibetan Buddhism, I 
have since come to nearly the opposite conclusion: analytical psychology does not unveil 
fundamental truths about Tibetan Buddhism but psychologizing Tibetan Buddhism can 
tell us something about analytical psychology and about Jung. Deeper engagement with 
Tibetan Buddhism and the post-colonial critiques of representation have shown me that 
Jung’s attempts to analogize his own system to that of Tibetans is highly problematic. 
They reflect certain political and professional agendas as determined by his position as an 
intellectual writing in twentieth century Europe. Within this zeitgeist, Orientalist 
discourse played a crucial role in shaping Jung’s commentaries. “Orientalism” here refers 
to the epistemological system that Europeans used to make sense of the Asian East that 
commonly entailed reducing their objects of inquiry into misrepresentative tropes for the 
sake of analysis.6 This agenda complicates the possibility of using ideas that emerged in a 
particular time and place to represent concepts that developed under entirely different 
circumstances, raising larger questions about using Jungian concepts to shed light on 
foreign cultural phenomena. 
However, my initial mistake was not solely that of an overexcited student 
posturing far beyond my actual erudition. Rather, it is an interpretive problem endemic to 
many intellectuals attempting to make sense of Tibetan Buddhism following Jung’s 
writings on the religion in the early twentieth century. While this thesis will only touch 
upon a handful of scholars who have proven particularly susceptible to the allure of 
Jung’s psychological interpretations, such as Timothy Leary,7 Radmila Moacanin8, and 
Rob Preece9, it points toward a larger trend in contemporary conceptions of Tibetan 
Buddhism. 
Given that Tibet was never colonized by a European power and consequently did 
not have formal Western academic institutions before the Tibetan diaspora in 1959, 
systematic study of the religion did not begin until the 1960s. Although Westerners, and 
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Romantics in particular, demonstrated great interest in Tibet prior to that period, specific 
methodological and rhetorical tools for analyzing Tibetan Buddhism were not codified 
until well after Jung had performed his psychological interpretations. As such, early 
accounts of the religion like Jung’s played a huge role in establishing its identity in the 
broader Western intellectual imagination. 
Although it is not the only, or even the dominant, interpretive lens applied to 
Tibetan Buddhism, psychologism is certainly prevalent in popular discourse on the 
subject. This particular theoretical framework rests on the assumption that human nature 
and behavior are best explained by psychological mechanisms that can be uncovered 
through empirical investigation.10 Consequently, psychologism often results in 
reductionism that interiorizes practices and transmutes cultural beliefs into expressions of 
psychological structures and treats them as carriers of timeless psychic data. This 
essentializing strategy not only supplants the voice of actual Buddhists by locating the 
‘essence’ of the religion in its experiential aspects, but also further dismisses their truth 
claims by suggesting that their religion is nothing more than phenomological experience. 
Psychologism is thus intellectually imperializing to the highest degree, denying all other 
traditional interpretations in favor of the psychological. 
Psychologism’s reductionism exemplifies what Susan Sontag refers to as 
formalist interpretation.11 According to Sontag, formalist interpretation and hermeneutics 
are epistemological fallacies that place an overabundance of importance on meaning at 
the expense of how the source material actually appears and functions in its original 
context.  In this view, analysis is an act of translation that seeks to establish 
correspondences between the new object that we’re studying (the material to be 
interpreted) and old objects with which we are familiar (the background of our 
interpretation.)12 Interpretation thus introduces meaning to a text or a practice that it did 
not previously have. Consequently, “nothing is ever comprehended, but rather designated 
and distorted.”13 By this logic, Jung’s attempts to interpret Tibetan Buddhism are unable 
to produce faithful reproductions of their source material, instead churning out 
palimpsests that retain traces of the original content, which are reinscribed according to 
Jung’s own positionality and agenda of advancing analytical psychology. 
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How and why did Jung fell pray to this fallacy of interpretation so easily? A 
possible clue lays in the clinical practices in his own field of psychoanalysis. In 
psychotherapy, it ordinarily takes two to make a diagnosis: a patient with a set of 
symptoms and the psychiatrist that classifies and labels them. Yet in cases in which 
psychoanalysts are working not with a person, but with a text or a symbol, such as the 
Tibetan Book of the Dead or a mandala, there is no voice other than that of psychoanalyst 
himself/herself. As the sole speakers, they are thus imbued with a tremendous authority 
to find what they wish in the text and to speak on its behalf without even realizing that 
they are doing so, thereby erasing the cultural and historical context that renders the text 
unique and significant.  
While Jungian inspired psychologism has occasionally been directly and 
unequivocally applied to considerations of Tibetan Buddhism, as in the cases of Leary, 
Moacanin, and Preece, it is more broadly problematic due to the convenient terminology 
it provides to describe the religion’s foreign concepts. Through continued use and 
normalization, Jungian linguistic conventions have subtly infiltrated even the most well-
intentioned and well-informed portrayals of the religion for popular audiences. In doing 
so, psychologism slyly transforms Tibetan concepts into Jungian ones, often without even 
acknowledging that this transformation is taking place. While Tibetan Buddhism 
undoubtedly possesses elements that we would classify as ‘psychological’ according to 
our current disciplinary categorizations, it possesses a bevy of other dimensions as well. 
These additional aspects, which include devotionalism, physiology, cosmology, and 
ritualism, are often brushed aside or reduced to human psychology when contemporary 
interpreters replace Tibetan Buddhist concepts with Jungian ones. 
Engaging in a critical yet sympathetic analysis of Jung’s encounter with Tibetan 
Buddhism serves a twofold purpose. First, it allows us to recognize the distorting lens 
that Jung imposes on contemporary conceptions of the religion through his reductionist 
commentaries and the persistent impact of his psychologism. Additionally, this analysis 
also enables a consideration of any potential benefits or more productive ends that his 
works might serve. In order to capture these dual movements of criticism and reappraisal, 
our project consists of two parts. To begin, Jung’s psychologism of Tibetan Buddhism 
instrumentalizes the religion by using it to support and advance his own system of 
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analytical psychology rather than seeking to accurately understand it. This treatment 
qualifies Jung as an academically imperializing Orientalist whose methodology and 
rhetoric have carried into contemporary discourse and thereby perpetuated the trend of 
intellectually dominating the religion. However, contextualizing Jung’s writings within a 
field of power relations reveals that his commentaries should not be treated as 
illuminating Tibetan Buddhism, as scholars have often done, but as further insight into 
his own system of analytical psychology. This contextualization also offers a new 
hermeneutical approach to Jung’s writings that highlight its potential to deconstruct the 
Orientalist episteme that he seemingly perpetuates.  
 
Recognizing and Reconsidering Jung: Plotting our Path Forward 
The first section of this thesis, which consists of the first four chapters, explores 
the specific ways in which Jung overemphasizes the psychological dimension of Tibetan 
Buddhism. In short, it is an examination of what is wrong with Jung and his Asian 
encounters. In Jung’s particular interpretation of the text, there are a number of authorial 
strategies that constitute acts of Orientalism. Edward Said has suggested that when we 
track the impact of the Orientalist episteme on textual interpretation we should pay close 
attention to “style, figures of speech, setting, narrative devices, historical and social 
circumstances, not the correctness of the representation nor its fidelity to some great 
original.”14 While Said provides helpful signs of Orientalist representations, we should 
rethink his decision to ignore the correctness of these depictions. Given that 
psychological perspectives are often implicitly treated as an accurate reflection of the 
Tibetan stance on their own beliefs and practices, we must go further than Said suggests 
and directly engage with the contents of Jung’s psychological commentaries to examine 
the specific distortions that occurred as he transmitted ideas from Tibet to the West.   
This exploration will therefore follow the critique of Jung that Luis Gomez lays 
out in his in Oriental Wisdom and the Cure of Souls: Jung and the Indian East.15 Gomez 
critically reconsiders Jung’s interpretation of key concepts in the Amitayur-dhyana Sutra, 
concluding that the psychologist primarily used the text to validate the universal 
applicability of his own system of analytical psychology and to advance it as a superior 
practice of inner healing.16 From his position of authorial authority, Jung claims 
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privileged access to Tibetan Buddhism and its doctrines, which he asserts are unusable to 
his Western audience in their unrefined form.17 These ideas, however, closely correspond 
to those of Jung’s own system of analytical psychology. By merging the East’s supposed 
concern for internal wellness with the West’s dedication to rationality and empiricism, 
Jung presents analytical psychology as a holistic practice for mental health that is more 
appropriate for his modern Western audience than traditional belief based religions. His 
concern with advancing analytical psychology thereby ensures that his interpretations do 
not represent Tibetan Buddhism as a cultural phenomenon in its own right, but transform 
it into convincing evidence for his own theories. By following Gomez’s astute analysis, 
we place ourselves in the best possible position to understand the intellectual harm 
inflicted upon Tibetan Buddhism by Jung’s initial interpretations and their influence on 
subsequent scholarship.   
This analysis begins by providing background on Jung’s project of interpreting 
Tibetan Buddhism in the broader context of European and American (which, following 
discursive conventions common to Jung’s time, we will refer to as the ‘West’) 
engagement with Asia (the so-called ‘East’) over the course of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries through the framework of Orientalism. Armed with the rhetoric of 
Orientalism, European and American scholars participated in the construction of ‘Mystic 
Tibet’ and ‘Western Buddhism.’ Although these representations claim to derive from 
evidence gathered from Asian cultures, they are ultimately far more representative of the 
Orientalists that constructed them than of the ideas they claim to explicate. 
These claims to authenticity highlight the essential problem of Orientalist 
constructions of the East. By producing representations that assert their ‘authenticity’ yet 
have little grounding in the actual material they claim to depict, Orientalism is primarily a 
discourse of domination. It enabled Western scholars to elevate themselves to a 
Benthamite position of authorial authority from which they could pass judgment on their 
Eastern objects of inquiry, rendering them into familiar and therefore useable analytical 
forms. From this position, Jung attempted to fit Tibetan Buddhism into the 
incommensurable framework of analytical psychology and used Tibetan materials to 
advance his own system of psychology as a superior alternative to traditional religions. 
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As he approached the Tibetan Book of the Dead and mandala iconography for his 
psychological interpretations, Jung picked through his source material for information 
that would prove most useful in the construction and legitimization of analytical 
psychology. He distorts Tibetan Buddhism by failing to mention its devotional and 
ritualistic elements, as well as the physical aspects of practice. His overemphasis of the 
psychological dimension of Tibetan Buddhism at the expense of its other features has 
helped to establish a distinctly psychological thread in broader contemporary 
understandings of the religion. While current scholars of Tibetan Buddhism such as 
Donald Lopez, Georges Dreyfus, and Janet Gyatso, have largely discredited Jungian 
psychologism’s applicability to Tibetan Buddhism, Jung’s perspective still persists in 
popular intellectual accounts of the religion, thus warranting much of the harsh criticism 
levied toward Jung for his role in this misrepresentative construction. 
While these appraisals of Jung as an Orientalist ring true and reflect very real 
problems with the psychologist’s engagement with Tibetan Buddhism, they also 
oversimplify his writings and use Jung as a scapegoat for larger issues present in any 
attempts to make objective statements about unfamiliar cultural phenomena. Reducing 
Jung’s appropriation of Tibetan Buddhism to nothing more than an act of intellectual 
imperialism ignores the potentially positive dimensions of this practice. As Jung himself 
noted, it would not be wise to follow directly in his footsteps18, though there is much to 
be learned from the way in which he walked the path, as well as the fact that he walked it 
at all.     
The second section of this thesis plots out the social and intellectual milieu in 
which Jung laid out his particular interpretive methods and uses this contextualization to 
reconsider the significance of his interpretations of Tibetan Buddhism. Chapter five will 
develop a Foucauldian analysis to complicate straightforward criticisms of Jung as an 
Orientalist by framing him within the set of power relations specific to his time and place. 
This contextualization paves the way for a consideration of the value of Jung’s 
interpretive psychologism. This analysis will locate Jung within an ideological matrix and 
appraise the different variables that factored into his specific method of psychologism. 
Among these various factors under consideration are Jung’s background as a child 
growing up in Switzerland, his endless fascination between the conscious Self and the 
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unconscious Other, the development of psychiatry in France as an offshoot of scientific 
positivism, and the scholarly trend of focusing primarily on texts and inner experience as 
Western intellectuals sought to make sense of foreign religions. Each of these discursive 
forces helped to shape Jung’s rhetoric and methodology as he metaphorically traveled 
East to produce his commentaries on Tibetan Buddhism. By considering each of these 
powers in turn, we can arrive at a deeper sense of Jung’s positionality and its influence on 
his perspective of the religion. 
Locating Jung in his social and intellectual context enables us to reevaluate 
common criticisms and draw out a more productive use for his writings in the final 
chapter. Rather than forgiving Jung as a product of his times or wholly dismissing his 
psychological commentaries, we will find a middle way between these two extremes. 
From this new perspective, we can reevaluate Jung’s psychologism as merely one 
perspective on Tibetan Buddhism that sheds light on a single dimension of the religion. 
This evaluation also prompts a reconsideration of the extent to which Jung’s voice should 
be considered to speak about Tibetan Buddhism at all, revealing that Jung himself did not 
view his claims as reflecting a traditionally Tibetan stance on Buddhist practice and that 
his commentaries are ultimately far more indicative of himself and of analytical 
psychology than the material he appears to explicate. 
Finally, performing a Derridean analysis on Jung’s own writings provides the 
necessary tools to “deconstruct”19 the Orientalist episteme from within which he writes. 
Although Jung’s writings perpetuate and advance the Western Orientalist domination of 
the East, the foundational ideas of analytical psychology ultimately run directly counter 
to the cognitively imperializing methodology he adopts in his interpretations. Analytical 
psychology and psychoanalysis in general occupy a unique position in the European 
intellectual tradition as continuations of prior attempts to make sense of human identity 
that simultaneously break from their lineage. By proposing the existence of an 
unconscious mind that is constitutive of our identity and yet forever unknowable, 
psychoanalysis deeply problematizes the possibility of self-knowledge and objectivity. 
Our existence as autonomous Subjects with the ability to make objective statements about 
the world around us is undermined by the presence of an obscure, internal Other on 
which our identities depend. Psychoanalysis is thus fraught with tensions that challenge 
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its own basis for existence because the methods that it uses to reify itself as a legitimate 
discipline are undermined by the very ideas it seeks to establish.  
This paradoxical nature of psychoanalysis suggests that its application to the 
study of the East was not a typical Orientalist endeavor. By questioning the fundamental 
relationship between observing Subject and observed Other, psychoanalysis casts doubt 
upon any Western attempts to speak objectively about the East. While European 
Orientalists may impose their ideas upon Asia and consequently appear to dominate it, 
the East simultaneously defines the West by providing a boundary for everything that it is 
not. Just as the unconscious is constitutive of consciousness by demarcating its limits, the 
East colludes with the West in the formation of each of their unique identities. 
Psychoanalysis thereby reveals that Orientalist intellectual domination of Asia does not 
place the West in a position of absolute superiority in relation to the East, but that the 
West is dependent on the East for self-definition as well.  
This tension between Jungian psychoanalysis and the methods that he requires to 
validate them as he writes about Tibetan Buddhism occasionally breaks through in his 
writings. These points of self-doubt provide opportunities to reconsider Jung’s 
psychological commentaries and catch a glimpse of the instability of Orientalism as an 
epistemological framework, thereby allowing us to deconstruct it. This deconstruction 
enables a rereading of Orientalism that reveals the futility of the West’s attempts to 
establish itself as hegemonic and presents us with the possibility of appropriating 
differently. In this light, Jung’s psychological commentaries are not solely 
misrepresentative accounts of Tibetan Buddhism, but are also material that enables a 
reconsideration of the psychological aspect of Tibetan Buddhist Modernism and the 
Orientalist episteme. 
It would thus seem that the question of, “What should we do with Jung and his 
psychological interpretations of Tibetan Buddhism?” is not quite as simple as we might 
like to imagine. In the following pages, we will trace how this question has typically been 
answered and then provide a new answer. Ultimately, it seems that we would do well to 
abide by Jung’s words that opened this chapter, though with a slight caveat. We should 
not tread the path that Jung laid out and that many subsequent interpreters have 
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mistakenly traveled down but, instead, taking a hint from Jung, will now find our own 
way forward.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Jung,	  The	  Red	  Book:	  Liber	  Novus	  (New	  York:	  W.W.	  Norton	  &	  Company,	  2009)	  308.	  2	  Shamdasani,	  C.G.	  Jung:	  A	  Biography	  in	  Books	  (New	  York:	  W.W.	  Norton	  &	  Company,	  2012)	  163.	  3	  Evans-­‐Wentz,	  The	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Chapter One 
 
What’s Wrong With Jung:  
Setting the Stage for Jung’s Journeys East 
 
What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, 
metonyms, and anthropomorphisms-in short, a sum of 
human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, 
and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which 
after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a 
people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten 
that is what they are.1 
         -Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
 Although our ultimate aim is to reconsider the scholarly significance of Jung’s 
psychological accounts of Tibetan Buddhism, we will begin with the traditional critique 
of Jung  that views his engagements with the religion as a series of acts of cognitively 
imperializing Orientalism. By positioning Jung within Orientalism’s larger project of 
transmitting Buddhism from Asia to Europe and America, we can begin to reclaim 
Tibetan Buddhism from his psychological interpretations and reassess the place of these 
interpretations in popular scholarship on Tibetan Buddhism. 
As a discourse and epistemological system, Orientalism denotes a particular way 
in which Europeans and Americans (the ‘West’) speak about the Asia (the ‘East.’) 
Grounded in the distinction between a Western Subject and an Otherized Eastern Object, 
Orientalist discourse allows European scholars to explicate and dominate over Asia via 
the analytical categories through which they it treat it as an object of study. Among the 
many Orientalist constructions of the East is that of ‘Mystic Tibet,’ which paints the 
Himalayan region as a land of purity and spiritual renewal, as well as ‘Western/Modern 
Buddhism,’ which portrays the Asian religion as a promising supplement to the 
spiritually impoverished West.  
In addition to providing background on Orientalism and the constructions of 
‘Mystic Tibet’ and ‘Western Buddhism’, we will also briefly examine Jung’s own system 
of psychology. Given that this is the primary theoretical framework through which Jung 
filters all of his analyses of Tibetan Buddhism, a cursory understanding of analytical 
psychology is essential to our project. Having achieved a grasp of the incommensurable 
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psychological theories that Jung later equates with Tibetan concepts, we may then engage 
with his commentaries on the Tibetan Book of the Dead and mandala iconography to 
reconsider the significance of the psychological dimension of Tibetan Buddhist 
Modernism.  
 
The ‘East’ in the ‘Western’ Gaze: The Orientalist Episteme and Discourse 
In his 1961 preface to History of Madness, Michel Foucault declared that,  
In the universality of the ‘Western’ ratio, there is this 
division which is the Orient…[offering] to the colonizing 
reason of the Occident, but indefinitely inaccessible, for it 
always remains the limit…The Orient is for the Occident 
everything that it is not, while remaining the place in which 
its primitive truth must be sought. What is required is a 
history of this great divide, all along this Occidental 
becoming, following it in its continuity and its exchanges, 
while also allowing it to appear in its tragic hieratism.2  
 
Seventeen years later, Edward Said responded to this call with Orientalism,3 a vigorous 
critique of Europe’s creation of the ‘East’ as a historical, cultural, and political entity. 
While Said is responsible for the popularization of the term “Orientalism” and his 
definition has proven quite durable and influential in discussions of postcolonial theory 
and European depictions of Asia, other scholars, notably, Ronald Inden,4 Richard King,5 
Jukka Jouhki,6 and Eric Meyer,7 have also discussed Orientalism, expanding the 
geographical zones under consideration beyond Said’s specific treatment of the Middle 
East. An extended consideration of Orientalism as an epistemological system will prove 
useful in unpacking Jung’s writings on Tibetan Buddhism by providing a framework for 
understanding his methodology and rhetoric for deciphering texts as ‘Eastern.’ 
Furthermore, it is only by laying the foundation of the Orientalist episteme that we can 
construct a metanarrative of the discursive forces acting upon Jung and rethink the proper 
place of the psychologist and his commentaries. 
 In its simplest form, Orientalism is a system of thought based on an ontological 
and epistemological distinction between the ‘Orient,’ or the ‘East,’ and the ‘Occident,’ 
otherwise referred to as the ‘West.’ This linguistic pair of East-West is built on a 
relationship of mutual dependence that positions the West as observing Subject in 
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relation to the East as passive Object. Although grounded in geographic relations, these 
concepts are not geographic designations per se, but are socially constructed concepts in 
the Andersonian sense.8 The ‘East’ and the ‘West’ do not exist in their own right as 
concrete places but, rather, are reified by collective perception and recognition.    
From the mid-1800s onward, Orientalism became the accepted grid through 
which all knowledge of Asia could be safely transmitted to Europeans and Americans.9 
According to Said, an Orientalist is anyone who claims to have expert or first-hand 
knowledge of Asia and the Middle East and therefore contributes to social institutions 
that deal with the East by “making statements on it, authorizing views on it, describing it, 
[and] teaching it,” which then disperse throughout the general cultural consciousness.10 
This is not solely the work of academics, but of anyone at all the claims to speak 
authoritatively on Asia and further contributes to an ever-growing body of knowledge of 
the East. 
 While the construction of the ‘Orient’ might have lain in the hands of Europeans 
and Americans, this is not to say that the concept was purely imaginative with no 
corresponding reality. But it is certainly not an accurate reflection of Asia either. Rather, 
the ‘East’ as a discursive construct reflects the concerns, interests, and agendas of 
European colonialism. This representation, while claiming to speak of Asia, actually 
requires the absence of the real Orient and the perspectives of its inhabitants. Such 
accounts might disrupt the apparent stability of Orientalism by contradicting its internal 
consistency and disrupting the stability of the discourse.11 The creation of the ‘East’ that 
relies on a complete silencing of actual ‘Eastern’ voices consequently affords European 
intellectuals a position of dominance over their Asian counterparts by denying them any 
sense of agency in the creation of their own identities in the Western imagination. 
 This dominating aspect of Orientalism is ultimately one of the defining 
characteristics of the episteme. In terms of the Lacanian theory of discourse, Orientalism 
is a discourse of the Master that places the European Subject in a position of authority 
over Asia, its Object.12 From this position of authority, the West places the East in its 
panoptic gaze, assuring mastery through knowing: “to have such knowledge of such a 
thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it. And authority here means for ‘us’ to 
deny autonomy to ‘it’-the Oriental space- since we know it and it exists, in a sense, as we 
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know it.”13  In Lacanian terms, the West as the Subject and Master orders knowledge 
according to its own values while repressing outliers as ‘fantastic’ and reconfiguring their 
potential along the lines of Western ethical and epistemological forms.14 
While this will to power may be considered to be the “fundamental impulse of 
man,”15 Orientalism indulges this impulse to a tremendous degree by providing a 
pervasive way of speaking and thinking about an entire geographic region and its 
population. This enables Western scholars to instrumentalize the East by putting it to use 
according to the economic, political, and intellectual agendas of colonialism. For 
example, European colonial agents commonly portrayed the Orient as a denigrated Other 
in relation to the Occidental Subject, characterizing the East as sensual, backward, 
disposed toward despotism, mentally aberrant, and habitually inaccurate. This portrayal 
of Asia thus justified the ascendency of Europe as a world power, having successfully 
risen above the mire of its past of irrationality that is now represented by the Orient.16 
 However, on the converse side of this sort of explicitly imperially driven 
Orientalism, we find accounts like Jung’s that positively valorize their Asian subjects of 
enquiry; these accounts have been labeled as Spiritualistic, Idealistic, and, as we will 
employ here, Romantic Orientalism.17 At the heart of Romantic Orientalism lies the idea 
that the East can revitalize the West by undermining the materialism, mechanism, and 
universalism that dominate European and American thought.18 Moreover, Romantic 
Orientalists believed that Asian religious traditions could supplement Christianity with 
their mystical leanings, which had largely disappeared from mainstream Western 
religions in contemporary Europe.19 While the Romantics still figured the East as the 
mysterious Other, it was by virtue of this very Otherness that the Orient presented such 
lofty possibilities for a renewal of Western society. 
While Said’s writings on Orientalism have often seemed to imply some sort of 
master agency at work in these constructions,20 perhaps that of a metaphorical imperialist 
puppet master pulling the strings, this is hardly the case. Although it would be fruitless to 
deny that Orientalist discourse contributed to maintaining a particular colonial status quo, 
Orientalism perpetuated itself once its key tenets were established. It is highly unlikely 
that Romantic Orientalists actively set out to subjugate their Asian subjects of inquiry 
but, as we shall see with Jung, they nevertheless became caught up in an inherently 
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dominating discourse in which they were profoundly and irrevocably enmeshed. Once 
they were assimilated into the discourse, Romantic Orientalists were prone to producing 
representations that are reductionist, pseudo-empirical, and internally consistent yet 
simultaneously ambiguous. Collectively, these characteristics established a framework 
for deciphering the East that proved all but inescapable for any writer seeking to make 
sense of the Asia. 
  As a system intended to filter tremendous quantities of information, Orientalism 
is reductionist by its very nature. Orientalism, as a Lacanian discourse of the Master, 
establishes itself as a master signifier that refers analysis of all Eastern phenomena back 
toward itself in order to make them comprehensible. This involves taking complex 
phenomenon that each have their own social, economic, and political histories, and fitting 
them into a predetermined schema. Thus stripped of everything that made these 
phenomena what they were, they are then reshaped into representative figures and tropes 
that are easily deciphered and analyzed. The very factors that give the people, places, and 
things of Asia their unique identity are excised, making them fit for European 
understanding. In doing so, Orientalism turns individuals into abstractions, dehumanizing 
them in the process. 
 This reductionism also enables the internal consistency that gives Orientalism its 
tremendous persuasive power. Once foreign phenomena are refigured into manageable 
forms, writers can easily place them within the closed system of Orientalism in which, 
“objects are what they are because they are what they are, for once, for all time, for 
ontological reasons that no empirical material can either dislodge or alter.”21 This sort of 
circular logic ensures that anomalies are either discounted or transformed, maintaining 
the internal consistency that is the bedrock of Orientalism as an epistemological system. 
While Orientalists might like to regard themselves as concerned solely with the facts of 
Asia, this pretense of empiricism is little more than a facade. However, by claiming to 
participate in the scientific positivism that was so highly lauded in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, Orientalists were able to position themselves as social 
scientists, lending credibility to their outlandish claims and generalizations.  
 On the converse side of this internal consistency is the remarkable ambiguity of 
Orientalist accounts of their Eastern objects. Once Eastern phenomena are flattened into 
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easily recognizable tropes, they are easily enlisted in the dialectical construction of 
Western subjectivity. By looking East, the West could define itself by what it is not, i.e. 
‘Eastern.’ This process of projection and introjection consequently renders the East as 
fearful and fascinating, alien and familiar, dangerous and attractive.22 Without this 
projection, the West would not exist; it requires the opposing Eastern Other as a reference 
point that the Western Subject can measure itself against. By maintaining ambiguous 
accounts of the Orient, Orientalist scholars could vary their portrayals of the East 
according to particular circumstances. This ambiguity allowed Romantic Orientalists to 
depict the East positively when they sought to draw from its wisdom or to figure it 
negatively when advancing their own interests as Westerners with authorial authority.  
Once these flattened figures of the East were constructed with both positive and 
negative valuations, it became nearly impossible for Europeans writing on Asia to avoid 
assimilating Orientalist tropes into their rhetoric. By providing a set of common, 
understandable, supposedly empirically verifiable tropes regarding the East that were 
widely accepted, Orientalism ensured that Asia was not a free subject of thought. 
Orientalism consequently imposed a set of limitations upon speaking about Asia that 
became so naturalized that they were scarcely recognizable to those caught up in the 
discourse. In this context, the very act of interpreting the East inevitably involves an 
appropriation and colonization of the material under consideration. Thus, even though 
Romantic Orientalists valorized their objects of inquiry more positively than their more 
overtly imperializing counterparts, the ambiguous nature of Orientalist tropes and their 
role in defining Western subjectivity ensured that the resultant accounts were no less 
dominating. 
 As Romantic Orientalists scoured the East for sources of redemption, they were 
particularly drawn to Buddhism, viewing its unique form of rational spirituality as a 
promising supplement to Western materialism. This appeal to Buddhism and the uncanny 
East had an undeniably strong allure, drawing in a number of influential scholars in a 
period that has been dubbed the “Oriental Renaissance.”23 The West’s increasing faith in 
materialism and the consequent fissures in the European psyche provoked impassioned 
lamentations by figures such as Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Baudelaire, and Nietzsche in 
the mid-nineteenth century.24 These men saw that, although materially circumstances 
	   18	  
seemed to continually improve, Western moderns were simultaneously experiencing 
severe inner degeneration.25 In the midst of this cultural crisis, the Oriental Renaissance 
established the East as a source of renewal and Orientalism, “helped to give expression 
and substance…to the loss of faith in the West’s idea of progress through scientific 
rationalism, and to a need for new modes of representation.”26 Although Indian Hinduism 
and Vedic religion had been prioritized in the nineteenth century as amenable to such 
modes of representation, eminent thinkers such as Arthur Schopenhaur (1788-1860) and 
Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862) began looking toward Buddhism in their writings.27 
Furthermore, in the wake of the First Opium War of 1839 and the Sepoy Mutiny of 
1857a, China and India came to be considered corrupt civilizations and therefore invalid 
sights/sites of ‘authentic’ Buddhism. Scholars turned their gaze to Tibet and were 
delighted to discover that it contained the exact elements the West required for its 
spiritual reawakening. Painted as a land of purity and redemption, ‘mystic Tibet’ was 
born. 
 
The Search for ‘Mystic Tibet’: Tibet in the Western Imagination 
 Although Romantic Orientalists conceived all of Asia as the spiritually charged 
East, this romanticization of geographically and metaphorically distant lands is nowhere 
more apparent than in the myth of ‘mystic Tibet.’ As a region located on the high planes 
of the Himalayas, Tibet has come to serve as a site of fantasy and romance for 
Westerners dissatisfied with the perceived materialism and spiritual ennui of Europe and 
America. From as early as the seventeenth century when Europeans first explored the 
territory, Tibet assumed a position as “a kind of sacred space within the desecrated 
wastes of the modern West.”28 This hunger for something Other in Tibet that might 
revitalize the internally impoverished Western Subject is echoed in Philip Rawson’s 
statement,  
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[Tibet’s] real interest for us is that Tibetan culture offers a 
powerful, untarnished, and coherent alternative to Western 
egotistical lifestyles, our short attention span, our gradually 
more pointless pursuit of material satisfactions, and our 
despair when these, finally, inevitably, disappoint us.29  
 
Tibet, perhaps more so than any other Asian country, has thus served as an ideal canvas 
on to which the West can project its own anxieties and desires as it struggles to come to 
terms with its own identity in the wake of its cultural crisis. 
 Although contemporary conceptions of Tibet are almost universally positive, the 
Romantic Orientalists’ general ambiguity toward the East ensured that Tibet not only 
inspired awe and admiration, but fear and disgust as well. Within early conceptions of 
Tibetan Buddhism there was a strong trend of antipathy, evidenced by the claim of a 
European traveler to Tibet in 1903 that, “Lamaism [an alternative and now outdated term 
for Tibetan Buddhism] is only thinly and imperfectly varnished over with Buddhist 
symbolism, beneath which the sinister growth of poly-demonist superstition darkly 
disappears.”30 From this perspective, Tibetan Buddhism is rendered as a bastardization of 
a purer form of Buddhism that has been infiltrated by superstition. This stance reflects 
not only a fear of the unknown Other, but also the Western desire to identify and pin 
down the pure and ‘authentic’ essence of Buddhism, and the consequent frustration at the 
apparent inability to do so.  
 Opposing the view of Tibetan Buddhism as polluted by superstition was that of 
Romantic Orientalists, who viewed Tibet as a land of purity that possessed tremendous 
redemptive power for the spiritually impoverished West. This perspective has since taken 
the forefront of contemporary portrayals of the region. Excluded from the imperializing 
efforts of European nations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Tibet was imagined 
as a sight/site of sealed off spirituality, free from the profane and contaminating 
influences of modernity. This exclusion from imperialism also ensured that Tibet was 
essentially absent from European world history before the Tibetan diaspora in the mid-
twentieth century, further cementing its reputation as a land of alluring mystery. 
Europeans and Americans frustrated with life in the industrialized West thus turned to 
Tibet for guidance and redemption, viewing the high Himalayan region as one of the last 
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living links with civilizations of the distant past and bestowing it with epithets echoing 
with mysticism including “Shangri-La,” “Shambhala,” and “the Forbidden City.”31 
This craving for preserved ancient wisdom is part of the common Romantic 
nostalgia for origins, which highlights Western ambiguity toward the East and reveals the 
implicitly critical aspect of Romantic Orientalist accounts of Tibet. On the one hand, 
Romantic nostalgia reflects the Western desire for a time when things were more ‘simple’ 
and ‘pure.’ Yet this positioning of Tibet as an origin point fixed in the distant past also 
relativizes the West as progressive and quintessentially ‘modern,’ highlighting the 
primitive nature of Tibet in the process.32  
As scholars captivated by the myth of Tibet first began to translate Tibetan texts 
into English and European languages over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries they played upon this ambiguity by attempting to extract the positive 
dimensions of Tibet Buddhism from the backward lands in which it was practiced. 
Western philologists explored Tibet not for the sake of understanding the region’s unique 
form of Buddhism but, rather, to shed light on Indian Buddhism. Their interest was 
guided by the belief that Tibet had functioned as a hermetically sealed container of 
otherwise lost religious wisdom in the wake of Buddhism’s disappearance from India, 
ready to be opened by discerning scholars that could see through the distracting cultural 
practices that obscured the religion’s ‘true essence.’33 In this view, even if Tibet was 
shamefully primitive in relation to the West, Romantic Orientalists imagined that they 
could cast aside its backwardness and distill Tibetan Buddhist doctrines down to their 
most basic forms.  
Madame Helena Petrovna Blavatsky  (1831-1891) capitalized on this ambiguous 
vision of Tibet in the creation of the Theosophical Society in 1875. Founded in New 
York City before moving its headquarters to India in 1882, the Theosophical Society 
declared its mission as, “to diffuse among men a knowledge of the laws inherent in the 
universe; to promulgate the knowledge of the essential unity of all that is, and to 
determine that this unity is fundamental in nature.”34 Blavatsky claimed to have spent 
seven years in Tibet under the tutelage of a secret order of masters called the Great White 
Brotherhood, following which she carried their enlightened teachings back to America to 
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disseminate among fellow spiritual seekers. She referred to this knowledge as “Esoteric 
Buddhism,” which she misleadingly claimed was the form that was practiced in Asia.35  
Blavatsky’s stance was part of the larger trend in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries of valorizing Buddhism as the key to revitalizing spiritually ailing Europe, 
reflected with particular clarity in her claim that Buddhism is “incomparably higher, 
more noble, more philosophical and more scientific than the teachings of any other 
church or religion,”36 By figuring Buddhism as “rational,” “scientific,” and “empirical,” 
European and American scholars and esotericists alike were able to reconcile it with 
modern science and Europe’s humanistic aspirations. In doing so, they created 
‘Western/Modern Buddhism,’ which was the ambiguous sight/site of a system that was 
different enough from Western religion and philosophy as to provide it with the 
necessary tools for renewal, yet similar enough that it was comprehensible and easily 
adopted. 
Of particular importance to the construction of Tibet and Buddhism in the 
Western imagination is the work of W.Y. Evans-Wentz. As a devoted member of the 
Theosophical Society, Evans-Wentz followed Madame Blavatasky in her admiration of 
Tibet and its “Esoteric Buddhism.” His translations of four Tibetan texts (The Tibetan 
Book of the Dead, Tibet’s Great Yogi Milarepa, Tibetan Yoga and Secret Doctrines, and 
The Tibetan Book of Great Liberation) are groundbreaking as the first texts to introduce 
Tibetan Buddhism to the English-speaking public.37 Tibetan Buddhism’s exclusion from 
the realm of comparative religion prior to the diaspora in 1959 ensured that early 
accounts of the religion such as Evans-Wentz’s played a crucial role in the construction 
of the tradition’s popular identity among European and American audiences, as well as in 
establishing methodological and hermeneutical strategies for future inquiry.38 As an 
earlier mediator in the transmission of Buddhism to the West, Evans-Wentz thereby 
assumed an “almost priestly function”39 in his ability to discern the ‘true essence’ of 
Buddhism that its Asian practitioners had either overlooked or perverted, allowing him to 
(re)present Buddhism to the West as he saw fit. 
However, of greater significance to our purpose, was the inclusion of Jung’s 
“Psychological Commentary” in Evans-Wentz’s translation of the Tibetan Book of the 
Dead. The text positions Jung as an essential bridge between Tibetan Buddhism and the 
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West, introducing and beginning to reinforce the trend of psychologizing the religion that 
remains present in broader intellectual portrayals of Tibetan Buddhism up to this day. 
 
Mapping the Mind: Jung’s Analytical Psychology 
As Jung approached Tibetan Buddhism to write his psychological commentaries, 
he already possessed his own well-developed framework of analytical psychology to 
make sense of foreign cultural ideas. Psychoanalytic concepts like the collective 
unconscious, the archetypes, the shadow, and individuation all definitively shaped his 
interpretations of Tibetan Buddhism, leading to the variety of misrepresentations 
criticized by Gomez. 
For Jung, there is a substrate of psychic instincts that, similar to our biological 
instincts, is common to all of humankind, which he labels as the collective unconscious. 
This shared psychological inheritance is populated by archetypes, which are “forms 
without content, representing merely the possibility of a certain type of perception and 
action.”40 Jung conceived the archetypes as general thought patterns without any specific 
substance, manifesting in each of our lives according to the available cultural symbols 
with which they are compatible. For example, the archetype of the Self, which is the 
central archetype to Jung’s analytical psychology and representative of psychological 
wholeness, is evident in the forms of Christ, Khidr (a legendary Muslim saint,)b and the 
Buddha. Although these are separate individuals belonging to disparate religious 
histories, Jung considers them all to be emanations of the archetype that is the Self, all 
refractions of a single light filtered through different cultural lenses.  
Given the presence of innumerable archetypes in the collective unconscious, our 
distinct and conscious identities are therefore incomplete, reflecting a mere fraction of all 
that is contained within the human mind. Socialization to a particular culture largely 
determines which elements of one’s personality are expressed as consciousness. It is only 
by repressing a myriad of Otherized elements in the unconscious that humans can exist as 
observing Subjects with their own unique subjectivities. Jung labels these 
underdeveloped and undifferentiated aspects of one’s personality that society does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  b	  For	  greater	  detail	  on	  Khidr	  as	  a	  historical	  figure,	  refer	  to	  Leaman,	  The	  Qu’ran:	  An	  
Encyclopedia	  (London:	  Taylor	  &	  Francis,	  2006)	  343-­‐345.	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allow them to express as the shadow.41 The shadow consists of those elements that 
society has deemed reprehensible and inferior, as well as those that have simply gone 
unrecognized and have not been given proper expression. While this need to account for 
and embrace one’s own Otherness poses itself as a personal problem, it is also one that is 
shared by all persons, acting as a collective struggle for self-realization.42  
Jung proposed that uncovering the shadow by recognizing and embracing all of 
the archetypes is fundamental to the ultimate goal of psychoanalytic practice and, in his 
view, human existence: to realize one’s true Self through the process of individuation.c 
Through individuation, individuals dispel the illusion that their personalities consist 
exclusively of the elements of which they are conscious (i.e. their ego) and find a 
harmonious balance between the contents of the personal unconscious and those of the 
collective unconscious. Individuation thus constitutes the process by which individuals 
become psychically whole beings.43   
Taken together, these concepts of the collective unconscious, the archetypes, the 
shadow, and individuation form the bedrock of analytical psychology. While Jung’s 
explicit appraisals of Tibetan Buddhism are almost unanimously positive, his 
interpretations of its foreign ideas into strictly Jungian terms places him in a position 
from which the East was forever fixed in his gaze and upon which he had deemed himself 
capable of passing judgment. His sense of awe and reverence towards the East is always 
balanced by an awareness of its instrumentality, treating it as, “a natural resource to be 
extracted and refined for the consumption of the West.”44 By defining and evaluating 
Asian traditions within the normative Western framework of analytical psychology, Jung 
ultimately participates in the same reductionism of cultural content as the more 
consciously imperialist Orientalists. From this position of unjustifiable authorial 
authority, Jung implicitly contributed to establishing a discrepancy between Tibetan 
Buddhism’s place within Tibet and its contemporary portrayals in Europe and North 
America. 
The ways in which Jung helped to produce this gap between Tibetan and Western 
depictions of Tibetan Buddhism are especially apparent in his analyses of The Tibetan 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  c	  Jung	  further	  labels	  individuation	  as	  the	  “transcendent	  function,”	  suggesting	  the	  religious	  leanings	  of	  his	  psychology.	  (Jung,	  1954b,	  489)	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Book of the Dead and mandalas. Focusing on these analyses not only sheds light on 
Jung’s role in developing the psychological dimension of Tibetan Buddhist Modernism, 
but also enables a recovery of some of the meaning of Tibetan Buddhism as it is practiced 
in Tibet from Jung’s interpretations, laying the groundwork for more profitable and less 
intellectually dominating interpretive methods. 	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Chapter Two 
 
Jung & The Tibetan Book of the Dead:  
Producing a Manual of Western Spirituality 
 
My admiration for the great philosophers of the East is as 
genuine as my attitude towards their metaphysics is 
irreverent. I suspect them of being symbolical 
psychologists, to whom no greater wrong could be done to 
take them literally.1 
          -C.G. Jung 
 
 Jung’s “Psychological Commentary on the Tibetan Book of the Dead” serves as a 
highly instructive case of the interpretive methods that he applied to his analyses of 
Tibetan Buddhism. It is a discursive site for unpacking Jung’s blatant acts of 
psychologism that reduce all phenomenological experience to nothing more than human 
psychology. In doing so, Jung distorts the Tibetan Book of the Dead (henceforth 
abbreviated to TBOD) into a form nearly unrecognizable to traditional Tibetan 
interpretations while elevating his own system of analytical psychology over and above 
Tibetan Buddhism, positioning it as the ideal healing practice for European moderns. 
This misrepresenting of the TBOD and shifting away from its traditional interpretations 
did not stop with Jung but, unfortunately, is perpetuated to varying degrees in translations 
and commentaries of the TBOD since Jung’s time until now. 
Although many of the authors considered here, including Jung, claim to analyze 
the Bardo Thos Grol, they are actually working with the Tibetan Book of the Dead as it 
was first redacted by its original translator, the Theosophist W.Y. Evans-Wentz. As such, 
for the remainder of this exploration we will use the term “Bardo Thos Grol/BTG” to 
refer to the text as it is understood and practiced in Tibet, while “The Tibetan Book of the 
Dead/TBOD” refers to the English textual incarnations of the BTG that circulate in 
Europe and North America. 
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The Bardo Thos Grol: A Cosmological Guide to the In-Between Realms 
 The Bardo Thos Grol is a cycle of textsa that are read aloud to deceased Tibetans 
in order to alert them to the various points at which they can achieve enlightenment 
during the intermediate states of consciousness between death and rebirth, referred to as 
the bardo realms. Tibetans should also read these texts over the course of their lives in 
order to familiarize themselves with the stages of the liminal bardos, which are 
partitioned into the Chikhai, Chonyid, and Sidpa bardos. Through a lifetime of 
preparation, the consciousness of the deceased becomes increasingly receptive to hearing 
the teachings of the BTG upon death, heightening the possibility of perceiving the true 
state of reality and achieving liberation. While Jung is strictly concerned with the 
psychological dimension of these texts, the Tibetan texts are deeply associated with 
devotion, Tibetan physiology, cosmology, and soteriology as well. The BTG thus has 
profound significance as a cultural and religious artifact beyond the cache of 
psychological data that it becomes in Jung’s reading. 
Authorship of the texts that constitute the BTG is traditionally attributed to 
Padmasambhava the Lotus Guru, an eighth century sage from India. This Indian mystic is 
said to have traveled to Tibet to spread the dharma where he exorcised the indigenous 
spirits that were hindering the transmission of Buddhism. Padmasambhava also translated 
a number of Pali and Sanskrit texts into Tibetan. Tibetan mythology maintains that, 
throughout his travels in the Himalayan region, Padmasambhava hid a number of 
religious “treasures” (Tibetan: gter-ma/terma) to be uncovered by “treasure seekers” 
(Tibetan: gter-ston/terton) in future ages, producing a tradition of continuing revelation 
within Tibetan Buddhism.2 At the request of the Tibetan king Trhi Songdetsen (742-797), 
Padmasambhava composed the specific texts that would come to be known as the BTG, 
claiming that they contained, “secret instructions on a swift and powerful method for 
liberating oneself in a single lifetime without any effort whatsoever…[and] a teaching so 
effective that it could shut the gates to the lower realms simply by being heard.”3 In 
actuality, the texts’ instructions are somewhat more complicated, requiring practitioners 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  a	  Although	  The	  Tibetan	  Book	  of	  the	  Dead	  is	  commonly	  treated	  as	  a	  distinct	  composition,	  the	  Tibetan	  title	  actually	  refers	  to	  a	  collection	  of	  texts,	  collectively	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Bardo	  Thos	  Grol.	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to have an intimate understanding of their contents in order to reap the greatest benefits 
from observing the textual prescriptions. Nevertheless, simply hearing the texts as one 
passes through the various intermediate realms is said to facilitate an increased awareness 
of the nature of the bardo experiences; hence its title properly reads: Great Liberation 
upon Hearing in the Bardo. Looking into Tibet’s future, Padmasambhava prophesized 
that the region was approaching dark times and that his teachings were destined for 
distortion and misunderstanding. As a result, Padmasambhava condensed his many secret 
teachings into abbreviated scriptures, which he concealed as a treasure on Gampodar 
Mountain in Central Tibet.  
Six hundred years later, Karma Lingpa, a treasure seeking mystic, uncovered a 
number of these textual revelations, which are commonly referred to as the Karling 
Peaceful and Wrathful (Tibetan: Kar-gling zhi-khro). These texts contained esoteric yoga 
practices involving a mandala of Tibetan Buddhist deities and precise instructions for 
funeral liturgical processes, including a detailed description of the deceased’s passage 
from death to rebirth to be read aloud in the presence of the corpse. The Karling Peaceful 
and Wrathful was further subdivided into two primary collections: the Great 
Compassionate One, the Peaceful and Wrathful Lotus and Self-Liberated Wisdom of the 
Peaceful and Wrathful Deities, from which the BTG was derived.4  
In his analysis of the textual history of the TBOD, Bryan Cuevas untangles the 
development of the BTG texts from the mythos of Padmasambhava and his treasure 
seekers by elucidating the specific historical developments involved in their production. 
He explains their creation in the Kongpo region of Eastern Tibet as part of an ancient cult 
of the dead, which institutionalized its rituals in the late fifteenth century. The systematic 
accounts of the bardo realms contained in the texts are considered to derive from the 
firsthand experience of enlightened voyagers who passed through the in-between states 
and preserved the memory so that they may later report their experiences. As Robert 
Thurman notes, while this proposition may seem implausible to our Western minds, 
“Tibetans accept these reports of their psychonauts just as we do those of astronauts who 
report what happened on the moon,”5 suggesting the Tibetan claims are not as outlandish 
as we might initially suspect. 
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As enlightened Tibetan lamas produced these accounts that form the basis of the 
BTG, they were primarily transmitted in direct oral exchange between teachers and 
students, occasionally making their way down to more pious segments of the laity.6 
While tradition proposes that Karma Lingpa uncovered the texts of the BTG in the 
fourteenth century, Cuevas comments that it is far more likely that they were not fully 
redacted and made widely available until the eighteenth century when xylographic 
technology was sufficiently advanced.7 As this technology flourished, it became easier 
for large monastic institutions to gather local manuscripts and compile them into the 
authoritative collection that would come to be known as the BTG. However, Donald 
Lopez notes that, although the BTG only contains a portion of the Karling texts, this 
process of revision and reorganization complicates attempts to identify which parts of the 
BTG text actually derive from the Karling cycle, especially because many of these works 
are no longer extant.8   
 Cuevas further considers twenty-one editions of the Karling cycle that 
encompasses these two collections and has identified three recurring texts that are central 
to the performance of Tibetan funerary rites. Among the large collection of texts that 
Karma Lingpa is said to have uncovered, Evans-Wentz only used three in his compilation 
of the TBOD, none of which has been identified as particularly significant in Tibetan 
funerary rituals. In fact, the three texts that Evans-Wentz chose are not even part of 
Tibetan funerary rites at all, but are actually meditation manuals for advanced Tantric 
practitioners.9 However, Evans-Wentz also had access to a larger collection of 
manuscripts that, although unpublished, informed his translation of the TBOD.10 The 
content of his translation is therefore relatively reflective of the redacted BTG texts as 
they are employed in Tibet even if his Theosophical terminology is not. Nevertheless, 
these developments remained unanalyzed until Cuevas and Lopez’ recent 
reconsiderations of the TBOD, obscuring that what is almost universally treated in 
Europe and America as a distinct and unified text is actually only a small portion of a 
collection of fragmented texts selected by a European scholar who could not even read 
Tibetan and spent but a day on Tibetan soil.11 
This is not to say, however, that the unification and glorification of the text is not 
supported by Tibetan Buddhists themselves. In fact, H.H. The 14th Dalai Lama has 
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claimed that the BTG “is one of the most important books [Tibetan] civilization has 
produced.”12 In order to understand exactly why this is so, we must briefly consider the 
ontological and epistemological premises that underlie Tibetan Buddhism. As with all 
forms of Asian Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhist cosmology posits that all unenlightened 
beings are trapped within an ongoing cycle of birth and death known as samsara 
(Tibetan: khor-ba), consisting of six realms of rebirth: gods, demigods, humans, animals, 
hungry ghosts, and hell beings. This theory of transmigration is not understood 
metaphorically but literally: death of the physical body is not the final end, but merely the 
completion of a single life in the endless play of innumerable existences.  
Our cyclical existence in samsara is characterized by constant craving for sensory 
gratification (Sanskrit: tanha, Tibetan: sred pa), which drives us to think, speak, and act 
in ways that cause us to produce karma. Although Westerners often equate this concept 
to fate or predetermination, karma (Tibetan: las) is actually the universal law of cause 
and effect of physical, verbal, and mental actions, which dictates that all volitional 
actions produce a reaction, either in this lifetime or in one to come.13 However, although 
craving and karma are the apparent causes of samsara, they both ultimately arise from 
ignorance of the true nature of reality as voidnessb (Sanskrit: sunyata, Tibetan: stong-pa 
nyid). This ignorance of ultimate reality induces living beings to falsely believe in the 
existence of an independent self, impelling them to act in ways that produce karma in 
order to satisfy their cravings, thus perpetuating samsaric existence. 
The Buddhist doctrine of voidness posits that, despite what conventional 
appearances might suggest, phenomena do not have any inherent essence that determines 
their true or absolute identity. This voidness characterizes the final and true state of all 
phenomena. As the fundamental reality of all reality, voidness is further equated with the 
dharmakaya, the Truth Body of the Buddha, and is sometimes known in Tibetan 
Buddhism as the Diamond Reality of Clear Light. Not only is this final reality 
characterized by absolute clarity, but it also consists of infinite bliss, beauty, and 
compassion.14 Inherent to all phenomena, including our seemingly independent 
existences, voidness and the dharmakaya allow for the possibility of natural liberation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  b	  Sunyata	  is	  often	  translated	  as	  emptiness	  as	  well.	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from samsara.15 As Padmasambhava is said to explain in the Natural Liberation Through 
Naked Vision:  
To introduce the forceful method to enter this very reality, 
your own awareness right now is just this! It being just this 
uncontrived natural clarity…Why do you say, ‘I don’t see 
the actuality of the mind’? Since the thinker in the mind is 
just it.16 
 
It is only our fundamental ignorance of reality that prevents us from coming to this 
realization of voidness and the dharmakaya, thus causing us to continue to roam through 
samsara.17 
As unenlightened beings travel through the bardo realms, their ignorance prevents 
them from seeing reality as emergent from the voidness of the dharmakaya and they are 
therefore overwhelmed by the appearance of various deities and bardo beings.18 
Although these figures emanate from the voidness of the deceased’s consciousness, 
unenlightened beings do not view them as such and are consequently terrified by the 
apparent reality of their experiences in the bardos.  
This is where the BTG assumes its great significance in Tibetan Buddhism. The 
BTG texts are traditionally read aloud by the spiritual mentor of the deceased to alert the 
latter to the true nature of their experiences in the bardo realms following death.19 The 
text maintains that the consciousness of the deceased achieves a state of 
hypermindfulness in the bardo realms that greatly sharpens its intellect and improves its 
receptivity to the dictated instructions of the BTG.20 Reciting the text in the presence of 
the deceased thus enables their consciousness to receive the teachings and realize the true 
nature of the bardos and thereby eliminate their ignorance and achieve natural liberation 
from samsara. Consequently, the BTG is of great importance to Tibetan Buddhist 
soteriology, serving as a tool to help bring about instantaneous Awakening.   
However, contrary to what the English translation suggests, the BTG is not merely 
intended for the dead, but is of equal, and perhaps even greater, importance for the living. 
While it is possible for consciousness to achieve liberation during this state if it had never 
heard the text before, its chances for liberation are tremendously improved if the 
deceased familiarized himself/herself with it during life. Given that these teachings are 
concerned with life, death, and the possibility for liberation, they are of tremendous 
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consequence and the BTG adamantly expresses the need for continuous study during 
one’s lifetime:  
It is very important during your life to cultivate your mind 
with this Book of Natural Liberation. You should practice 
this! You should read it! You should recite it! You should 
understand it! You should memorize it accurately! You 
should rehearse it three times a day without fail! You should 
become very clear about its words and meaning. You should 
not forget them even if chased by a hundred murders!21 
 
Due to the tremendously powerful pull of past conditioning and ignorance of the 
dharamkaya, bardo experiences can prove highly overwhelming if the deceased is not 
previously accustomed to its many terrifying sights and sounds. Preparation during life is 
therefore essential to reap the maximum benefits of its teachings. Unfortunately, the 
original translation of the title bestowed upon the text by Evans-Wentz obscures this far-
reaching significance of the text by reducing its broad thematic range and practical 
applications to the monolithic function of a mortuary manual. 
 The BTG texts begin with a series of prayers to Amitabha, the Lotus Deities, and 
Padmasambhava, who each represent one of the Three Bodies of Buddhahood (Sanskrit: 
trikaya, Tibetan: sku gsum), followed by a call to make extensive offerings to the Three 
Bodies and the Three Jewels. These prayers and offerings reflect a distinctly devotional 
aspect of the text, a facet that is neglected by Jung and subsumed in his psychologism. 
 Following these opening preparations, the BTG proceeds to describe the 
physiological occurrences that comprise the death processes and their phenomological 
correlates. According to Tibetan physiology, the human body is a psychophysical system 
that consists of a subtle body scheme of channels, winds, and drops that are closely 
related to developments in our consciousness. There are 72,000 channels (Sanskrit: nadis, 
Tibetan: rtsa), although our central axis consists of three main central channels that run 
from the crown of the head down to the coccyx.22 These channels carry our internal 
winds, which are considered to be the vehicle of consciousness and the animators of our 
bodies.  
 These descriptions are not intended as mere metaphors or poetics, but serve as 
specific instructions for the living to act on behalf of the dead. The living must closely 
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monitor the outer breath of the deceased and place the corpse into the proper position on 
its right side, squeezing he blood vessels in the neck to prevent the winds from exiting the 
central channel and obscuring the appearance of one’s own consciousness as the Clear 
Light of Buddhahood.23 These physiological developments are thus inextricably tied to 
the transformation of the deceased’s consciousness and highlight the physical aspect of 
the BTG’s teachings. 
 Just as the breath ceases, consciousness enters the first bardo realm, the Chikhai, 
which is commonly translated as “bardo of the moment of death” and is characterized by 
the Clear Light of voidness.24 However, unless the deceased are already intimately 
familiar with the notion of the Clear Light, it is unlikely that they will recognize it as such 
and will consequently undergo the eight dissolutions, which are the subjective 
experiences accompanying the decomposition of the body’s five constitutive elements: 
earth, water, fire, air, and space.25 
 Following the dissolution of these elements, the deceased enters the Chonyid 
bardo, which is referred to as the “bardo of the experiencing reality” and features 
hallucinations of various mild and fierce deities emerging from the dharmakaya. As 
one’s mind stream travels through the interim realms, booming sounds and disorientingly 
bright lights continually overwhelm and disorient it.26 Giving in to these feelings only 
exacerbates them, driving the deceased to believe more fully in their intrinsic reality and 
perpetuating the cycle of embodied existence. Both the calm and fierce appear as guides 
on the path, urging the deceased to a higher realm of rebirth or complete liberation.27  
 Failure to achieve liberation in the presence of the calm and fierce deities propels 
the deceased’s consciousness into the final bardo realm: the Sidpa bardo. This realm, 
which is often translated as the “bardo of rebirth,” is marked by the appearance of Yama, 
the Lord of Death, as well as visions of one’s past life and potential future lives to come. 
Although not impossible, the Sidpa bardo presents far fewer opportunities to achieve 
liberation and so the text’s concern shifts to helping the deceased direct their rebirth 
toward a favorable realm rather than escaping samsara completely.28 As consciousness is 
propelled through the Sidpa realm, it is drawn towards the dull lights that emanate from 
each of the realms of samsara.29 Ignorance and delusion prevent the deceased from 
recognizing the folly of following these lights, which appear to offer a salvational return 
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to mundane existence. In the common symbolic depiction of samsara of the Tibetan 
Wheel of Life, this misrecognition of samsara as salvific is referred to as contact 
(Sanskrit: phassa, Tibetan: reg pa), which is represented iconographically by a 
copulating couple. It is this contact with the external world via the sense pleasure of 
encountering the couple that one is thrust from the Sidpa bardo back into cyclical 
existence, ending the in-between state and undergoing rebirth.  
  
The Birth of a New Guru: Jung analyzes The Tibetan Book of the Dead 
In his “Psychological Commentary,” Jung recounts that the TBOD was his 
“constant companion” and the provocateur of many stimulating and fundamental 
insights.30 Jung’s sentiment was common and his fascination reflects that of an entire 
generation of Westerners hungering for spiritual wisdom. As Donald Lopez has noted, 
“Along with the Bhagavad Gita and the Tao Te Ching, [The Tibetan Book of the Dead] 
entered the canon of classics of Oriental mysticism for readers once again seeking the 
wisdom of the East.”31 As a text from ‘mystic Tibet,’ the TBOD came to serve as a 
symbol of lofty spiritual knowledge, representing an existential position different from 
that traditionally held by Western readers and, consequently, functioning as a supplement 
to traditionally European (and its Greek antecedent) modes of thought. Following its 
initial publication in 1927, the TBOD therefore served as a huge boon in the Romantic 
Orientalist quest to uncover Eastern knowledge that might help uplift the crushed spirits 
of Europeans.  
Furthermore, the TBOD was the first work to provide a large English-speaking 
audience with a sustained elaboration of the Buddhist doctrine of transmigration.32 As 
one of Buddhism’s fundamental and more thought-provoking axioms, this elaboration of 
reincarnation attracted large European and American audiences, captivating not only 
individuals hoping to learn more about the world beyond the West, but anyone at all 
seeking to quell their fears of death. Separated from its cultural roots in Tibet, the TBOD 
therefore played a central role in mediating Westerners awareness and understanding of 
Buddhism in the mid-twentieth century.  
 Far from being a mere admirer of the text, Jung was one of the TBOD’s primary 
mediators as it was introduced to English-speaking audiences in Europe and America. 
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Although Evans-Wentz’s translation was first published in 1927, the revised 1957 edition 
included additional commentaries and is still in use today.33 This edition contains a new 
preface from Evans-Wentz, another introductory foreword by Lama Anagarika Govinda, 
and, most significantly for us, Jung’s “Psychological Commentary.”c  
 The “Psychological Commentary” must be read keeping in mind that Jung was 
working with a version of the text that had been translated and filtered through the lens of 
Evans-Wentz’s Theosophical background, which encouraged a “highly verbal and 
intellectual style,”34 as well as imbuing it with many Theosophical ontological premises.d 
Evans-Wentz’s Theosophical leanings come across particularly strongly in his 
interpretation of karma and reincarnation, which he understands as a progressive process 
in which individual souls, or monads, are continually reincarnated until they achieve 
enlightened consciousness. 35In this view, souls may reincarnate as higher forms, but 
never in a lower one, marking a clear deviation from the Buddhist perspectives on karma 
and transmigration.  
 Evans-Wentz, however, attempts to disguise this imposition of Theosophy onto 
the TBOD by claiming that his translated text derived from the teachings of his Tibetan 
guru, Lama Kazi Dawa-Samdup.36 This deferral to Tibetan lineage allows Evans-Wentz 
to form an identity between the BTG and the TBOD. By citing an actual Tibetan voice as 
the source of his translation, Evans-Wentz validates his interpretive efforts and effaces 
his interpretive liberties as condoned by the Buddhist tradition. 
 In addition to Evans-Wentz’s modifications to the text, Jung was also influenced 
by Sir John Woodroffe’s foreword that was included in the first publication of the TBOD 
in 1927. Woodroffe emphasizes the parallels between Hindu Tantrism, his own area of 
expertise, and the contents of the TBOD. By engaging in these cross-cultural 
comparisons, Woodroffe helped to lay the foundation for Jung’s own method of 
amalgamating a number of different religious traditions. Woodroffe also referred to 
Evans-Wentz’s guru as the source of the BTG’s supposed English translation and placed 	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  Jung	  actually	  wrote	  his	  “Psychological	  Commentary”	  in	  1935,	  but	  it	  remained	  untranslated	  from	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  until	  the	  1957	  edition	  of	  The	  Tibetan	  Book	  of	  the	  Dead.	  (Lopez,	  1998,	  48)	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  For	  greater	  detail	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  this	  initial	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  see	  Lopez,	  The	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Dead:	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  Biography	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	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tremendous emphasis on its Tibetan origin,37 thus allaying any doubt as to the 
authenticity of Evans-Wentz’s translation.  
 Consequently, although Jung continually refers to his commentary as an 
interpretation of the BTG by employing the Tibetan title, he is really already working 
with the TBOD instead. Nevertheless, while Jung was interpreting a text that had already 
been fundamentally altered through a selective compilation and Theosophical 
domestication for an English-speaking audience, he also took liberties to introduce his 
own modifications of the TBOD’s contents. 
At the time of the revised text’s publication, Jung was the first to approach the 
TBOD on strictly psychological terms, provoking a great deal of interest from academic 
and non-academics intellectual communities alike. Sonu Shamdasani (1962-present), a 
historian of psychology, has suggested that Jung’s commentary was a significant factor in 
the book’s overall popularity. Shamdasani refers to Evans-Wentz’s comments that,  
Dr. Jung’s contribution has a unique value; it shows the 
advanced scientific attitude of Europe’s foremost 
psychologist and suggests how in future ages the sages of 
the Occident and those of the Orient will grasp each other’s 
hand in mutual understanding and respect.38  
 
Additionally, although this edition was published over fifty years ago, Evans-Wentz’s 
translation and its successive generations of commentaries are still the most common 
point of reference for scholarly work on the BTG.39 In other words, Jung’s commentary, 
published in this translation, remains central to contemporary Western conceptions of the 
text. As Bryan Cuevas succinctly comments, “His psychological approach would come to 
have an enormous impact on all future interpretations of the Tibetan texts,”40 a reference 
to Jung’s centrality to Western conceptions of the TBOD and Tibetan Buddhism in 
general.  
With the psychologist’s help, the TBOD has thus become a book that is “not 
really Tibetan, it is not really a book, and it is not really about death.”41 As an early 
mediator of Buddhism’s transmission to the West, Jung was able to project his own 
system of understanding onto the TBOD, creating a distinctly psychologized simulacrum 
of it. This text, which has become integrally woven into European views of Tibetan 
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Buddhism, is thus far more reflective of Jung than of the tradition that he claims to 
represent.  
  
Psychologism in the Bardos: Jung Travels Through the In-Between Realms 
 As a European with no prior background in Tibetan Buddhism, Jung’s 
engagements with the TBOD and his distortions of its contents are hardly more admirable 
than those of Evans-Wentz. While Jung claims that his psychological interpretation is 
intended to domesticate the complex ideas of the TBOD for European and American 
audiences, his actual writings reveal a far different goal. As he transforms Tibetan 
Buddhist concepts into those of analytical psychology, he simultaneously denigrates the 
Tibetan ideas as confusing and dangerous to Europeans and uplifts his own system as 
more accessible and therefore of greater potential benefit. By setting the TBOD as an 
ambiguous marker of comparison that is similar yet inferior to analytical psychology, 
Jung promotes his own thought system as a preferable theoretical framework, revealing 
his disguised agenda of positioning analytical psychology as superior to religion or, if 
you will, as a religion after religion. In doing so, he absolutely psychologizes the contents 
of the TBOD by reducing the physiological, the cosmological, and the religious to 
nothing more than human psychology. 
 Jung opens his “Psychological Commentary” with a statement of intent, 
announcing his goal of “[making] the magnificent world of ideas and the problems 
contained in this treatise a little more intelligible to the Western mind.”42 This claim 
neatly fits alongside the general interest of Romantic Orientalists in exposing Europeans 
to different modes of human existence to supplement their materialism and relieve their 
spiritual ennui. To a certain extent, we might find this ambition praiseworthy insofar as it 
demonstrates an intense compassion for his European audiences that inspires him to 
enlighten them to a more satisfying form of existence. 
 However, Jung’s superficially laudable project is complicated by the ambiguity 
that undergirds all Orientalist attempts to make sense of and transmit knowledge of their 
Asian subjects of inquiry. On the one hand, Jung clearly believes that the TBOD contains 
important knowledge, knowledge that, “because of  [its] deep humanity and [its] still 
deeper insight into the secrets of the human psyche, make an especial appeal to the 
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layman who is seeking to broaden his knowledge of life.”43 This attitude reflects the 
Romantic Orientalist belief that the East holds essential wisdom that has been lost in the 
West’s dedication to materialism but is nevertheless salvageable. Although this 
represents a positive valorization of the Orient, it also demonstrates Jung’s will to power, 
mastery, and knowledge, testifying to “the Faustian obsession of Western man with the 
project of fixing the Orient in his gaze, with deciphering its secrets, possessing its riches, 
and making it yield its meaning.”44 
 Jung approaches Tibetan Buddhism not because he has any desire to learn about 
the religion or the culture as they exist in practice, but because he believes they have the 
potential to be useful to his Western audience and to his own aims of solidifying the 
theoretical foundation of analytical psychology. Through the relationship he posits 
between Tibetan Buddhism and Western thought, Jung makes possible the Western ideal 
of psychological wholeness and unity. The objective is not to accurately understand the 
Other, but to catalyze the emergence of an empowered observing Western Subject 
through its encounter with the Eastern Other. Speaking on such desires, bell hooks has 
stated that,  
The lure is a combination of pleasure and danger. In the 
cultural marketplace the Other is coded as having the 
capacity to be more alive, as holding the secret that will 
allow those who venture and dare to break with the cultural 
anhedonia and experience sensual and spiritual renewal.45  
 
Not only does this statement reflect the ambiguity that exists in every encounter with the 
Other, but also reveals the projection that occurs in these interactions. Rather than 
viewing the Tibetan Other as a legitimate Subject with its own cultural, intellectual, and 
social histories, Jung transforms it into a blank slate upon which he can project his hopes 
for spiritual transformation and psychic wholeness. Even when Jung praises the TBOD, 
his admiration is not of the text as an artifact of Tibetan culture but for what it can 
become in his hands. 
 Qualifying Jung’s positive evaluation of Oriental religious knowledge is his 
characterization of that same knowledge as potentially dangerous and threatening to his 
audience. Although, for Jung, the ideas contained in the TBOD contain tremendous 
potential for Europeans’ personal development, one must also exercise extreme caution 
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when working with them: “These things really are dangerous and ought not to be 
meddled with in our typically Western way. It is a meddling with fate, which strikes at 
the very roots of human existence…”46 By Jung’s estimation, Westerners cannot simply 
adopt the practices described in the TBOD. He must first domesticate these ideas so that 
Westerners can approach them to reap the greatest possible rewards with minimal risk.  
 By portraying the TBOD as a source of tremendous insight that must nevertheless 
be filtered into terms acceptable to European consciousness, Jung subsumes the 
representation of Tibetan Buddhism as an Eastern Other into a reconfirmation and 
expansion of Western subjectivity. He first praises the Tibetan text for its redemptive 
potential in a typically Romantic Orientalist move, noting that Westerners could use it to 
expand their knowledge of themselves and of life. He then immediately undercuts the 
legitimacy of the Tibetan system as dangerous and as requiring domestication, calling its 
validity into question. Furthermore, his claims regarding the necessity of such a 
reconfiguration implicitly stress the strangeness of the Tibetan Buddhists who produced 
the text and their fundamental difference from individuals in the West.47 His point, in 
short, is that Westerners could benefit from the Tibetan knowledge but a mediator is 
required in order to safely assimilate it into Western consciousness. As a European man 
with the theoretical framework of analytical psychology and (self-proclaimed) experience 
with the TBOD, Jung thereby elevates himself to the position of a trustworthy authority 
who will guide the reader into the unknown realm of Tibetan Buddhism.  
From this vantage point, Jung’s writings express a hyperawareness of the 
ontological premises that, for him, govern the relationship between Western and Eastern 
conceptions of reality. In his discussion of the TBOD’s “essential metaphysical 
premises,” Jung explores Tibetan Buddhists’ capacity to maintain the ambiguity of ‘both-
and’ statements, as opposed to the Western demand for the clear-cut clarity of ‘either-
or.’48 Although drawing this distinction between Europe and Asia on the grounds of an 
“East-West” dichotomy falls into the Orientalist trap of generalizing, Jung’s statement 
does, in fact, reflect a truth of the BTG: cosmological, physiological, metaphysical, and 
psychological truths are all maintained in balance.  
Unfortunately, although Jung points out this discrepancy between European and 
Asian ontological frameworks, he nevertheless falls prey to the Western commitment to 
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dualism and looks upon the text with a domineering gaze through a distinctly European 
ontological lens. . Only a paragraph after condemning the “niggardly European ‘either-
or’,”49 Jung issues the proclamation that, “the Bardo Thodol is in the highest degree 
psychological in its outlook” and that, “metaphysical assertions…are statements of the 
psyche, and are therefore psychological.”50 Without even realizing it, Jung commits the 
very same interpretive fallacy that he claims to view as so egregious. Unable to maintain 
the ambiguity of the TBOD’s assertions as being both metaphysical and psychological, he 
reduces them solely to the latter. 
 Jung justifies his psychological approach on the grounds that the TBOD is of 
particular interest because it expresses an outpouring of the unconscious mind. He asserts 
that, “it is an undeniable fact that the whole book is created out of the archetypal contents 
of the unconscious. Behind these there lie--and in this our Western reason is quite right--
no physical or metaphysical realities, but ‘merely’ the reality of psychic facts, the data of 
psychic experience.”51 In one swift stroke of psychologism, Jung paints an ontological 
picture that reduces metaphysics and cosmology to nothing more than psychology. 
Having done so, Jung is able to transform the TBOD into a carrier of psychic data, which 
he uses in service of supporting the legitimacy of his own ideas. The text becomes 
dehistoricized and decultured, no longer representing the product of Tibetan religion and 
culture but instead serving as a complex cipher that can be decoded to unveil fundamental 
psychological truths about humankind.  
 While the BTG certainly contains elements are distinctly psychological, its 
cosmological and physiological premises are equally prominent, a fact to which Jung 
does not do justice in his psychologizing reductionism. Jung’s treatment of the text as a 
manifestation of the contents of the human unconscious neglects the Tibetan stance that 
the events described in the TBOD reflect occurrences that have real cosmological 
significance for the fate of the deceased’s consciousness. His mystification of the text as 
an outpouring of the unconscious undermines the credibility of the Tibetan lamas that 
produced it and removes the attribution of intentionality of the putative knowers, as well 
as the significance of their intellectual and spiritual labors. 
 Having expunged the text of its non-psychological dimensions, Jung is able to 
form the fundamental identity between Buddhist ontology and analytical psychology that 
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is the bedrock of all his other analogies: the dharmakaya (Truth Body of the Buddha and 
the foundation of reality) is nothing more than the collective unconscious. Jung 
correctly52 understands the goal of the BTG as bringing the deceased to realization of the 
dharmakaya as the fundamental nature of their own mind.53 His view of the collective 
unconscious as the underlying matrix of all phenomological experience that sentient 
beings must recognize in order to achieve a higher state of consciousness54 appears 
extraordinarily similar to the dharmakaya’s function in Tibetan Buddhisme and thereby 
enables him to form an identity between the two concepts.  
 However, while this equation may stand up to superficial scrutiny, closer analysis 
reveals a number of discrepancies between descriptions of the dharmakaya and the 
collective unconscious. To begin with, the dharmakaya is believed to be the fundamental 
reality of all phenomena55, not merely the basis of human consciousness as the collective 
unconscious is described. Furthermore, the dharmakaya is clear voidness free of any 
intrinsic permanent existence and is thus infinite potentiality flooded with bliss and 
compassion56: as nothingness itself, the dharmakaya is simultaneously everything. It is 
“your own conscious awareness, unceasing, bright, distinct, and vibrant…Just this 
presence of the indivisibility of your awareness’s naturally insubstantial voidness and the 
vibrant bright presence of your conscious awareness.”57 While the nature of the 
dharmakaya presents an obviously cognitive aspect to one’s passage through the bardo 
realms, the characterization of this mental facet is distinctly different from Jung’s 
proposition. 
 The collective unconscious is not defined by voidness, but, on the contrary, is 
populated with a variety of particular thought and emotional patterns in the form of 
archetypes. While the specific content of the archetypes can never be satisfactorily 
pinned down, they nevertheless are “eternally inherited forms and ideas” that are “the 
original structural components of the psyche.”58 Far from the indiscriminate awareness of 
the dharmakaya, the collective unconscious has particular forms that determine the fabric 
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of our phenomological experiences. Thus, while Jung may seek to equate these two 
concepts, they are fundamentally different almost to the point of direct opposition. 
 However, by establishing this identity and imposing it upon his readers, Jung 
authorizes his psychologizing aims and definitively declares that the experiences of the 
deceased are nothing more than projections of the unconscious mind. In this rendering, 
the BTG’s “five Dhyani Buddhas are themselves no more than psychic data…[and ] the 
world of gods and spirits is truly ‘nothing but’ the collective unconscious inside me.”59 
Beyond this point, Jung does not clarify what the significance of the Buddhas is, or for 
what reason they appear; he merely notes that they are archetypes. For his purposes, that 
is all Jung is obligated to do. Through his claims, he demonstrates that the archetypal 
contents that he found present in himself and his European analysandsf are also evident in 
the minds of Tibetans far removed from Western civilization. Yet by doing so, Jung 
completely obscures the importance of the figures that arise from the mind of the 
deceased, content with simply labeling them as archetypes and moving on with his 
analysis. He describes the appearance of Amoghasiddhi, Amitabha, Ratnasambhava, 
Vajrasattva; their accompanying colors; and their mandala-like arrangement. But his 
commentary on them is purely descriptive, absent of any further elaboration,60 which 
denies the significance that lies behind these Buddhas and bodhisattvas in Tibetan 
Buddhism. 
 In fact, according to the BTG, each of these figures appears at a particular time 
and for a specific reason. They are not archetypes that spontaneously arise from the 
unconscious mind, but figures that are intended to redirect the attention of the deceased 
toward the ever-present possibility for liberation in the bardos. Furthermore, each of the 
five Dhyani Buddhas that appears possesses qualities that align with the elements and 
processes of the mundane universe.61 By drawing parallels between the seemingly 
supranormal experiences of the bardo realms and those of daily life, the mind stream of 
the deceased is directed toward the possibility for transmuting ordinary experience into 
enlightened existence. Similarly, the arrangement of the deities in a mandala invokes 
Buddhist cosmology as a set of Pure Lands, with one in the center and one in each of the 
four directions.62 Each of the peripheral Pure Lands and its accompanying Buddha is also 	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associated with a particular form of enlightened wisdom,63 further contributing to the 
dense web of associations between cosmological, physiological, and philosophical 
concepts. By continually building upon this network of associations, there is an increased 
possibility that any one of the experiences of the deceased will be that essential moment 
at which they apprehend the reality of voidness and the dharmakaya.  
 Jung fabricates yet another connection between the contents of the TBOD and 
analytical psychology by likening the deceased’s journey through the bardos to the 
Jungian concept of individuation. In order to draw this comparison, Jung suggests that his 
European audience read the TBOD backwards.64 Drawing from the common Orientalist 
epistemological premise of duality between the ‘East’ and the ‘West,’ Jung estimates that 
the psychology of Westerners, which is characterized by its “thoroughly intellectualistic 
and rationalistic worldly-mindedness,”65 and “love of clarity and unambiguity,”66 must 
deal with the text on different terms than it was produced. He adopts the Orientalist 
assumption that Orientals are more inwardly focused and comfortable with ambiguity, as 
evidenced by their “magnificently affirmative ‘both-and’”67 statements, suggesting that 
their dominant psychological predispositions are the exact opposite of those of his 
audience. Thus, their ideas require a literal inversion if Europeans are to glean anything 
of value from them.  
 This inversion conveniently transforms the Tibetan Buddhist guide to the 
processes of death and rebirth into a European description of individuation. This 
transformation uses the rhetorical invocation of sameness-difference as a way of 
furthering Jung’s own aims. By noting the similarity between the text’s ideas and those of 
analytical psychology he gathers support for individuation, only to immediately draw 
attention to the literal backwardness of Tibetan Buddhism. These complementary moves 
allow Jung to invoke the simultaneous wisdom and strangeness of the religion, thus 
reconfirming his own system of thought as superior. 
 In accordance with Jung’s inversion of the text, he begins his close reading with 
the Sidpa bardo, which is the final stage of the BTG. Jung relates this realm to Freud’s 
psychoanalytic findings regarding sexual fantasies, the omnipresence of the Oedipus 
complex, and neuroticism.68 As the final state of bardo existence in which one finally 
returns to one of the six realms of being and experiences rebirth, the Sidpa bardo consists 
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of coming upon a copulating couple, at which point the Oedipus complex comes into 
play. According to Jung, “If [the dead man’s] karma destines him to be reborn as a man, 
he will fall in love with his mother-to-be and will find his father hateful and 
disgusting.”69 Putting aside for a moment Jung’s particular interpretation of karma, his 
understanding actually reflects the Tibetan belief that the consciousness of the deceased 
will be attracted to the copulating partner that is the opposite gender of its future rebirth.70  
 However, far from being a realm dominated by feelings of sexuality as Jung’s 
Freudian reading proposes, the Sidpa bardo is concerned with mitigating the 
overwhelming desire for existence. While this craving may be related to sexual 
excitement, it ultimately encompasses many more deeply seated feelings of desire. This is 
not strictly a matter of contending with sexual desire, as Jung suggests, but of eliminating 
feelings of craving altogether. However, Jung’s strictly psychoanalytic interpretation robs 
the Sidpa Bardo of this nuance.  
 Furthermore, Jung’s treatment of the encounter with a copulating couple as a 
manifestation of the Oedipus complex denies any biological component to the 
experience, considering it as nothing more than a representation the surfacing of deep-
seated psychological desires.71 Following Freud, Jung’s reference to the Oedipus 
complex draws from Greek mythology, implicitly suggesting that the contents of the 
TBOD are as mythological as the tale of Oedipus and are therefore strictly metaphorical. 
However, the Tibetan Buddhist tradition views this as a very real encounter with the 
actual beings that will be one’s parents following rebirth. As the consciousness of the 
deceased comes upon the couple, it is filled with love for its future mother and hate for its 
father. Far from being a mere metaphor for psychological processes as Jung suggests, this 
encounter is a reminder of the biological elements of craving and aversion, as well as the 
dangerous potential of these strong emotions to thrust consciousness back into samsaric 
existence. 
 Following his consideration of the Sidpa bardo, Jung moves on to an 
interpretation of the Chonyid bardo. He notes that Freud was deterred from exploration 
beyond the Sidpa bardo due to his “fear of metaphysics.”72 However, if Jung’s previous 
mentor and colleague had been willing to cast off the materialism that plagues the West 
and penetrate further he would have found that, “the transition, then, from the Sidpa state 
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to the Chonyid state is a dangerous reversal of the aims and intentions of the conscious 
mind. It is a sacrifice of the ego’s stability and a surrender to the extreme uncertainty of 
what must seem like a chaotic riot of phantasmal forms.”73 Jung relates this experience to 
the chaos of diving into the undifferentiated collective unconscious, in which estranged 
elements of one’s mind burst forth as powerful and destructive forces, and he 
consequently describes it in language that explicitly parallels his own notions of 
individuation.74 His analogy of the theories of analytical psychology to those present in 
the TBOD not only serves his agenda of promoting analytical psychology over Tibetan 
Buddhism, but of establishing it as superior to Freudian psychoanalysis as well. By 
praising the wisdom of the TBOD as part of a larger critique of Freud, Jung elevates 
analytical psychology above other forms of psychoanalysis due to its Romantic 
willingness to seriously engage with non-Western metaphysical propositions. 
 Jung attempts to strengthen the connections between analytical psychology and 
Eastern thought through his interpretation of the concept of karma. Given that the 
Chonyid bardo is commonly translated as a state of “karmic illusion,”75 Jung is obliged to 
offer an explanation of karma to his Western readers that might be unfamiliar with the 
topic: “According to the Eastern view, karma implies a sort of psychic theory of heredity 
based on the hypothesis of reincarnation.”76 This interpretation of karma is simply 
incorrect, scarcely reflecting the Tibetan view of this cosmological law.  
 Jung, however, presses onward and engages in a series of sleights of hand in 
which he equates the existence of inherited psychic factors to universal dispositions of 
the mind, Plato’s theory of forms, and, finally, to the Jungian concept of archetypes.77 
Upon establishing this identity, Jung then abandons any discussion of the TBOD in order 
to flesh out his theories of the archetypes. He relates the appearance of a deity-filled 
mandala in the Chonyid bardo to the presence of archetypal forms in dreams and waking 
fantasy. Given his understanding of karma as psychic heredity and the archetypes as 
psychic instincts ingrained into humankind over the course of generations, Jung’s 
analogy neatly comes together. Having equated the appearance of Buddhas and 
bodhisattvas to archetypes, Jung denies them any sense of metaphysical reality or 
devotional legitimacy by painting them as nothing more than reflections of one’s 
unconscious mind. Completing this reduction and misrepresentation of the BTG’s 
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description of the Chonyid bardo, Jung decidedly states that, “The Chonyid state is 
equivalent to a deliberately induced psychosis.”78 In one decisive stroke, Jung dismisses 
the truth claims of the Bardo Thodol by assimilating them into his own psychological 
system, transforming the spiritual experiences of Tibetan mystics to little more than self-
inflicted insanity. In light of the apparent abnormality of the TBOD’s claims and 
methods, analytical psychology is thus further advanced as a superior healing practice. 
 One further concern regarding Jung’s interpretation of the Chonyid bardo is his 
insistence on the impossibility of resisting the karmic winds that propel the deceased’s 
consciousness through the bardos.79 While the BTG maintains that past karma has 
strongly conditioned one’s consciousness and deluded it into striving toward rebirth,80 it 
also recognizes the possibility for agency and directed intention. In fact, the text points 
out a number of different methods that the deceased can employ in the Chonyid bardo to 
subvert the propulsion of the karmic winds and enable either liberation or directed 
rebirth, such as focusing on the compassion of the Buddhas, releasing attachment to one’s 
previous life, blocking the door to the womb, or choosing to be reborn in a higher 
realm.81 Recognizing neither these crucial opportunities nor the essential roles of agency 
and intention during this stage, Jung continues to misunderstand the TBOD as speaking 
metaphorically when it is describing events of real cosmological import.  
 Finally, we must consider Jung’s interpretation of the Chikhai bardo. It seems, 
however, that Jung could find little in this particular state to relate to his own theorizing, 
curtly concluding his interpretative summary of the three bardo realms, “Thus (reading 
backwards) the Chikhai state, which appeared at the moment of death, is reached.”82 At 
the point at which the text exhausts any possibility for instrumental application, Jung has 
nothing more to say.  
 However, Jung does note that this final stage marks the point at which “the soul” 
of the deceased is “restored to the divinity it lost at birth.”83 While Jung’s ambiguous 
usage of the terms “soul” and “divinity” make it exceedingly difficult to parse through 
the origins of this idea, it is clear that the meaning Jung associates with these terms is not 
the same as their usage in the BTG. Even if we are generous with our interpretation of 
Jung’s use of the term “soul” and assume that he is speaking of consciousness rather than 
of the immutable human essence suggested by Christianity, Tibetan Buddhism does not 
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propose that our minds are stripped of their “divinity” through rebirth and embodiment. It 
is not a matter of recovering something that is lost, but of realizing the full potential of 
one’s Buddha-nature by eliminating ignorance.  
 This misguided assumption that Jung makes about the goal of the TBOD is only 
one of his numerous points of confusion regarding the purpose of the text. Jung initially 
asserts that the purpose of the text is to serve as a guide for the deceased through the 
bardo realms84 and to “enlighten the dead on their journey.”85 While this claim seems to 
be in line with the goal that the BTG expresses, it quickly becomes clear that Jung does 
not mean “enlighten” in the sense of nirvana, but as a synonym for “inform.” In the 
closing pages of his Commentary, he claims that, “life in the Bardo brings no eternal 
rewards or punishments, but merely a descent into a new life which shall bear the 
individual nearer to his final goal.”86 This indicates that Jung clearly does not view 
nirvana as a legitimate possibility in the bardos but that the deceased must content 
themselves with attempts to redirect rebirth, after which they may then pursue liberation. 
 However, it seems that Jung does not actually take claims of directed rebirth or 
nirvana seriously either. He reflects that, “This cult of the dead is rationally based on the 
belief in the supratemporality of the soul, but its irrational basis is to be found in the 
psychological need of he living to do something for the departed.”87 Rendered as such, 
the TBOD is no longer about the dead, but about the living. Yet this is not a text for the 
living as Tibetans propose, but, in Jung’s reading, serves a purpose similar to that of 
death ceremonies held in other cultures by helping the living feel as if they are doing 
something of substance for the dead. His belittling proposal therefore suggests that the 
TBOD is nothing more than an aid to manage grief. 
 To soften the blow, Jung concedes that the text is “unexpectedly original,”88 but is 
only barely willing to entertain the idea that there is any truth to its contents. As an 
afterthought to his actual analysis, Jung suggests that, “every serious-minded reader must 
ask himself whether these wise old lamas might not, after all, have caught a glimpse of 
the fourth dimension and twitched the veil form the greatest of life’s secrets.”89 Jung’s 
skepticism of the TBOD’s potential to actually describe the stages of the death process 
thus further justifies his psychological reading as the most reasonable interpretive lens for 
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the text. Successfully rendering the strange Eastern Other in familiar terms and capturing 
its true inner meaning, analytical psychology once again emerges as the superior system. 
 Completing this implicit comparison that runs throughout the rest of his analysis, 
Jung closes his reading by posing an analogy between the significance of the TBOD and 
his own system of analytical psychology. He refers to the BTG as an “initiation process” 
for the consciousness of the deceased, the goal of which is “preparation for a descent into 
physical being.”90 He views this initiation process as essential to the conditioning and 
development of human consciousness. Yet, having already warned his readers of the 
dangers of adopting this Tibetan initiation practice,91 Jung seems to leave his European 
audience at a loss for any applicable techniques that could help them achieve 
psychological health. 
 Fortunately, he has a solution: “The only ‘initiation process’ that is still alive and 
practiced today in the West is the analysis of the unconscious as used by doctors for 
therapeutic purposes,”92 i.e. Jungian analytical psychology. This is the final move that 
cements not only the importance and validity of Jung’s metapsychology, but its necessity 
and superiority to Tibetan Buddhism. Jung thus vindicates his reading of the text, 
confirming for his readers that analytical psychology closely parallels the TBOD but, as a 
system native to the West, possesses none of the danger of adopting practices of the 
Eastern Other and is therefore the most promising path to redemption for Westerners. 
 Although Jung may have spent the better part of his analysis justifying his own 
interpretive approach, his psychologism clearly violates the limits of his authorial 
authority through its reductionism of the TBOD’s teachings. Even though he 
Romantically valorizes the text for its capacity to uplift the consciousnesses of his 
audience, Jung’s gaze to the East remains dominating, impoverishing his Tibetan object 
of study by denying its voice. This was not merely a single unfortunate incident but, 
rather, an act of an enduring misplaced emphasis that has impacted conceptions of the 
TBOD up to this day.  
 
The Tibetan Book of the Dead After Jung: A Guide to Western Spirituality 
 While Jung’s psychological reading accurately captures certain elements of the 
text, his is merely one lens among many others, an insight that seems to have been lost on 
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many subsequent interpreters of the TBOD. Although Jung’s voice does not resonate in 
all future interpretive endeavors,g several translations of the text echo both his specific 
terminology and his methodology for their interpretive liberties. Running alongside the 
other two dominant threads of interpretation, the scientific and the humanistic,93 the 
psychologizing trend instigated by Jung is apparent throughout many attempts to interpret 
the text following his initial production of a psychological commentary. The 
psychologist’s voice echoes in subsequent interpretations by Timothy Leary and his 
peers, Francesca Fremantle and Chogyam Trungpa, and even the renowned Buddhologist 
Robert Thurman. 
 Perhaps the most blatantly misguided of the successors to Jung is the 
interpretation offered by Timothy Leary (1920-1996), Ralph Metzner (1936-present), and 
Richard Alpert (later to become Baba Ram Dass) (1931-present), entitled The 
Psychedelic Experience: A Manuel Based on the Tibetan Book of the Dead.94 Taking 
their cue from Aldous Huxley’s LSD-inspired musings on the use of TBOD as analogous 
to the work of psychiatrists,95 Leary and his co-authors treat the text as a guide for 
navigating reality-altering experiences in general. Their interpretation has no relation to 
the Tibetan BTG whatsoever beyond offering cursory descriptions of each of the bardos, 
but, rather, following Jung, treats the text as a window into an initiation process, and a 
dissassociative psychedelic experience at that. The Psychadelic Experience is not about 
Tibetan Buddhist religious experience at all, but instead concerns the phenomenology of 
consuming mind-altering substances clothed in spiritualistic language. 
 As the title suggests, this 1964 interpretation of the text offers a guide to the use 
of hallucinogenic drugs in which the three bardo realms are transposed upon the various 
stages of a psychedelic experience. The authors open their book with tributes to Huxley, 
Evans-Wentz, Lama Govinda, and Jung, who all espoused a strongly psychological view 
of the TBOD and were forerunners to Leary and his colleague’s project. Their tribute to 
Jung is extensive and replete with quotations from the “Psychological Commentary” that 
are multiple paragraphs long, citing his ideas on the significance of mandalas, deities, and 	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  HarperCollins,	  2002)	  admirably	  abstains	  entirely	  from	  employing	  psychologized	  language.	  
	   50	  
the overall purpose of the text. Although Leary believes that Jung was too caught up in 
the European mindset (as if Leary was not equally vulnerable to his biases as an 
American), his praise is ultimately quite high. 
 While Leary may not have adopted Jung’s psychologism completely, favoring 
more psychedelic terminology instead, his method of deciphering the text is nearly 
identical to that of Jung. Leary briefly acknowledges the specific contents of the TBOD 
as the exoteric meaning of the text, before dismissing them in favor of his own esoteric 
interpretation. He notes that the bardos are considered as the realms in-between death and 
rebirth of the physical body, but claims that it is actually the ego that undergoes death and 
rebirth, not the body.96 This explanation aligns with Jung’s own interpretation of the text 
as a commentary on individuation, rather than death, and also conveniently aligns it with 
the experiences of a hallucinogenic acid trip. 
 Needless to say, this interpretation of the text finds little support in the BTG itself. 
In fact, the authors’ liberties with the original text are so great that they neglect to include 
any direct translation of either the BTG or the TBOD, instead producing a work that is 
nothing but commentary. This particular incarnation thus marks a point at which the 
TBOD completely abandons its textual grounding and enters the popular imagination, 
resulting in a complete distortion of the original Tibetan text. Although their work does 
not claim to be an authentic translation of the BTG, the authors’ decision to frame their 
project within the framework of the TBOD demonstrates the interpretive possibilities that 
Jung opened up through his initial psychological commentary. 
 However, even when interpretations return to an actual translation of the BTG, 
psychologism remains pervasive, as can be seen in the second English translation of the 
text. Published in 1975 by Francesca Fremantle and Chogyam Trungpa (1939-1987), an 
influential incarnate Tibetan lama, this edition of the TBOD, appended with its proper 
title (The Great Liberation Through Hearing in the Bardo),97 continues to render the 
text’s concepts in highly psychological terms. This approach is even more explicit than in 
Jung’s own commentary, replete with statements such as, “it is noticeable that several of 
the words which best express the teachings of Buddhism are part of the language of 
contemporary psychology, for the attributes of certain schools of Western psychology 
often come closer to Buddhism than do those of Western philosophy or religion.”98 While 
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Jung at least attempted to mitigate his blatant psychologism by continually referencing 
the contents of the Tibetan text, Fremantle appears far more comfortable eschewing 
subtlety and drawing the direction connection between “certain schools of Western 
psychology”99 and Buddhism. 
 In his analysis of Fremantle and Trungpa’s text, Donald Lopez has traced this 
reductive psychologization of the concepts of the TBOD.100 He notes that Tibetan texts on 
the dying process have traditionally described the early stages in which the elements that 
constitute an individual’s physical body dissipate as one enters the bardo state. Trungpa’s 
interpretation, however, refigures the dissolution of the elements as an analogy for 
psychological occurrences that we each experience every day,101 thus extending Jung’s 
metaphorical treatment of the text.   
 Even the more philologically accurate rendition of the BTG by the eminent 
Buddhologist Robert Thurman is not free of Jung’s influence. Although Thurman’s 1994 
translation102 falls prey to scientific terminology far more frequently than psychologism,h 
Jung’s specter is still apparent. We might expect better from a man that has been deemed 
by journalists as America’s leading Buddhist due to his scholarly credentials and (since 
lapsed) ordination as the first American to become a Tibetan Buddhist monk in 1965.103 
In line with this appraisal, he actively speaks out against previous translations that had 
employed psychologized terminology.104 Nevertheless, he is still unable to fully rid 
himself of the same psychologically suggestive language that he denounces. 
 The point here is not to criticize Thurman but to draw attention to the remarkable 
degree to which Jung’s psychologizing voice has become assimilated into the discourse 
of the TBOD. Even the most respected scholars on the topic cannot fully escape it in their 
translations! As with the interpretations by Leary and Fremantle and Trungpa, Thurman 
struggles to establish his own voice and ends up incorporating Jungian psychological 
language even after attempting to distance himself from it. Rather than suggesting any 
particular shortcoming of Thurman in particular, a consideration of his use of 
psychologism reveals how deeply embedded Jung’s terminology has become in 
discussions of the TBOD. The psychoanalytic notions of the unconscious, the archetypes, 	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and repression that Jung first applied to the text have since become a normative 
interpretive lens for translating Buddhist ideas. Given Thurman’s interest in reaching a 
broad Western audience with his translation,105 there are clearly points at which he felt he 
had no other way of expressing himself than through the language of analytical 
psychology. 
While psychologism is not evident throughout Thurman’s entire translation, it 
tends to dominate his commentary on the ontological status of bardo occurrences. Just as 
Jung interpreted the appearance of a deity-filled mandala in the Chonyid Bardo as an 
outpouring of the archetypes, Thurman insists that, “encountering them is like 
encountering extremely deeply repressed elements of your own psyche, terrifying 
because they are denied,”106 and even refers to them as “archetype deities.” He further 
describes the accompanying terror of this bardo as arising from an inability to 
“incorporate all the repressed imagery of her unconscious.”107 While these instances 
serve as examples of the fact that psychoanalytic terminology pervades our linguistic 
conventions for Tibetan Buddhism, Thurman further demonstrates Jung’s instrumental 
role in this normalization of psychologized discourse through his statement that, “the 
Natural Liberation consciously opens up the treasury of depth psychology of the Tantric 
tradition for the sake of ordinary people.”108 This explicit reference to depth psychology, 
an offshoot of psychoanalysis grounded in Jungian theory, reveals that not only has 
psychological terminology become naturalized into discourse on the TBOD, but that it is 
Jung’s voice in particular that has resounded through contemporary accounts by 
introducing terms like “collective unconscious” and “archetypes” to the discourse. 
This point highlights that Jung’s categorization of the TBOD as psychological is 
not wholly inaccurate, but is rather a matter of misplaced emphasis. Given the importance 
of the consciousness of the deceased to creating the experiences of the bardos there is 
undoubtedly a psychological dimension to the text. However, Jung and his subsequent 
psychological interpreters allow this single aspect of the TBOD to overshadow all others, 
transforming physiological and cosmological occurrences into psychic data. Although 
this perspective is not outright false, it is, at the very least, a misrepresentation of the 
broader contents of the text as it is applied within Tibetan Buddhist practice. Hopefully 
our prior analysis of Jung’s production of this misleading simulacrum of the TBOD has 
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contributed to recovering some of the larger meaning of the BTG text as a specific 
historical and cultural production. 
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Chapter Three  
 
Jung & the Mandala:  
A New Vision of Psychological Unity 
 
The results [of mandala analysis] which I now lay before 
you are the unadulterated, conscientious, and exact self-
observations of a man of unerring intellect, who had 
nothing suggested to him from outside and who would in 
any case not have been open to suggestion. Anyone at all 
familiar with psychic material will have no difficulty in 
recognizing the authentic character of the results.1 
          -C.G. Jung  
 
 Aside from His Holiness the Dalai Lama, mandalas are perhaps the most 
recognizable symbol of Tibetan Buddhism in Europe and America. Their use ranges from 
implementation in art therapy, to features in museum exhibits, and even as a motif in 
advertising by businesses interested in projecting an image of Eastern exoticism. While 
this emergence of the mandala as a symbol of Tibetan Buddhist wisdom represents the 
convergence of numerous factors, Jung’s psychological interpretations have been 
instrumental to the construction of mandalas as projections of internal processes and 
states.  
Although the Tibetan tradition supports a psychological reading of mandalas, it 
contains cosmological, physiological, devotional, and soteriological elements as well. 
These many dimensions of mandala practice come together in detailed rituals and 
complex visualizations in which individuals seek to enact fundamental changes in their 
state of being, transforming themselves from deluded humans into enlightened Buddhas. 
Jung’s psychologizing captures certain aspects of this process of transformation, yet often 
at the cost of supporting elements that are of immediate consequence to a full Tibetan-
style reading, such as the material aspects of mandala rituals and the spatialization of 
abstract concepts that such practice allows. This chapter’s focus on somaticization and 
spatialization of doctrine serves as a key vehicle to communicate the mechanism by 
which mandalas enlist Tibetan physiology and cosmology in the service of transforming 
consciousness, elements that Jung entirely overlooks. Ultimately, Jung found in mandalas 
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exactly what he was seeking, rather than allowing the symbol to reveal its culturally 
specific wisdom to him. 
 Jung’s interpretive efforts have proven quite influential by providing future 
scholars and laypersons with psychological terminology that claims to align with Tibetan 
Buddhist evaluations of mandalas. This has skewed literature on mandalas away from its 
ritual use and towards its significance in meditation, absolutely internalizing a practice 
with obvious external dimensions. Although not every account of the mandala in Tibetan 
Buddhism occupies this stance, Jung’s voice continues to resound in many contemporary 
interpretations and therefore deserves closer consideration. 
 
The Tibetan Mandala: Awakening Enlightened Body, Speech, and Mind 
 Within Tibetan Tantric practice, mandalas hold tremendous power as sacraments 
capable of transforming practitioners at all levels of being from impurity and delusion to 
enlightened Awakening. This transformation is not strictly psychological, but involves 
physical and verbal elements as well, playing upon the esoteric threefold formula of 
body, speech, and mind as constitutive of all action and being.2 By engaging the body 
through the performance of mudras (hand gestures) and speech by repeating mantras 
(sacred sounds,) mandalas use concrete, material forms to facilitate the non-material, 
mental aspect of cultivation that is visualization of the mandala as a sacred space. As a 
ritual tool and technology for producing Buddhas and bodhisattvas, mandalas unite these 
three aspects of action and being, thereby collapsing the boundary between mind and 
matter, and enabling Tantric practitioners to awaken their enlightened consciousness.3 
The Tibetan term for mandala, dkyil-khor, translates literally to, “center and 
surrounding environment.” Thus, on its most basic level, the mandala is a circle: it is “a 
strongly symmetrical diagram, concentrated about a center and generally divided into 
four quadrants of equal size; it is built up of concentric circles (khor) and squares 
possessing the same center (dkyil),”4 which often results in a rather aesthetically pleasing 
image. However, far from merely serving as a work of art, mandalas take on a wide 
variety of forms and serve a number of different purposes within Tibetan Buddhist 
practice.  
	   58	  
 Mandala usage in religious practice long predates historical Buddhism, appearing 
in the Vedic Brahmanas in reference to the creation of a sacred space dedicated to the 
performance of devotional ceremonies. The mandala is also at the heart of Shakyamuni 
Buddha’s awakening as the site where he found enlightenment beneath the Bodhi tree.5 
Tibetan Buddhism adopted the mandala from its antecedent Indian religions and 
repurposed it for a variety of innovative uses. There are natural mandalas, which signify 
the five primary elements upon which the universe is built and represent a simple 
elementary cosmology. This cosmology is expanded with greater detail in offering 
mandalas employed during rituals, which depict the central axis of the universe as Mt. 
Meru and its surrounding planets and oceans. Buddhist Tantric texts also discuss 
mandalas in great detail, illustrating the human body as a mandala and unveiling the 
ritual practice of deity yoga in which initiates perform complex visualizations to 
transform their consciousness into an enlightened state,6 which will our primary focus in 
the present context.  
 All of these Tibetan conceptions of the mandala as a sacred circle are supported 
by the alternative mandala world, a three-dimensional environment surrounding a 
magnificent divine palace that is replete with Buddhas and bodhisattvas. This mandala is 
believed to be a Pure Land, created through the infinite compassion and wisdom of the 
Buddhas as an ideal environment for spiritual development and achievement of 
enlightenment. This divine mandala is recapitulated and invoked in mandalas at various 
levels spanning from the macrocosm of the universe down to the microcosm of the body 
in order to tap into its transformative potential. Mandalas thus serve as a locus for the 
intersection of Buddhist cosmology, physiology, devotionalism, and soteriology, all of 
which ultimately come together in the mandala’s ritual use. 
 Due to the tremendous power and accompanying danger of mandala rituals for 
altering the physiology and consciousness of practitioners, there has been a great deal of 
secrecy surrounding the specifics of initiation practices. However, the Kalacakra mandala 
and the Kalacakra Laghutantra on which it is based have been among the most 
systematically researched by English-speaking scholars and have been further exposed by 
initiation ceremonies that His Holiness offers around the world. While many of the 
statements that follow are specific to the Kalacakra mandala, the general premises that 
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undergird its usage and transformative potential are common to mandalas used in Tibetan 
Buddhist Tantric practice in general and serve as a fair sketch of their meaning and 
significance, in contrast to that which is suggested by Jungian readings.  
 Although the term Kalacakra, which translates literally as “wheel of time,” is 
commonly used to describe a specific mandala, its wider use refers to the broad collection 
of philosophical doctrines and meditation practices that are contained within the 
Kalacakra Laghutantra, as well as the deity Kalacakra. While detailed consideration of 
this tantra may appear to be an unnecessary digression from the iconography with which 
it is associated, the Kalacakra mandala is a visual scripture that symbolically 
communicates the full contents of the Kalacakra Laghutantra,7 demonstrating the 
interdependence of the Kalacakra text and image. Once initiates are fully familiarized 
with the contents of the text, they prioritize its pictorial representation as a way of 
moving beyond discursive understanding of abstract concepts into the experiential 
knowledge that arises from direct sensory engagement with mandala iconography. As 
David McMahon has noted, the production of visual scriptures in the form of mandalas 
represents an important attempt to translate “abstract doctrine into the more immediately 
accessible language of gesture, symbol, and image,”8 which offers more direct 
understanding that is unencumbered by the linguistic barriers constructed between 
thought and experience.  
 Although McMahon’s comments on the somaticization of doctrine shed light on a 
unique function of mandala iconography, he stops short of a full consideration of the 
ways in which abstract ideas are concretized within mandala practice. Using mandalas as 
visual scripture not only somatacizes doctrine by mapping it onto specific aspects of the 
human body and its adornments, but also spacializes doctrine by linking concepts to a 
map of the cosmos and blueprints of a mandala palace in a Pure Land. These dual 
processes of somaticization and spacialization give conceptual ideals a sense of concrete 
reality by aligning them, respectively, with the human body and locations in physical 
space, thus offering initiates an additional angle from which they can approach their 
practice. Somaticizing and spacializing philosophical ideas allows initiates to take 
advantage of the human mind’s unique storage and processing mechanisms that have 
been honed by evolution. Our minds do not store and engage with all forms of 
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information equally well: visual imagery is far more easily encoded and recalled than 
language.9 Providing abstract concepts with a visual form, such as a mandala, as well as 
placing these images at distinct locations in space, such as on a map of the cosmos or the 
human body, serves to plant the ideas more firmly in our minds and circumvent cognitive 
processes, encouraging experiential realization that is grounded in material reality.  
 Furthermore, given the nonlinear associative nature of our minds, it is impossible 
to search the contents of our mind in an orderly fashion.10 Rather, we recall and work 
with concepts by cuing some other thought or perception that is linked to the material that 
we wish to recall. Consequently, the denser the web of conceptual correspondences, the 
greater the chance of coming across a thread that is linked to an idea we hope to activate. 
Hence, the remarkably complex logic of correspondences contained within mandala 
iconography that is laid out within the mandala’s accompanying tantra. 
 The Kalacakra Laghutantra is traditionally subjected to a tripartite division that 
splits its contents into three distinct but interrelated dimensions: the outer, the inner, and 
the alternate.11 These three aspects roughly correspond to the cosmological, the 
physiological, and the psycho-spiritual. Each of these facets is essential to understanding 
the place of the mandala within Tibetan Buddhism as a whole and offers insight into the 
vast network of correspondences between the physical, mental, and spiritual worlds in 
which we exist simultaneously. While the outer and inner dimensions emphasize 
materiality and lay the groundwork for transformation by spatializing doctrine within the 
cosmos and somaticizing it within the body, the alternate aspect focuses on mental 
actions and capitalizes on these pre-established correspondences to allow initiates to 
transform their own being.  
 The Kalacakra’s descriptions of the outer and inner aspects capture the essential 
wisdom of the tradition that ordered structures are endlessly recapitulated in systems at 
various levels from the macrocosm of the cosmos at large down to the minute microcosm 
of individual human beings. This logic of correspondences is supported by the 
fundamental Buddhist ontological premise that reality is characterized by its emptiness of 
any inherent essence. Given that all things emerge from emptiness, they are ultimately of 
the same final nature, forming an inner kinship of all beings that enables transformation 
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from one into the other through the experiential realization of the emptiness of all 
phenomena.  
 The Kalacakra Laghutantra proposes the outer mandala as a cosmogram that 
details the layout of our present universe and the processes that govern its emergence, 
sustained existence, and dissolution. This cosmology depicts the universe as circular in 
structure, with Mount Meru resting in the center upon four ascending disks composed of 
air, fire, water, and earth.12 Twelve continents, as well as twelve wind-tracks on which 
the planets glide, further surround Mount Meru. The space above Meru forms a head with 
neck, chin, nose, forehead, and a topknot,13 indicating the special relationship between 
the Kalacakra’s conception of the universe and the human form. 
 The correspondences between the outer and the inner go far beyond this single 
analogy, revealing connections at nearly every possible point of contact between the 
cosmos and the individual. While there are parallels between the universe and the gross 
body, such as the coincidence of Mount Meru and the human spine, as well as between 
the human realm and one’s arms,14 far more extensive analogies arise in consideration of 
the relationship between the cosmos and the subtle body. Not only are the winds that 
circulate Meru related to the lungs, but also to the energy-laden winds (Sanskrit: prana, 
Tibetan: rlung) that move throughout the human body by means energy channels. These 
channels intersect at various points along the central channel (Sanskrit: sushumna, 
Tibetan: dbu ma) that runs up the middle of the body from the genitals to the crown of the 
head, forming circular intersections called cakras that constitute smaller internal 
mandalas. The half of the central channel located above the navel is likened to the eclipse 
planet Rahu, and its lower part with the eclipse planet Kalagni. The primary channel that 
runs to the left of the sushumna corresponds to the feminine, wisdom, and the moon, 
while the right channel is analogized to the masculine, compassionate ability, and the 
sun.15 By maintaining awareness of these correspondences and envisioning one’s self as a 
mandala, practitioners are able to draw a clear connection between the processes that 
govern the universe and those that govern their body, enabling conscious control of the 
forces at work in this integrated hierarchy of mandalas.16 
 These complementary inner and outer elements of mandala practice are united in 
its alternative aspect and invoked to transform consciousness during the Kalacakra 
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initiation ritual. By connecting mundane cosmology with the divine Pure Land mandala 
and mundane physiology with the Kalacakra deity, this ritual aims to bring about a 
transformation of being that cleanses individual consciousness of obscurations and 
dissolves it into emptiness, allowing it to reemerge in the form of the enlightened 
Kalacakra. This transformation takes place upon the physical and mental planes, playing 
upon the interdependence of these two categories and their interplay at various levels of 
the micro-macrocosmic system.  
 In its ritual context, the mandala is thus a sacred altar upon which initiates 
undergo a twofold transformation, which employs the four different kinds of Tantric 
rituals: Action, Performance, Yoga, and Unexcelled Yoga. During the initial two types, 
Action and Performance Tantras, mandalas are primarily directed towards external ritual 
performance, functioning as an implement that cordons off sacred space and invokes 
deities to descend via physical and verbal actions. This ritual usage is primarily 
concerned with the subsidiary goals of pacifying illness and danger, fostering prosperity 
and merit, and destroying illness and danger, rather than with achieving enlightenment.17 
Furthermore, these preliminary stages of Tantric practice condition initiates for the later 
stages by familiarizing them with the processes of attainment through repeated ritual 
performance.18  
 Moving beyond these initial practices into those of Yoga and Unexcelled Yoga 
Tantras, mandala usage shifts towards the more complex mental processes and initiates 
adopt mandalas as a tool for radically transforming consciousness to achieve Awakening. 
However, it is only following the earlier, materially grounded stages that the more 
distinctly psychological elements become the primary focus of practice.19 Although the 
following description of initiation into the Kalacakra mandala is greatly simplified for the 
sake of succinctness,a it illustrates the distinctly devotional and highly systematized 
ritualistic aspects of mandalas that appear prominently within Tibetan practice, as well as 
its distinctly spatial element, all of which go unrecognized by Jung.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  a	  For	  further	  detail	  regarding	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  Kalacakra	  initiation	  rites	  and	  its	  intricate	  system	  of	  correspondences,	  please	  refer	  to	  the	  appendix.	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 The Kalacakra initiation process begins with a request to the earth goddess to 
provide a purified empowerment siteb where initiates can draw upon the intimate 
relationship between their ordinary phenomological existences and fundamentally divine 
nature.20 From the very beginning, mandala ritual practice aims to deconstruct the lines 
between mundane and enlightened, between matter and mind. The vajra master who 
confers the initiation further purifies the grounds by dispelling spirits that might hinder 
the ritual processes. These acts of invoking deities to purify the space and banishing 
negative spirits are not treated as empty gestures, but are devotional procedures that are 
essential to ensuring a successful initiation.   
 After purifying the grounds, the vajra master and his accompanying monks begin 
to lay out the gridlines that guide the construction of the physical Kalacakra sand 
mandala. Beginning with these lines, the monks systematically construct the mandala 
according to highly specific iconometric proportions. These gridlines ensure that the 
mandala does not reflect the momentary inclinations or artistic whimsy of the individuals 
responsible for its construction, but possesses an exact similitude to the ideal alternative 
mandala world. The physical mandala constructed in the ritual space is therefore a perfect 
reconstruction of the patterns recapitulated in the human body, the universe, and at all 
other levels of the micro-macrocosmic scheme.21 Drawing upon the implicit connection 
between image and presence, this similitude actively divinizes the space and, 
consequently, those that enter it as well.  
 Once the monks complete the mandala, initiates officially “enter” the mandala for 
the first time. “Entry” into the mandala occurs on two complementary levels. On the first, 
initiates physically enter the empowerment site. As they do so, they recite the mantras 
(sacred sounds) and make the mudras (hand gestures) associated with the Kalacakra 
deity. These verbal and embodied elements that accompany entry into the mandala 
demonstrate that initiates are not enacting a strictly internal self-transformation, but that 
these processes have distinct physical correlates that embody the enlightened deity that 
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  where	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  that	  enter	  it	  in	  their	  pursuit	  of	  Awakening.	  (Powers,	  1995,	  111)	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they aspire to become.  It is only by imitating and embodying the enlightened body, 
speech, and mind of a Buddha that initiates can fully enact a transformation of being.  
 These embodied elements are accompanied by the second level of “entry” into the 
mandala, which entails mentally entering into a visualized mandala palace. According to 
Tantric ritual logic, aligning one’s mundane body (mudras,) speech (mantras,) and mind 
(visualization) with that of the deity establishes a direct conduit to the alternate mandala 
world, allowing the initiate to become one with all of the mandala’s deities and for those 
deities to enter the initiate as well. By fully integrating body (mudras), speech (mantras), 
and mind (visualization), mandalas thus function as sacraments that empower and 
transform the initiates that enter them.22 In other words, transformation of consciousness 
is impossible on solely the mental level, but depends upon its accompanying elements of 
body and speech as well. 
 The visualized mandala palace represents a realm in which the infinite wisdom 
and compassion of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas are concretized and manifest in forms 
discernable to unenlightened beings.23 By spacializing infinite wisdom and compassion 
and giving them a sense of physical reality, initiation into a mandala provides 
practitioners with a far more accessible sense of divinity and the qualities of enlightened 
beings. As they mentally travel through this space and encounter different objects and 
divine beings, initiates gradually become purified and transformed through their 
encounters. However, these transformations are not merely imaginative, but are instances 
in which the initiate’s mind actually becomes indistinguishable from the very forms that 
it visualizes and is thus divinized.24  
 Each of these forms holds unique significance and transformative potential in the 
enormous web of correspondences that undergird and are encoded into mandala 
technology. In the words of Mattieu Ricard, “meditating upon the mandala is not a mere 
daydream musing through an enchanting paradise disconnected from reality, but the 
rediscovery of the very framework of our being and of the phenomenal world.”25 For 
example, images of twelve animals are placed at equal intervals along the outer ring of 
the mandala, which correspond to the twelve months of the year. Each of these animals 
bears a 28-petaled lotus, upon which sit a pair of deities in union that represent the new 
and full moon. Together, these symbols embody the 30 lunar days in a month and, taken 
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alongside the eleven other animals in the mandala, constitute the total number of days in 
a lunar year. Furthermore, relocating this cosmology in the human body, the number 360 
also corresponds to the sets of breath we take in cycles of 60 each day.26 Thus, one set of 
symbols serves to illustrate multiple elements that are present within the systems of the 
microcosm and macrocosm alike. While Orientalizing scholars such as Jung have 
attempted to separate these elements from each other for the sake of simplifying analysis 
of mandalas, these diverse aspects are inextricably linked and separating them 
undermines the very power of correspondence from which the sacred circle derives its 
power. 
 In fact, while visualization is commonly highlighted as the cornerstone of 
mandala practice, it appears that this portrayal is not wholly accurate in actuality. As 
Stephen Breyer demonstrates in the following account, extensive visualization is often 
sacrificed to the more ritualistic elements of practice: 
 
The ability to achieve single-minded concentration on a 
vividly appearing picture is the result of long and really 
rather frustrating practice. We must remember-and this point 
should be emphasized-that the visualization is performed 
during a ritual…The reading of the ritual text in the 
assembly hall often goes at breakneck speed, and the vast 
majority of monks are unable to visualize that quickly, if 
indeed they are able to visualize at all.27 
 
Given the necessity of conditioning one’s mind before complex psychological 
transformation is possible, ritual action is therefore prioritized to adequately familiarize 
initiates with the processes of Awakening. Breyer’s candid admission should not 
completely discount the importance of visualizations to mandala practice since they 
clearly play a role in the initiation ceremonies and are referenced in the tantras, but, at the 
very least, demonstrates that they are merely one part of a larger ritual rather than the 
central element of practice.  
 As initiates near the end of their visualized circumambulation of the mandala 
architecture, they come upon Kalacakra and his consort, Visvamatr, at the apex and 
center of the palace. Although Kalacakra is ultimately infinite and void of any essential 
identity, he takes on a human form in these initiation rites, enabling further 
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somaticization of the Kalacakra Laghutantra’s doctrines. For example, following 
McMahon’s analysis,28 the concept of “raising the bodhicitta”, which refers to the 
aspiration toward enlightenment born from compassion for all sentient beings in 
Mahayana literature, is closely mapped onto Kalacakra’s physical pose. Having achieved 
enlightenment, Kalacakra has correspondingly tamed the internal winds and is thereby 
able to prevent the white bodhicitta that resides in the left channel and the red bodhicitta 
of the right channel from leaving the body. This is iconographically represented by 
Kalacakra’s outstretched right red leg, which indicates the downward flow of red 
bodhicitta, and his bent left white leg, which symbolizes the hooking up of the white 
bodhicitta.29 Taken together, the positioning of Kalacakra’s legs serves as an additional 
point of association to awaken the need to direct the winds into the central channel and 
gather them at one’s heart, as well as the accompanying need to awaken compassion to 
enlighten all other living beings. As initiates come upon Kalacakra and Visvamatr, they 
do not consciously attend to these processes but they literally become them as the line 
between mind and matter disappears, producing a new Buddha in the process.30 
 This process of transformation from unenlightened initiate into a fully awakened 
Buddha thus not only represents a psychological transformation, but a physical one as 
well. Indeed, without the physically embodied aspects of mudras and mantras, 
psychological transformation could not occur. Ritual mandala practice is not a process of 
self-discovery, but one of purification and dissolution that occurs in a physical space and 
requires devotional offerings to various deities. To bring about the awakening that the 
Kalacakra initiation is directed towards, initiates must achieve understanding not only of 
their own nature, but also of their relationship to the cosmos and the inner physiological 
workings of their being. In this context, mandalas are not merely psychograms as Jung 
will suggest, but are sacred altars, charts of the cosmos, maps of the human body, palaces 
of Buddhas and bodhisattvas, and themselves the very processes of transformation and 
realization of one’s ultimate Buddha-nature given spatial and somatic reality. 
 
The Jungian Mandala: An Icon of Psychological Unity 
 As Jung turned his gaze to the East and caught sight of Tibetan Buddhist 
mandalas, he saw none of their ritual, cosmological, or physiological significance. In fact, 
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the mandalas that Jung saw were not the distinctly Tibetan sacred circles that have just 
been described but, quite literally, the product of his own imagination. While mandalas 
certainly appear prominently in Tibetan Buddhist iconography and practice, they are, in 
Jung’s final analysis, a universal symbol, i.e. an archetype. Not only are mandalas an 
archetype, but they are the most important of all the archetypes, representing the process 
of individuation and the emergence of the Self. Jung placed deep personal and scholarly 
significance on mandalas, as seen with his engagement with them throughout the better 
part of his career. Yet, while Jung continued to come across new forms of the symbol in 
different places carrying varying meanings, he only became further entrenched in his 
conclusions designating the mandala as the fundamental representation of psychological 
unity. Jung quite adeptly manages to reconfigure mandalas so that his perspective aligns 
with the Tibetan Buddhist stance in regards to their function, the means by which they 
work, and the end goal of their practice, but these comparisons are ultimately superficial 
and are easily undermined by a simple consideration of Tibetan sources. 
 Jung first encountered mandalas not within Tibetan Buddhism, but during an 
exploration of his own mind. This discovery occurred between 1912-1917 when Jung, 
following his break with Freud, endured psychic trauma as he was overwhelmed by what 
he identified as the contents of his unconscious. Over this period, during which Jung 
produced what would ultimately become known as The Red Book, the psychologist 
became a psychonaut and ventured into the depths of his mind to discern the basic 
principles of human psychology. It was on this inward journey that Jung formalized his 
theories of archetypes, the collective unconscious, and individuation, as well as when he 
first encountered the sacred circle, which he regularly found manifested in his drawings 
with variations that accorded with his mental state at the time of production.31  
 Even following this period of psychic chaos, Jung continued to draw mandalas, 
sketching one every morning in a notebook. As he studied these images he concluded that 
they,  
were cryptograms concerning the state of the Self…The 
Self, I thought, was like the monad which I am, and which is 
my world. The mandala represents this monad, and 
corresponds to the microcosmic nature of the psyche…The 
mandala is the center. It is the exponent of all paths. It is the 
path to the center, to individuation.32  
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Due to the circular nature of mandalas, they came to represent the movement in a circle 
around oneself so that all sides of the personality become involved, demonstrating the 
integration of the shadow archetype into one’s conscious mind.33 Jung believed that, 
although the conscious mind is unwilling to admit these elements into itself, the 
symbolism of the mandala awakens something within the unconscious, drawing these 
contents out and integrating them in the process of individuation. Thus, even before 
recognizing the mandala in any religious tradition, it seems Jung had already arrived at a 
conclusive meaning of the symbol, a meaning that he would retain even as he 
encountered contrary perspectives. 
 It was in 1929, in Richard Wilhelm’s manuscript for the Daoist text, The Secret of 
the Golden Flower, that Jung first encountered a mandala prominently featured in a 
thought system beside his own.34 Although Jung’s reminiscence on the spontaneous 
emergence of mandalas during the years in which he ventured through his unconscious is 
replete with references to “mandalas,” his use of the term is anachronistic and was 
applied retrospectively to his experiences following his commentary on Wilhelm’s text, 
which is the first published work in which Jung explicitly refers to “mandalas.”c This 
retrospective labeling disguises that Jung’s speculations on mandalas were largely 
independent from his engagement with them in culturally specific settings and that he 
carried many pre-conceived notions about mandalas before he had even encountered the 
term.  
 After his initial recognition of mandalas within Daoism, Jung later found them 
again in Tibetan Buddhism,35 Hermetic Philosophy, and Christian mysticism,36 as well as 
in the absent minded drawings of many his analysands.37 Jung’s continual bombardment 
by the symbol from disparate cultures spread across time and space only strengthened his 
conviction of the mandala as the central archetype of the Self and as one of “the oldest 
religious symbols of humanity and [one that] may even have existed in Paleolithic times 
(cf. the Rhodesian rock-paintings).”38 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  c	  Jung’s	  commentary	  on	  The	  Secret	  of	  the	  Golden	  Flower	  suggests	  that	  he	  actually	  first	  encountered	  “mandalas”	  by	  reading	  Evans-­‐Wentz’s	  first,	  1927	  edition	  of	  the	  
TBOD,	  but	  the	  term	  doesn’t	  appear	  in	  his	  published	  corpus	  until	  his	  commentary	  on	  Wilhelm’s	  text.	  (Jung,	  1931,	  25)	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 For Jung, then, new encounters with mandalas were not opportunities for 
expanding his understanding of the symbol, but, rather, only further concretized the 
foundation on which he confirmed his theory of individuation. In his analyses, Jung 
invokes the rhetoric of sameness by drawing comparisons between his own mandalas and 
Tibetan ones, using them as empirical evidence to advance his own claims regarding the 
universal significance of mandalas and archetypes in general. In Jung’s writings, the 
mandala is a “symbol of the center, the goal, or the Self as psychic totality; self-
representation of a psychic process of centering; production of a new center of 
personality.”39 When he first came across the mandala in Tibetan Buddhism in Evans-
Wentz’s The Tibetan Book of the Dead, Jung projected his own preconceived conclusions 
onto the symbol and saw only one thing: its psychological dimension. 
 Yet, while mandalas undoubtedly play an important role in the transformation of 
consciousness, which might be identified as their psychological dimension, we have also 
explored their ritual, devotional, cosmological, and physiological significance. Jung, 
however, enthrones the psychological, eschewing the elements that are not as 
immediately or easily profitable to him, including mandalas’ emphasis on embodiment 
through mudras and mantras. While these practices are ultimately integrated into the 
psychological end of personal transformation, Jung’s omission of mandala rituals’ 
physical and verbal elements obscures the very reasons that mandalas possess such potent 
transformative potential. Additionally, his psychological approach semiotizes mandalas 
by transmuting them into nothing more than symbols, as well as interiorizing them, 
thereby prioritizing inner experience over external practice and erasing vast swathes of 
what make Tibetan mandalas unique.  
 Although Jung’s considerations of mandalas within the Tibetan context certainly 
reveal a high degree of general confusion regarding his source material, we would be 
mistaken to judge his conclusions as entirely nonsensical flights of fancy. They are quite 
internally consistent and enable him to forge widely applicable statements that are highly 
convincing, providing that the reader has no more than a cursory background in Tibetan 
Buddhism. The issue at hand here is not the relative correctness of his statements 
regarding the significance of mandalas in general, but how closely these conclusions 
actually align with Tibetan practices, the source of his inspiration. Although he ultimately 
	   70	  
posits mandalas as an iconographic prototype beyond tradition, Jung’s inclusion of 
Tibetan Buddhist mandalas in the construction of his universal theory of mandalas has 
consequently produced confusion as to the nature of specifically Tibetan mandalas.  
 Our task of comparing the Jungian interpretation of mandalas to their place within 
Tibetan Buddhism is further complicated by Jung’s obvious confusion about exactly what 
should be included under the label of “Tibetan Buddhism.” While this is admittedly a 
serious difficulty and not one that any scholar should deal with lightly when attempting to 
delineate the contents of any particular religious tradition, Jung does not attend to these 
difficulties in his equation of Tantric Shaivism and Kundalini yogic philosophy with 
Tibetan Buddhism. While there is historical evidence to suggest that these systems have 
influenced Tibetan Buddhism, Jung does not engage in a critical analysis of their 
developmental trajectory but simply conflates the three. By attempting to amalgamate 
multiple thought systems without recognizing that he is doing so, the inaccuracies in his 
interpretation are compounded even further, leaving his commentary on Buddhist 
mandalas replete with references to Shiva, Shakti, and the awakening of Kundalini 
energy.d 
 In one of his rare considerations of mandalas within the specifically Buddhist 
context, Jung reflects on the purpose of the symbol by means of anecdote, recalling a 
conversation that he had with a monk while traveling in 1938. He cites his interlocutor’s 
conclusion that,  
the true mandala is always an inner image, which is 
gradually built up through (active) imagination, at such 
times when psychic equilibrium is disturbed or when a 
thought cannot be found and must be sought for, because 
not contained in holy doctrine.40  
 
While we are not in a position to outright dismiss the possibility that this statement 
originally came from the mouth of a practicing Buddhist monk, it is worth noting the 
remarkable similarity between this construction of mandalas and Jung’s during his period 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  d	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  “the	  lamaistic	  quadrangle,”	  Jung	  refers	  to	  the	  common	  presence	  of	  “the	  God	  Shiva”	  as	  the	  “Holy	  of	  Holies	  [and]	  “the	  cosmic	  source	  of	  energy.”	  (Jung,	  1936,	  124)	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of psychosis and inner exploration; both cases envision mandalas as images that emerge 
from within the depths of an individual as evidence of psychological fragmentation. 
 While the Jungian conception renders mandalas as a barometer for the conditions 
of a troubled psyche and prescribes their construction as a balm for an ailing mind, their 
usage in Tibetan ritual practice treats them in the exact opposite manner. Mandalas are 
not projections of a deluded mind, but depictions of enlightened existence on both the 
cosmic and individual level. During the construction of a mandala for initiation rituals, 
participants are forbidden to incorporate elements from their current, subjective state of 
mind and are required to abide by the textually prescribed iconometric proportions. Far 
from serving as a space for the voice of the individual, mandalas are sites in which that 
voice is dissolved so that it may reemerge in a purified and enlightened form. Even 
though Jung’s comparison is inaccurate, he still finds a way to further the universal 
legitimacy of analytical psychology by invoking a sense of false similarity between his 
own perspective and that of a Tibetan monk. 
 In further consideration of scenarios in which Tibetan Buddhism uses mandalas, 
Jung states with some degree of accuracy that mandalas are “instruments of meditation, 
concentration, and self-immersion, for the purpose of realizing inner experience.”41 
While this characterization is accurate at its most basic level, it is also tremendously 
vague and hardly says anything about the significance or practical function of mandalas 
at all. Although Jung does not explicitly discount the ritual importance of mandalas, he 
does not affirm it either, thus leaving his readers in a state of uncertainty that parallels 
Jung’s own.  
 However, it becomes increasingly evident just how widely Jung’s perspective 
diverges from the stance maintained by Tibetan Buddhist texts and practice when he 
further elaborates on mandalas’ functionality, rendering them as an aid to “concentration 
by narrowing down the psychic field of vision and restricting it to the 
centre…[Mandalas] are meant to shut out the outside and hold the inside together.”42 
Although cultivation of one-pointed concentration is a necessary prerequisite for 
effectively engaging in mandala practice, concentration is essential to nearly all forms of 
meditation and this point does not shed any light on the uniqueness of mandalas. In fact, 
the capacity to maintain one-pointed concentration is assumed throughout textual 
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accounts of mandala practice and it is extremely unlikely that practitioners would seek 
initiation into a mandala simply for the sake of developing concentration. Additionally, 
his conclusion that mandalas are meant to “shut out the outside and hold the inside 
together” not only has no grounding in Buddhist practice, but does not even impart 
anything of substance at all.   
 Jung’s speculations on the means by which mandalas enact such substantial 
transformations in human psychology also suffer from his apparent confusion regarding 
Tibetan Buddhism and consequent projection of his own theories. He theorizes that 
mandalas possess transformative potential due to the primacy of the symbol and its 
unique capacity to awakening materials in the unconscious that would otherwise remain 
latent.43 Within this speculation, we find a kernel of truth: mandalas do possess the 
possibility of awakening potentialities that lie latent within the individual’s mind, 
namely, the possibility of awakening one’s Buddha-nature.  
 Unfortunately, Jung’s framing of the mechanism by which this awakening occurs 
sharply differs from Tibetan accounts and suggests that any superficial similarity is 
merely coincidental. Whereas Jung asserts that individuals become awakened to their true 
selves by means of mandala symbolism sparking something that already exists but lies 
latent within their unconscious, Tibetan Tantric practice relies on the conscious and 
painstaking construction of a network of associations between mandala symbolism, 
abstract doctrinal concepts, cosmology, and the physiology of the subtle body. While 
these correspondences may ultimately leave initiates’ conscious minds and become 
ingrained in their unconscious memories, they are not inherent to one’s mind as Jung’s 
theory of the collective unconscious suggests, but are actively placed there for the 
purpose of later activation. Mandalas are not accidents that just happen to emerge from 
the unconscious mind and that have the potential to draw other elements up out from its 
depths, but are constructions with specific properties and highly detailed systems of 
correspondence that govern their usage.  
 Jung elaborates on the mandala’s mechanism of transformation by considering the 
role of circular movement when engaging with the symbol, yet his interpretation 
similarly suffers from a lack of textual grounding. At first glance, Jung correctly 
identifies circulation as essential to the process of working with a mandala. He further 
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identifies the act of circulation as equivalent to forging a union of opposites in which the 
peripheral elements of the mandala are subordinated to and, ultimately, united in its 
center.44 He labels this circulation as, “the ‘movement in a circle around oneself,’ so that 
all sides of the personality become involved.”45 Through this rendering, mandalas are 
configured as tools for dispelling the illusion of duality that enable integration of the 
disparate elements of the psyche. 
 Drawing from his own conceptions of individuation as an innate drive towards 
integration, Jung projects this inherent tendency towards unity onto the mandala’s 
encouragement of movement from the periphery to the center. In consideration of the 
vajra mandala, he comments that, “the four [vajras] in the gates of the inner courtyard 
are meant to indicate that life’s energy is streaming inwards; it has detached itself from 
objects and now returns to the center.”46 His usage of “life’s energy” is vague to the point 
of meaninglessness and has no discernable relationship to the palace’s gates or 
ornamentation. Far from having any basis in doctrinal descriptions of mandala initiations, 
Jung’s assertion reflects his own pseudo-mystical leanings far more so than the Tibetan 
Buddhist stance.  
 In order to further illustrate the mandala’s natural drive towards unity, Jung also 
refers to the single vajra that is located at the center of the mandala. He relates this 
symbol, which is alternatively translated as diamond, adamantine, or thunderbolt, to a 
state of psychic wholeness in which masculine and feminine energies are united.47 
However, the vajra does not represent the unity of the masculine and feminine, but rather 
stands for exclusively male energy and is equated with compassionate method.48 Even 
when Jung does manage to find a legitimate point of contact with Tibetan Buddhism, it 
seems that his erudition regarding its symbolism was not deep enough to prove that the 
accuracy of his comparison is anything more than coincidence. Although Tibetan 
Buddhist practice supports Jung’s notion that mandalas undermine dualistic appearances, 
their power to do so lies not in their encouragement of circular movement but in their 
foundation of emptiness. Dualism is not illusory due to the capacity of the circle to bring 
together its peripheral elements in a united center, but because all phenomena are 
ultimately of the same empty nature. Despite the fact that this ontological premise is 
fundamental to working with mandalas, Jung never addresses it. 
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 Additionally, the Jungian perspective that moving in a circular motion through a 
mandala is essential to integrating the various archetypes of the Self is also completely 
absent from Buddhist texts and practice. Circulating from the periphery of the mandala 
towards its center does not constitute a continual process of amassing an ever-increasing 
number of elements of personhood onto one’s conscious personality as Jung suggests, 
but, conversely, signifies the continual dissolution of one’s identity. As initiates move 
through the mandala and encounter its various deities, they become increasingly purified 
and divinized. This process culminates at the elevated center of the mandala, at which 
point the initiate is believed to be capable of mastering control of the subtle levels of the 
mind-body complex. Given that Jung does not address the physiological elements of 
mandala practice, it seems impossible that he could have ever recognized this specific 
purpose of circulation.  
 This discrepancy between the Jungian and Tibetan Buddhist perspectives on the 
significance of circulating the mandala points to one final misinterpretation that Jung 
makes in his consideration of mandalas: the goal towards which their practice aims. In 
consideration of the vajra mandala, he comments that the goal of contemplation is the 
initiate’s recognition of “himself as God again…thus returning from the illusion of 
individual existence into the universal totality of the divine state.”49 At first glance this 
appears to be quite astute insofar as it successfully recognizes the capacity of mandalas to 
divinize its practitioners by transforming them into deities. However, a closer look at 
exactly what Jung means by “God” reveals that the similarity is purely semantic. 
 As we have already seen, Jung views mandalas as representations of the Self, in 
which the many aspects of one’s personality are integrated in the process of 
individuation. The end goal of mandala practice is thus the union of opposites and 
wholeness of psychological existence, which is, by Jung’s estimation, to be Godly.50 
However, within Tibetan Buddhism this practice is not concerned with psychological 
unity per se, but with purification of all levels of one’s being, dissolution of dualistic 
appearances, and cessation of submission to the karmic forces of samsara.51 This may 
entail achieving some high degree of psychological unity in which previously dualistic 
elements of one’s mind are harmoniously reconciled, but this integration is a waypoint 
along the path to purity rather than the final goal. While Jung may conflate the 
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soteriological goal of mandala practice in analytical psychology and Tibetan Buddhism, 
they are ultimately quite different: the former is concerned with psychic integration, 
while the later strives towards freedom from samsara through the development of 
enlightened wisdom and compassion. As such, the two systems are concerned with totally 
different realms of experience. In this case, the Jungian interpretation does not appear to 
be a complete inversion of the Tibetan Buddhist perspective, but is, rather, an act of 
reading in between the lines that discounts the Tibetan voice entirely. 
 Thus, although Jung appears to be in alignment with the Tibetan Buddhist 
perspective on the function of mandalas, the scenarios in which they are used, the 
mechanisms by which they work, and the goal toward which their practice strives, these 
points of contact are primarily superficial and crumble away upon closer inspection. 
While these artificial parallels misrepresent the tradition of which he speaks, the greater 
harm arises from Jung’s vast overstatement of his authority to speak on such matters. 
 By stating his own perspective on mandalas as that of a Buddhist monastic, Jung, 
willingly or otherwise, denies agency to his object of inquiry and erases the presence of 
Tibetans from their own iconography. Given that Jung encountered mandalas most 
prominently in his own scattered psyche and in those of his analysands, it should be 
unsurprising that he viewed mandalas as devices that produce inner order following states 
of inner chaos and turmoil. However, this is merely Jung’s perspective and certainly 
should not be imposed upon anyone else. Nevertheless, Jung’s anecdote of his 
conversation with a Buddhist monk performs that exact imposition of interpretation. Not 
only does Jung substitute his own perspective for that of Tibetan Buddhists, but he hides 
that he is doing so by attributing the claims to someone from the tradition. By implicitly 
suggesting that his interpretation is authentic, Jung thus oversteps the reasonable 
boundary of his authority even further than he already had through his overt 
psychologization of mandala practice. 
 Furthermore, by relating the mandalas used in Tibetan initiation rites to those 
produced by the fragmented minds of his analysands, Jung tacitly draws a connection 
between these two groups of individuals, which effectively denigrates Tibetans as 
psychologically fragmented as well. His consideration of Tibetan mandalas as “free 
creations of fantasy” that “move within fairly narrow limits”52 further disparages the 
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Tibetan system as simultaneously fantastical and overly restrictive, thus limiting its 
effectiveness. Jungian mandalas produced through active imagination, on the other hand, 
are configured as essential windows into the process of analysands coming to terms with 
themselves. By allowing his analysands to freely express themselves, rather than limiting 
them as the Tibetan tradition does, Jung claims that he can help them reduce psychic 
confusion to order, which serves as a far more effective method of psychological aid.53 
After employing a rhetoric of sameness throughout the bulk of his prior commentaries on 
mandalas to support his theory of the archetypes, Jung switches to a rhetoric of difference 
that distances Jungian mandalas from Tibetan ones and highlights the superiority of 
analytical psychology’s methods over those of the Tibetans. Not only do Jung’s 
commentaries misrepresent the significance of mandalas within Tibetan Buddhism but, as 
with his treatment of the TBOD, they further advance Jungian analytical psychology as a 
thought system that is superior to Tibetan Buddhism. 
 While Jung’s interpretation of the TBOD primarily misrepresented the text by 
overemphasizing certain elements at the exclusion of others, his treatment of Tibetan 
mandalas is even more reductive in its attempts to disguise such misrepresentation as an 
accurate portrayal. Had such a misrepresentation occurred in the work of a less prominent 
author, it might be considered little more than a regrettable occasion of a misplaced claim 
of authority. Unfortunately, Jung’s ubiquity and reputation within academic and popular 
Orientalist discourse in the early to mid-twentieth century have enabled his authority to 
grow even greater, which now pervades modern interpretations of mandala symbolism 
and practice. 
 
The Western Mandala: A Doorway to Our Own Divinity 
 Reflecting on the place of Tibetan Buddhist mandala’s in the collective 
imagination of Europeans and Americans, His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama has 
remarked that, “many speculative and mistaken interpretations have circulated among 
people who viewed them simply as works of art or had no access to reliable 
explanations.”54 Although it is not quite ubiquitous and perhaps not even the most 
dominant form of misrepresentation, the Jungian psychological perspective is certainly 
one of the “mistaken” interpretations to which His Holiness refers. Such interpretations 
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follow Jung by either completely omitting any mention of the ritual elements of mandala 
practice, or by strongly prioritizing an explication of mandalas’ psychological 
significance over its other facets. Even in cases that do not adopt psychologism as their 
primary interpretive lens, the availability of psychological terminology encourages a 
general interiorization of mandala practice that excludes or marginalizes its significance 
in ritual use. This section will consider a number of authors that have adopted Jung’s 
interpretive methods and, more prominently, his psychological terminology, 
demonstrating the extent to which his perspective has seeped into many contemporary 
portrayals of mandalas and the pervasive linguistic conventions that support these 
depictions. 
 Contemporary adoptions of an explicitly Jungian stance have not solely been 
restricted to interpretations of the meaning of mandala iconography, but have also 
followed Jung’s particular practice of using mandalas with his analysands during therapy. 
Okada Yasunobu is a Japanese psychoanalyst who has incorporated Sandplay therapy 
into his practice by asking his analysands to construct sand mandalas. Drawing directly 
from Jung’s conclusions regarding the therapeutic potential of constructing mandalas, 
Yasunobu believes that mandalas can help diagnose and develop crucial qualities for 
mental health such as inner awareness, overall self-knowledge, and a balance of feminine 
and masculine.55 This usage is entirely removed from any Tibetan context and, instead, 
derives exclusively from Jungian premises. 
 However, therapeutic use of Jungian mandalas, while existent, is admittedly 
relatively rare and is far less pervasive than the scholarly trend of adopting Jung’s 
particular methodology for working mandalas by reducing them to nothing more than 
symbols. This act of semiotization serves three central purposes. First, it universalizes 
mandalas, stripping them of their culturally determined nuances and putting them to use 
for humanistic aims. Secondly, it facilitates and justifies the interiorization of mandala 
symbolism and practice, strictly psychologizing them and removing the other elements of 
practice. Finally, and most importantly to our critique of Orientalism, it allows European 
and American scholars to occupy a privileged position where they can divine the ‘true’ 
meaning of such symbols and their surrounding practices, thus muting or distorting any 
Tibetan voices that attempt to enter the conversation.  
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 Donald Lopez has discussed this hermeneutic strategy of semiotization, finding 
that the study of mandalas has more often reflected a desire to unveil fundamental truths 
about Tibetans and, for more spiritual-inclined authors, the cosmos at large, than a 
genuine interest in the perspective of the actual Tibetan Buddhist tradition.56 Just as Jung 
did not view mandalas as a strictly Tibetan symbol but as an innately human one, 
scholars that have adopted Jung’s method of analysis have drawn from as many sources 
as possible in order to prove the ubiquity of mandalas.  
 This line of Jungian influence is particular apparent in José and Miriam 
Argüelles’ Mandala (1972), which is effectively a New Age manual for personal 
transformation through mandala practice. Although Tibetan mandalas are explicitly 
mentioned a number of times throughout the text, such references are interspersed among 
references to sacred circles found in India, Java, France, Spain, Yucatan, and Australia,57 
as well as in Christian58 and Daoist59 religious contexts. While it is undeniable that 
specifically Tibetan Buddhist mandala practice emerged from its Indian antecedents, the 
Argüelles text is not concerned with the historical development of the concept and 
practice. They conflate the symbol and its ritual use in one culture with its use in all 
cultures, despite apparent differences in doctrine and practice. Instead of attempting to 
understand mandalas as unique artifacts of specific cultures, the authors are only 
concerned with them as a universal symbol that carries wisdom about the fundamental 
nature of the human mind and reality as a whole. The line between the mandalas of Tibet 
and those of other cultures is blurred to the point of irrelevance, revealing the Argüelles’ 
work as psychological and humanistic speculation rather than legitimate scholarship that 
should have any bearing on popular conceptions of Tibetan mandalas whatsoever. 
 In addition to contemporary adoptions of Jungian methodology when working 
with mandalas, applying psychologized terminology for discussing them has been 
tremendously pervasive as well and is evident in many accounts of mandalas and their 
symbolic significance. As with Jung’s treatment of the symbol, these interpretations have 
been severely reductionist, representing mandalas and their deities as nothing more than 
instantiations of psychological processes. By reducing mandalas to symbolic or 
metaphorical representations, they are thus transmuted into psychic data, furnishing the 
ground for detailed psychological analyses. Hence, statements such as the following, 
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which is from Robert Thurman and Marilyn Rhie’s accompanying catalog to the 1992 
Wisdom and Compassion: The Sacred Art of Tibet60 museum exhibition: “The erotic and 
terrific deities of Tibetan art and culture express the Tibetan mastery and further 
development of the sophisticated depth psychology inherited from Indian Buddhist 
civilization, anticipating discoveries in psychology made only recently in the West.”61 
The mandala thus becomes a symbol for a cache of ancient psychological wisdom 
protected within the confines of Tibet, only now being unearthed by academia. 
 Treating mandalas as treasures of psychological wisdom elevates Jung and his 
interpretive followers to a position of tremendous authority in which their conclusions 
about the significance of mandalas are prioritized over authentic Tibetan interpretations. 
Viewing mandalas and their resident bodhisattvas as instruments of a pre-modern depth 
psychology, contemporary interpreters either explicitly or implicitly credit Jung as the 
man capable of adequately domesticating these foreign ideas for safe consumption. These 
scholars play on the trope that “the elites knew that the images were symbols pointing to 
an unseen reality, while the unlettered masses were superstitious idolaters,”62 situating 
themselves within the ranks of the privileged that truly comprehend their objects of study, 
as opposed to the average Tibetan layperson who is figured as unable to understand his 
own practices. Although Jung may not have consciously asserted so, his participation in 
Orientalist discourse implicitly suggests that to have such knowledge of Tibetan 
Buddhism is to dominate it and to have authority over it, resulting in the production of 
material about Tibet that even Tibetans do not have.63 
 Even renowned Tibetologists such as Giuseppe Tucci have fallen prey to 
assimilating the logic of Jung’s voice without recognizing the distortions their subsequent 
interpretations perform on Tibetan Buddhist use of mandalas. Tucci’s The Theory and 
Practice of the Mandala64 (1961), which is one of the first books on mandalas written for 
a general, English-speaking audience, praises Jung in its opening page and adopts his 
notion of mandalas as vehicles for reintegration.65 While the text is not wholly 
problematic insofar as it presents specific details of the structure of mandalas and their 
symbolism, his analysis is pervaded by Jungian vocabulary and relies almost solely on a 
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psychological interpretive lens,e demonstrating that even renowned Tibetologists are not 
safe from Jungian terminology and rhetoric. 
 Although Tucci adamantly expresses his desire to not misrepresent the stance of 
Tibetan Buddhist doctrine and practice,66 his invocation of Jung does exactly that. He 
refers to mandala symbolism as essential to inducing a “liberating psychological 
experience,”67 making no mention of the physiological element of liberation. He 
continues to downplay the non-psychological elements of the mandala by stating that, 
“the mandala is no longer a cosmogram, but a psychocosmogram, the scheme of 
disintegration from the One to the many and of reintegration from the many to the 
One.”68 As with Jung’s interpretation, Tucci’s statements have a vague resemblance to 
the Buddhist doctrinal stance on dispelling duality, but are couched in strictly 
psychologized, pseudo-mystical language that disguises the broader role of mandalas in 
Tibetan Buddhism. While his words may be poetic and alluring, they obscure the actual 
significance and usage of mandalas and actively subvert the Tibetan voice.  
 Rob Preece’s The Psychology of Buddhist Tantra69 (2006) serves as another 
example in which the interpretive lens of analytical psychology is prioritized over all 
other possible explanations. The text is grounded almost entirely in the works of Jung and 
his primary disciples, essentially functioning as an expanded version of Jung’s brief 
musings on Tibetan Buddhism. Preece draws primarily from Jung’s conception of the 
mandala as an archetype of the Self that tends towards wholeness, following the 
psychologist’s line of thought so far as to conclude that, “the mandala, therefore, is the 
extraordinary power of homeostasis within each of us. It enables us to remain sane and 
relatively healthy in the most intolerable circumstances.”70 While this is a beautiful 
sentiment, it has no grounding in Tibetan Buddhism and is connected to the tradition 
solely by way of Jung. This is a tenuous relationship at best, yet it still disguises that 
Preece is not really talking about Buddhist mandalas, but about Jungian ones. By 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  e	  Tucci	  claims	  that,	  “I	  have	  not	  dwelt	  too	  much	  on	  details…since	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  archetypes	  which	  are	  innate	  in	  the	  soul	  of	  Man.”	  (Tucci,	  1961,	  vii)	  He	  later	  elaborates,	  “[mandalas]	  occur	  through	  some	  mysterious	  intrinsic	  necessity	  of	  the	  human	  spirit,”	  (Tucci,	  1961,	  37)	  and,	  “for	  this	  reason	  Buddhism	  never	  speaks	  of	  the	  ‘repression’	  but	  of	  the	  ‘transfiguration’	  of	  passions,	  since	  they	  are,	  in	  fact,	  essential	  elements	  of	  our	  psyche.”	  (Tucci,	  1961,	  53)	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conflating these two forms, Preece writes the Tibetan voice off as relatively insignificant 
in light of Jung’s conclusions. 
 Referring to Jung’s interpretation of the mandala as “one of his gifts to the West,” 
Preece clearly cannot see the inherently problematic nature of his reliance on Jung’s 
voice at the expense of Tibetan ones. This is Orientalism and fallacious formalist 
interpretation at their finest: it ignores the actual tradition of which the author claims to 
speak and works with a distorted simulacrum instead, prioritizing the interpretive voice 
of the European scholar over that of the originators of the practice.  
 Romeo Shrestha’s Celestial Gallery (2009) serves as another example of the 
extremes to which the Jungian perspective has developed and is one of the most overtly 
misleading manifestations among popular depictions of mandalas. Although Jung is not 
ever explicitly mentioned in this work, his influence could hardly be more apparent than 
in phrases such as, “as we gaze upon these extraordinary paintings, we are transported 
into the innermost reaches of the psyche-a place in which anything is possible,” 71 and 
“[Buddhist deities and bodhisattvas] are not gods remote from our experience, but 
reflections of different states of awareness.”72 Not only does Celestial Gallery use 
Jungian psychologism to universalize mandalas, as in the Argüelles’ text, but it takes the 
process one step further by applying these conclusions to exclusively Tibetan mandalas. 
The result is a series of one-sided statements about mandalas in the specifically Tibetan 
context that, in actuality, are only loosely grounded in Tibetan Buddhism and have roots 
in a number of other cultures as well.f The authors never actively address this 
methodological point, thus giving the impression that they are presenting an authentic 
view of Tibetan mandalas when they clearly are not. 
 When modern scholars of Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan culture depict mandalas 
as “transports to the innermost reaches of the psyche” in which “the Buddhas, Taras, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  f	  This	  author’s	  unaddressed	  universalist	  stance	  is	  particularly	  apparent	  in	  conclusions	  such	  as,	  “…recognized	  as	  reflections	  of	  unexplored	  regions	  of	  the	  psyche,	  [the	  mind’s	  deepest	  dimensions]	  offer	  complete	  liberation	  from	  our	  slavery	  to	  emotional	  and	  material	  attachments.	  Like	  the	  awakened	  heart	  of	  the	  Buddhas,	  the	  universe	  selflessly	  gives	  of	  itself,”	  (Baker,	  2005,	  48)	  as	  well	  as	  their	  conclusion	  that,	  “fearless	  awareness	  [frees]	  its	  patrons	  from	  the	  unconscious	  forces	  of	  repression	  and	  suppression	  and	  boldly	  [brings]	  forth	  energies	  that,	  in	  their	  pure	  form,	  are	  expressions	  of	  enlightenment.”	  (Baker,	  2005,	  44)	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other peaceful divinities represent sublime states of consciousness” and “the wrathful or 
diabolical forms represent our inner tendencies for resentment, jealousy, greed, and 
guilt,”73 they ignore that mandalas are considered to be palaces of Buddhas and 
bodhisattvas in which one enacts a transformation of selfhood from the mundane to the 
divine. They ignore that mandalas are visually encoded with highly specific doctrines and 
the rituals in which initiates engage with these symbols. They ignore the necessity of 
possessing an extensive background not only in meditation, but also in cosmology, 
physiology, and philosophy. In short, they ignore almost everything that makes Tibetan 
mandala practice uniquely powerful and not merely another form of one-pointed 
meditation. 
 By psychologizing mandala symbolism and transforming practice into 
phenomenology, European and American scholars following Jung have denied a voice to 
the Tibetans who enlist mandalas in their practice and elevated themselves to a position 
of authority and superiority. Consequently, these scholars have made it quite difficult to 
parse through fact and fiction regarding Tibetan mandalas, having woven together 
multiple interpretive threads without attempting to keep track of where the Tibetan voice 
ceases and the Jungian one begins.  	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Chapter Four 
 
Jung’s Echo:  
Jung’s Broader Influence on Modern Tibetan Buddhism 
 
I have neither the desire nor the capacity to stand outside 
myself and observe my fate in a truly objective way…In the 
end, man is an event which cannot judge itself, but, for 
better or worse, is left to the judgment of others.1 
          -C.G. Jung 
 Although Jung may not have intended so, his commentaries on Tibetan Buddhism 
have earned him an important place in the development of Western contemporary 
conceptions of the religion. His writings demonstrate a convergence of Romantic 
Orientalist assertions that take Tibetan Buddhism to be a source of redemption for ailing 
Westerners and a heavy reliance on psychologism that interiorizes religious practice, 
which come together to satisfy the interests of both scholarly and popular audiences. Not 
only were Jung’s particular views adopted by many of his contemporaries and successors 
as his participation in the Eranos lectures demonstrates, but his methodological approach 
to domesticating Tibetan Buddhism for consumption in Europe and North America has 
persisted as well. The Jungian voice has not only echoed over the past century up to the 
present, but the implications of its authority have grown as well, no longer taking Jung at 
face value but for the meaning that his psychologism enables. Alongside the scientific 
and humanistic perspectives, Jungian psychologism has contributed to the formation of 
Tibetan Buddhist Modernism, a domesticated doppelganger of the religion it proposes to 
be, by introducing a distinctly psychological thread of interpretation to the discourse. 
Although contemporary specialists in Tibetan Buddhism have largely dismissed Jungian 
psychologism’s applicability to the study of the religion, Jung’s impact on scholars 
producing popular intellectual works has been substantial and thus figures him as a key 
player in the construction of Tibetan Buddhism in the larger Western imagination. 
Ultimately, these subsequent psychological commentaries commit a fatal epistemological 
fallacy in which the line between source material and its interpretation is either ignored or 
erased, resulting in distortions of Tibetan Buddhist theory and practice that still 
preponderate today. 
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The Eranos Conferences: Searching for a Religion After Religion 
 Beginning in 1933, the Eranos conferences served as a locus where scholars from 
a wide variety of fields could come together to meditate on the relationship between the 
East and the West. This multidisciplinary convergence drew scholars from philosophy, 
theology, ethnology, comparative religious studies, and philosophy. Although Eranos did 
not strictly adhere to Jungian theory or methodology, Jung was its single most influential 
member,2 widely praised by his fellow participants and requested to contribute to the 
discussions a remarkable fourteen times.3 Even Frau Olga Fröbe-Kapteyn, the primary 
patron of these conferences, commented that the “fruitful confrontation of East and 
West” with which the Eranos participants concerned themselves “is above all a 
psychological one,”4 demonstrating Jung’s centrality to these discussions. Aside from 
Jung, the Eranos conferences featured contributions from a number of other eminent 
scholars of comparative religion and theology at the time, including Giuseppe Tucci, 
Henry Corbin, Paul Tillich, Gershom Scholem, Martin Buber, Caroline Rhys Davids, and 
D.T. Suzuki, as well as Heinrich Zimmer, Joseph Campbell, and Mircea Eliade.5 
 Jung’s impact on Zimmer, Campbell, and Eliade was particularly pronounced, 
evidencing the creation of Jung as a prophetic figure capable of illuminating Tibetan 
Buddhism to new audiences. Zimmer, a professor of Indology at Berlin University, was 
the first person that Olga Fröbe invited to speak at an Eranos conference, taking on the 
subject of Indian Tantric yoga. In identifying the major influences that factored into his 
understanding of Indian Tantrism, Zimmer referred primarily to Indian sources, 
consisting primarily of early translations of yoga tantras and the Puranas. However, he 
also cites Jung’s Psychology of the Unconscious as a prominent formative force as well,6 
grandiosely claiming that, “when I first met [Jung] he struck me as the most 
accomplished embodiment of the big medicine man, of the perfect wizard, the master of 
Zen initiations.”7 While Zimmer was well aware of the dangers of psychological 
reductionism,8 he was also optimistic about the potential for collaboration between 
modern psychology and Eastern philology and ethnology, in which he enthusiastically 
participated.9 
 Impressed as Zimmer was by Jung, it seems that the psychologist’s influence was 
even greater on Joseph Campbell. Both his central works, The Hero with a Thousand 
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Faces and the Masks of God, focus on the monomyth, a narrative template that is the 
foundation of all myths and has clear roots in Jung’s theory of the collective unconscious 
and the archetypes. His praise of psychoanalytic methodology for providing a coherent 
system by which we can decipher and systematize symbols from cultures separated by 
time and space is most clearly directed at Jung’s cross-cultural explorations, rather than 
by Freud’s endeavors.10 Although contemporary scholars in the field of comparative 
religion have largely dismissed Campbell’s analyses, his work still remains significant to 
a large general audience outside of the discipline,11 demonstrating how he has carried 
Jung’s voice further into public consciousness. 
 Like Zimmer and Campbell, Mircea Eliade was also deeply influenced by Jung 
and enthralled by his presence, finding that, “After half an hour’s conversation I felt I 
was listening to a Chinese sage or an East European peasant, still rooted in the Earth 
Mother yet close to Heaven at the same time.”12 The two men found common ground on 
a great deal of subjects, including mythological symbolism, esotericism, the mystical 
literature of the East, and its potential applications to remedying the pathologies of 
modern European and North American civilization. Eliade was so impressed by Jung’s 
work that he even compares his explorations of the unconscious to the discoveries of 
oceanographers and speleologists, opening up new worlds of existence to human 
consideration.13 Given that Eliade has been treated as the single most influential figure in 
the academic study of religion over the second half of the twentieth century,14 his 
tremendous admiration for the psychologist is key to the expansion of Jung’s 
authoritative voice as a valid lens for studying religion. 
 Collectively, this group of eminent scholars explicitly sought to develop a 
common ground between the East and the West, which was often found in the form of 
Jungian psychology. Through their praise and assimilation of aspects of Jung’s ideas and 
method, they helped to popularize and legitimize the application of analytical 
psychoanalysis to religion. Furthermore, as a transcultural group of extremely erudite but 
non-practicing believers that prioritized the study of religion over its practice and 
dogmatic belief, Eranos’ participants worked toward the development of a religion after 
religion.15 While these efforts parallel Jung’s own attempts to position his analytical 
psychology as a superior substitute to traditional religions, they also complement the 
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development of ‘modern Tibetan Buddhism,’ an iteration of what is often called 
“Buddhist Modernism”16 that transcends cultural boundaries by romanticizing and 
psychologizing Tibetan Buddhism, domesticating it for consumption in Europe and North 
America.  
 
Amplifying the Jungian Voice: The Direct Inheritors of Analytical Psychology 
 Turning now to scholars who have followed most directly in Jung’s footsteps, we 
find a considerable expansion of his authority and repurposing of Jungian psychologism 
toward new ends. For our present analysis, we will concern ourselves primarily not with 
the specific points of correspondence between analytical psychology and Tibetan 
Buddhism that authors draw from their position at the intersection of the two fields, but 
with the larger implications of each work. As publications for popular audiences, the 
following examples are quite instructive of the place that Tibetan Buddhism currently 
holds in the Western imagination following Jung. While we could examine a number of 
other works that consider the relationship between these two thought systems,a the three 
present examples closely follow Jung’s technique of conflating Tibetan Buddhism and 
analytical psychology, thereby erasing the idiosyncrasies of both systems, while 
simultaneously prioritizing their ‘true’ esoteric interpretation over the literal meaning of 
the Tibetan texts.  Although Jung was not the originator of this analytical technique of 
playing upon both sameness and difference, he was the first to assimilate that particular 
rhetoric into a unified psychological framework for evaluating Tibetan Buddhism and 
thus established a referent methodology that future scholars could conveniently adopt.  
Additionally, each of these examples also draws a unique conclusion regarding 
the significance of the Jungian approach, demonstrating the multiple ways in which 
Jung’s voice has been repurposed without any serious consideration of the limitations on 
such claims. They reveal how Jung has not been read at face value, but for the meaning 
that his methods and interpretations have enabled, encouraging an amplification of Jung’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  a	  For	  example,	  see	  H.	  Aronson’s	  Buddhist	  Practice	  on	  Western	  Ground,	  M.	  Unno’s	  
Buddhism	  and	  Psychotherapy	  Across	  Cultures,	  and	  J.M.	  Spiegelman’s	  Buddhism	  and	  
Jungian	  Psychology.	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authoritative voice. Ultimately, the Jungian approach helped to lay the groundwork for 
the development of the psychological dimension of Modern Tibetan Buddhism.  
We shall begin with Radmila Moacanin’s The Essence of Jung’s Psychology and 
Tibetan Buddhism: Western and Eastern Paths to the Heart,17 which Luis Gomez has 
already briefly considered in his impressive excavation of Jung’s relationship to the 
Indian East.18 Although Moacanin warns her readers of the potential dangers of making 
cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary comparisons between Tibetan Buddhism and 
analytical psychology,19 she nevertheless proceeds to adopt Jung’s technique of claiming 
access to Tibetan Buddhism’s esoteric meaning by psychologizing its beliefs and 
practices. Her claim that, “despite its intricate complexity and esoteric nature, Tibetan 
Buddhism is essentially a psychological and ethical system,”20 enables her to analogize 
the enlightened mind to the collective unconscious21 and Buddhist deities to archetypes,22 
as well as liken the goal of enlightenment to the process of individuation.23  
Moacanin’s analysis overly simplifies Tibetan Buddhism by stripping it of its 
nuances and fitting it into the schemas of analytical psychology. However, as Gomez has 
already pointed out, her stance goes further than Jung and “advocates a particular 
interpretation of Jung as a normative standard for Buddhist orthodoxy and praxis.”24 She 
thus authorizes Jung’s statements on the religion, viewing his voice not as one particular 
way of making “the magnificent world of ideas [of Tibetan Buddhism]…a little more 
intelligible to the Western mind,”25 but as the definitive one. 
In his Dreams of Power: Tibetan Buddhism and the Western Imagination,26 Peter 
Bishop furthers this expansion of Jung’s authority by reversing the agency of attempts to 
fit Tibetan Buddhism into the framework of analytical psychology. Interestingly, Bishop, 
who identifies himself as a postcolonial theorist,27 prefaces his work with concerns 
regarding cultural imperialism and the dubious possibility of drawing comparisons 
between Tibetan Buddhism and Jungian psychology,28 concluding that his work is “a 
study of the Western imagination as revealed in the encounter with an Eastern spiritual 
system.”29 However, similar to Moacanin’s qualifying statements, Bishop’s claims are 
quickly superseded by his actual analysis. 
Aside from his claims that Tibetan Buddhism describes psychological reality30 
and is concerned with establishing psychic order and integration,31 the primary issue at 
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hand in Bishop’s text is his assertion of the relationship between the two thought systems. 
Whereas Jung clearly uses Tibetan Buddhism instrumentally as a baseline against which 
he can measure analytical psychology, Bishop blurs the direction of agency of this 
relationship in his claim that, “Buddhism has reached for depth psychology in its search 
for an effective Western language to use in translation and in an attempt to validate itself 
in the Western imagination.”32 In this unreliable interpretation, reductionist psychologism 
is no longer an act of cognitive dominance or validation of analytical psychology, but an 
attempt of the Tibetan tradition to remain relevant in the modern world. Accordingly, 
Bishop treats analogies between Tibetan Buddhism and analytical psychology as a move 
towards modernization instigated by Tibetans rather than as a Western scholarly tactic for 
instrumentalizing the religion as such comparisons ultimately are. In doing so, he 
reverses the agency behind psychologizing Tibetan Buddhism, attempting to mask the 
dominating behavior of Jung and those that follow his methods of psychologism. Jung’s 
authority is thus expanded even further than Moacanin’s analysis allowed, transforming 
analytical psychology not only into a normative interpretive method for Westerners 
interested in learning more about Tibetan Buddhism, but as the definitive lens for 
Tibetans wishing to make themselves understood as well. 
Robert Preece continues to expand Jung’s authority on Tibetan Buddhism by 
enlisting it in the larger project of secularizing the religion for scholarly study and 
popular consumption. In his The Psychology of Buddhist Tantra33 (2006), the most recent 
of the texts under consideration, Preece adopts Bishop’s perspective of psychologism as a 
viable mechanism for modernizing Tibetan Buddhism because it provides useful 
terminology for Westerners and Tibetans to meet on common discursive grounds. 
As a trained Jungian psychoanalyst and a veteran of Tibetan Buddhist retreats,34 
we might expect Preece to demonstrate greater sensitivity to respectfully representing 
both thought systems. Indeed, he admirably includes brief considerations of Tibetan 
physiology, cosmology, and their union in Tantric practice through their connection in 
the micro-macrocosmic complex.35 Unfortunately, his analysis is regrettably shallow and 
ultimately falls back on the practice of claiming access to the esoteric meaning of these 
concepts. Just like Jung, he reduces them to symbolic metaphors, allowing for far greater 
interpretive liberties.36 His text primarily emphasizes opportunities to bring the lessons of 
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Tibetan Buddhism into daily life, transforming our day-to-day existence into a form of 
“living alchemy” in which we manipulate symbols to bring about personal 
transformations.37 This particular interpretation represents a domestication of Tantrism 
that opens the practice not only to Buddhist laypeople, but to anyone at all interested in 
coping with fear, anger, frustration, and feelings of inadequacy.38  
The text’s interest in domesticating Tibetan Buddhism is highlighted by Preece’s 
inclusion of a foreword by Stephen Batchelor,39 a well-known scholar and author on 
Buddhism for general audiences in his own right. Batchelor is best known for his vision 
of “Buddhism without beliefs”40 that strips the religion of its overtly theistic and 
cosmological elements for atheistic Americans and Europeans. The presence of his voice 
in Preece’s work demonstrates the clear intent of the text to use psychologism to 
domesticate the religion for Westerners by rendering it in the terms of modern 
psychology. As with Preece, Batchelor’s primary concern is integrating Tibetan Tantric 
theory into daily life, which might help readers channel their negative and antisocial 
impulses into “creative expression, loving relationships, and wisely engaged forms of 
life.”41 Batchelor uses this stance to justify stripping Tibetan Buddhism of its ritual and 
devotional aspects, performing a wholesale reduction and transformation of the religion 
into an easily digestible philosophy for European and American audiences. 
Following Jung’s authorial decision to sever ideas from their particular context by 
transforming them into psychic data, Moacanin, Bishop, and Preece all thereby contribute 
to the formation of a ‘Tibetan Buddhism’ that is not really Tibetan Buddhism at all. Their 
psychological interpretations reflect a concern to distill the religion’s supposed belief 
system into a form that is more easily assimilated into (fundamentally Westerner) modern 
lifestyles and scholarly practices for analyzing religion. While Jung undoubtedly set the 
stage for these applications of psychologism, we cannot place blame for the consequent 
distortions of Tibetan Buddhism entirely on his shoulders. Instead, we must consider the 
ways in which his distinctly psychological perspective enabled the larger intellectual 
project of Tibetan Buddhist Modernism.  
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Modern Tibetan Buddhist Psychologism: The Creation of a Domesticated 
Doppelganger 
 
Although the desire to domesticate Tibetan Buddhism is assuredly present in 
Jung’s commentaries as well, Preece and Batchelor adopt his techniques of romanticizing 
and psychologizing their object of study toward a different end. While Jung’s 
psychologism of Tibetan Buddhism is often a method of promotion for analytical 
psychology,42 subsequent interpreters have enlisted psychologism in the broader 
construction of Tibetan Buddhist Modernism, which secularizes the religion and directs it 
toward humanistic ends while simultaneously maintaining that it is an ‘authentic’ form of 
the religion. While many of the following methodological approaches have now been 
criticized and abandoned within formal academic inquiry on Tibetan Buddhism, their 
prominence in the early development of Tibetan Buddhist Studies has enabled them to 
perpetuate among non-specialists. Even though the field has now advanced to more 
complex and thoughtful forms of analysis, Jungian psychologism still echoes in the 
broader Western discourse on Tibetan Buddhism. 
Our present analysis does not claim that psychologism is the sole methodological 
tool of scholars investigating Tibetan Buddhism, or even that it is the most dominant 
interpretive trend. Admittedly, the scientific and humanistic trends have been equally, if 
not more, prevalent and persuasive.43 Nor does this argument suggest that the early 
hermeneutical tools of Tibetan Buddhist Studies originated with Jung and that he is solely 
responsible for their proliferation. Given that the European exploration of Tibetan 
Buddhism emerged from Indology, Sinology, philology, and archaeology, the field 
inevitably adopted analytical practices from these various disciplines.  
Nevertheless, while Jung was heir to interpretive trends pre-established by other 
fields, he also elaborated on these practices and introduced a strictly psychological lens to 
the discourse. As works like those of Moacanin, Bishop, and Preece clearly demonstrate, 
Jung’s particular interpretive technique and its terminology still persist in popular 
scholarly works on the religion. As such, we cannot deny Jung an important role in the 
creation and maintenance of Tibetan Buddhism as an object of scholarly study and 
popular interest. Moreover, due to Jung’s insistence that he abides by empirical 
methodology and his romanticization of Tibetan Buddhism, Jungian psychologism 
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partially appeases interpreters with more scientific or humanistic aims and therefore 
serves as somewhat of a locus at which the three dominant strands of Buddhist 
Modernism can converge. 
As a culturally specific form of Buddhism that adherents label as ‘authentic,’ 
Tibetan Buddhist Modernism is hardly unique, having occurred in every instance in 
which the religion was transmitted from one place to another. However, attempting to 
trace the forces that govern the emergence of a distorted double that claims to be 
‘authentic’ is an engaging intellectual labor that can help us to parse through the many 
voices that claim to elucidate Tibetan Buddhism. We should not fall into the belief that 
sorting out these various voices will unveil Tibetan Buddhism’s ‘true’ form, as that 
would merely be a recapitulation of the Romantic Orientalist hungering for essences, but 
an analysis of modern Tibetan Buddhism can, at the very least, help us distinguish some 
of the ways in which the specific time and place of its transmission to the West renders it 
unique. In the end, there is no real ‘Buddhism’ separate from its traditions, so 
understanding the tradition as it has been transmitted to the West is now instrumental to 
understanding the religion as a whole. 
Buddhist Modernism’s construction of a domesticated Tibetan Buddhism for 
European and American audiences has occurred within the spheres of academic 
scholarship and popular culture alike. However, these two spheres are far from discrete, 
having commingled throughout Western engagements with Tibet and continually 
informing each other on the basis of the confines of time, place, and cultural climate.44 
While contemporary academic specialists may wish to silence Jung’s voice, its presence 
in works directed to broader audiences ensures that Jungian psychologism persists. 
Although chapter one offered an overview of ‘Buddhism’ and ‘mystic Tibet’ in 
the Western imagination during the nineteenth century, these constructions and their 
accompanying interpretive practices were not yet subsumed under a particular academic 
field at that time. In fact, while the discipline of Religious Studies did not formally exist 
prior to the 1960s,45 the introduction of Tibetan Buddhism to these departments occurred 
even later. Although Brian Houghton Hodgson made a tremendous quantity of Sanskrit 
texts on Buddhism available to Europeans in 1837,46 it was really only following the 
Tibetan diaspora in 1959 that the study of Tibetan Buddhism as a unique phenomenon 
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received acceptance as a valid field of inquiry.47 Following the diaspora, however, there 
was tremendous interest in the religion itself, rather than just as a derivation of Indian or 
Chinese Buddhism, and study of Tibetan Buddhism flourished with the translation of vast 
archives of Tibetan texts between the 1960’s and 1980’s.48 As these newly unearthed 
texts passed into the hands of academics, most of who were in America,49 it was common 
for them to adopt psychological interpretations that had been popularized by Jung. 
Although many of the following methodological approaches have now been 
criticized and abandoned within formal academic inquiry on Tibetan Buddhism, their 
prominence in the early development of Tibetan Buddhist Studies has enabled them to 
perpetuate among non-specialists. Even though the field has now advanced to more 
complex and thoughtful forms of analysis, Jungian psychologism still echoes in the 
broader Western discourse on Tibetan Buddhism. 
According to Donald Lopez’s analysis, the newly emergent field of Tibetan 
Buddhist Studies relied on psychologizing the foreign religion for a number of reasons. 
To begin with, focusing on the inner experience of Tibetan Buddhism enabled scholars to 
carve out a niche within the field of Religious Studies, which was actively seeking to add 
non-Christian religions to its curricula. By juxtaposing the religion’s systematic 
meditations and penetrating philosophies against Christianity’s greater emphasis on 
doctrine and belief, scholars of Tibetan Buddhism were able to justify their existence and 
necessary inclusion in departments of Religious Studies.50 
Furthermore, psychologism was easier than alternative hermeneutical methods. 
As many budding Buddhologists, particularly those studying under Edward Conze and 
Richard Robinson, came across tremendously arcane accounts of doctrines, institutions, 
and rituals, they directed their attention toward the presumed source of these other 
elements: meditative experience.51 Considering Tibetan Buddhism from the 
phenomenological standpoint rather than from the doctrinal, institutional, or ritual side of 
things seemed to get to the heart of the religion far more easily than examining its 
particular cultural instantiations, making academic analysis both easier and presumably 
more penetrating. 
Psychologizing Tibetan Buddhism thus also served as a tool for scholars to claim 
that their object of inquiry is a ‘pure’ form of Buddhism, one that is separated from 
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complicating cultural influences. This assumption, which is a direct consequence of the 
Romantic Orientalists’ quest for ‘authentic’ Buddhism, enabled the alluring idea that 
Buddhism had a “transhistorical and self-identical essence that had benevolently 
descended on various cultures over the course of history, its instantiations, however, 
always imperfect.”52 Playing directly into this vision, psychologism satisfies the common 
scholarly desire to identify ‘essences,’ which greatly simplifies exploration of a complex 
historical phenomenon and more easily subjects it to classification.  
Approaching Tibetan Buddhist teachings and practice psychologically in terms of 
mental constructs rather than as foreign cultural artifacts also makes them more 
accessible to popular audiences. Configuring Tibetan Buddhism as a cache of psychic 
data innate to each of us allows anyone to find solace in Tibetan Buddhist teachings. 
Paired with such psychologism, romanticization of Tibetan Buddhism is not only a 
valorization of the practices of another culture, but of the potential of our own minds. 
Tibetan Buddhism consequently becomes a path to inner freedom amidst our suffering at 
the hands of modern Western civilization.53 Scholars played on the same Romantic 
Orientalist trope of the evils of materialism as Jung in order to appeal to popular 
audiences hoping to alleviate their own day-to-day struggles. This recapitulation of 
Romanticism created both a public interest in the religion and a market for publications 
on the topic, thus further establishing Tibetan Buddhist Studies as a legitimate 
discipline.54 In this way, scholarly and popular interests reciprocally supported each 
other, the former providing new and alluring information about the religion that the latter 
then consumed, thereby encouraging the production of even more scholarly knowledge. 
Psychologism was thus a node around which Tibetan Buddhism was able to sustain itself 
on cultural grounds already saturated with various sources of proclaimed Eastern 
wisdom.  
By psychologizing and romanticizing Tibetan Buddhism, methodological 
strategies first united in the study of Tibetan Buddhism by Jung, scholars and general 
audiences over the past half a decade have thereby contributed to the creation of a 
psychologized doppelganger within the broader construction of Modern Tibetan 
Buddhism. However, once psychologism was employed, it was no longer perpetuated 
solely by Westerners, but also implicated the very Tibetans about whom it claims to 
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speak. As Tibetans have made their way West following the diaspora, they have since 
come into contact with their own double and have often integrated into it seamlessly.55 
Influential lamas such as His Holiness the Dalai Lama himself have now joined in the 
development and propagation of Modern Tibetan Buddhism as well, evidenced by the 
tremendous number of popular works on the religion published under his name.56 
Jefferey Paine views this encounter as the  
…greatest revolution in the history of the religion”57 and 
thus: “In exile Tibetan Buddhism thus initiated its own 
novel experiment of a religion voluntarily surrendering its 
power to prescribe conduct and to dictate a cosmology of 
existence. It had little choice, for if it did not relocate at least 
partially to America and Europe, it would likely perish.58  
 
Phrased as such, the assimilation of Tibetans into their Western mirage is not primarily 
an act of recognizing their own beliefs and practices properly rendered in new terms, but 
an act of necessity that allows Tibetans to adopt a somewhat distorted identity, rather 
than risking the loss of a unique identity altogether. 
Tibetan teachers that heavily relied on psychological terminology, such as the late 
lamas Thubten Yeshe59 and Chögyam Trungpa,60 found a way to meet European and 
American practitioners on the grounds on which they are most comfortable.b In this view, 
the adoption of the terms of analytical psychology provides Tibetan lamas the 
opportunity to help their audiences experience the psychological effects of the religion 
without elements that are objectionable to their Western sensibilities. These teachers 
employed techniques to keep their religion relevant at a time when it has been cast out 
from its homeland, consequently actualizing Bishop’s claim that Tibetan Buddhism has 
reached out to modern psychology for legitimacy in the modern world. While this 
statement would not likely have come true had scholars of Tibetan Buddhism refrained 
from integrating Jung’s methodology into their study, their reliance on psychologism has 
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  particularly	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  and	  demonstrates	  a	  near	  universal	  appeal,	  evidenced	  through	  his	  claims	  that,	  “Buddhism	  isn’t	  some	  fanatical	  religious	  trip.	  It’s	  a	  philosophical	  way	  of	  living	  life.	  And	  also,	  to	  study	  Buddhism	  you	  don’t	  need	  to	  believe	  in	  something	  extreme.	  It’s	  a	  matter	  of	  investigating,	  examining,	  and	  experimenting	  on	  yourself.”	  (Yeshe	  and	  Zopa	  Rinpoche,	  2009,	  23)	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helped make Bishop’s assertion into a reality. In a sense then, the Tibetan voice and 
Jung’s voice have now become one. 
 
Against Interpretation: Concluding a Traditional Critique of Jung 
 Given that Jung’s methodology for working with Tibetan Buddhism caused him 
to produce a misrepresentative simulacrum of the religion of which he claimed to speak, 
it is unsurprising that intellectuals who adopted his penchant for psychologism have 
produced a similarly perverted form of the religion. Their psychologized and redemptive 
Tibetan Buddhism falls prey to the same epistemological fallacy of formalist 
interpretation identified by Sontag that blurs the line between the religion as it is 
practiced in Tibet and its contemporary interpretations. Having seen the intellectually 
damaging consequences of echoing Jung’s psychologizing voice, we might follow this 
fallacy to its logical conclusion that all interpretations are doomed to failure and decide to 
eliminate the psychological perspective on Tibetan Buddhism entirely. Indeed, there are a 
number of authors who have advocated this stance, claiming that Jungian psychologism 
desecrates the religion it proposes to explain. Such criticism has been incredible harsh, 
including assertions that, “one of the most insidious and destructive illusions is the belief 
that depth-psychology…has the slightest connection with spiritual life, which these 
teachings persistently falsify by confusing inferior elements [psychic] with superior 
[spiritual].”61 While this critique may ring true, we should not take that as a call to 
outright dismiss psychological interpretations of religious and spiritual phenomena, but 
rather to reconsider them. 
 Luis Gomez can help us reevaluate such claims without moving to the opposite 
pole of total acceptance of psychological accounts of Tibetan Buddhism. He helpfully 
points out three different ways in which we encounter foreign cultures:  
(1) repeating, albeit respectfully, a tradition 
(2) viewing it critically and creatively  
(3) appropriating an ‘alien’ culture through a construct 
from one’s own culture.62 
 
Gomez confesses that the line between these three types of engagement is far less 
apparent than his discrete systematization suggests and adopting a stance that is 
simultaneously respectful and insightful can be quite difficult. The perplexities that 
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accompany encounters with a foreign Other have consequently led many interpreters to 
the extremes of complete acceptance of Jungian psychologism and outright rejection. 
While Moacanin, Bishop, and Preece demonstrate a commendable degree of self-
awareness in their attempts to create an intermediate space by recognizing the difficulties 
inherent to such encounters, they all ultimately succumb to the pitfalls that they had 
pointed out. 
 I suggest that we reconsider interpretive applications of psychologism to Tibetan 
Buddhism by returning to the zeitgeist in which Jung wrote and by revisiting the words of 
the psychologist himself. Although he has proven an easy target for our earlier critique of 
him as an Orientalist that sacrifices the voice of his Tibetan objects of inquiry to the 
larger task of legitimizing analytical psychology, Jung’s problematic commentaries also 
provide us with the tools to reconsider the significance of his voice. This reappraisal will 
allow us to reorient psychologism of Tibetan Buddhism in a way that does not unfairly 
skew perceptions of the religion and that might actually serve to teach us something 
about our own positionality as Westerners. As we look back on our previous criticism of 
Jung and now look ahead in an attempt to reframe both Jung and traditional critiques of 
him, we would do well to abide by the guiding words of Pierre Bourdieu: 
Those who nowadays set themselves up as judges and 
distribute praise and blame among the sociologists and 
ethnologists of the colonial past would be better occupied in 
trying to understand what it was that prevented the most 
lucid and best intentioned of those that they condemn from 
understanding things which are now self-evident for even 
the least lucid and sometimes the least well-intentioned 
observers: in what is unthinkable at a given time, there is not 
only everything that cannot be thought for lack of ethical or 
political dispositions which tend to bring it into 
consideration, but also everything which cannot be thought 
for lack of instruments of thought such as problematics, 
concepts, methods, and techniques.63 	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Chapter Five 
 
Pursuing the Eastern Other: 
Jung’s Attempts to Decipher Human Personality 
 
At last I was where I had longed to be: in a non-European 
country where no European language was spoken and no 
Christian conceptions prevailed, where a different race 
lived and a different historical tradition and philosophy 
had set its stamp upon the face of the crowd. I had often 
wished to be able for once to see the European from 
outside, his image reflected back at him by an altogether 
foreign milieu1. 
          C.G. Jung 
 
Jung’s resonance in contemporary appraisals of Tibetan Buddhism is most 
problematic in its advocacy for Jungian psychologism without qualification. Even when 
scholars warn of drawing cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary comparisons or attempt to 
situate Jung within a particular network of power r elations, they often still fall into the 
trap of treating analytical psychology as a totalizing system. This stance leaves their 
interpretations one-sided and open to the invasion of unrestrained psychologism that 
obscures the Romantic Orientalist nature of their analyses. On the converse side of such 
approaches to Jung are those who immediately write him off as an Orientalist. However, 
given the zeitgeist in which Jung was writing and his professional agenda to establish and 
promote analytical psychology, it would have been impossible for him to express himself 
in any way other than as a cultural imperialist or an Orientalist. This is not an apology for 
Jung’s treatment of Tibetan Buddhism or an attempt to fully exculpate him, but is 
intended to draw attention back to the forces that defined his context and informed his 
rhetoric so that we can reevaluate traditional critiques of his work. 
 Between the two extremes of either wholly accepting or absolutely dismissing 
Jungian psychologism there lies a middle way that we can uncover by performing an 
archaeology of his life and work, thereby revealing that Jung’s journeys East were rooted 
in demands that emerged equally from his internal and external worlds. Dissatisfied with 
Western religious, philosophical, and scientific discourses, Jung sought out an 
Archimedean point outside of his European consciousness that could provide new modes 
of thought for making sense of the inner turœmoil between his ego personality (“No. 1”) 
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and its shadow side (“No. 2”). Furthermore, as Jung’s own field of psychiatry developed 
in Europe in the late nineteenth century, it became increasingly committed to positivistic 
science and empiricism for legitimacy. In order to establish the universal applicability of 
analytical psychology, Jung was consequently required to abide by these same methods 
to validate his work. He required empirical data from non-Western society to demonstrate 
that the archetypes are not just the result of socialization to a particular culture, but are 
innate to all of humankind. Taken together, these dual threads of inner curiosity and 
external professional ambition drove Jung East, hoping to find a remedy to the one-
sidedness of his own personality and Western civilization as a whole. As he did so, Jung 
became implicated in the Orientalist discourse common to his time, as well as in the 
European scholarly trend of prioritizing inner experience in the study of religion. Jung’s 
place in this network of power relations therefore ensured his adoption of interpretive 
strategies that implicitly dominate his objects of study. 
Many of the following accounts have been drawn from Jung’s autobiography, 
Memories, Dreams, Reflections (MDR), which was dictated to his secretary, Aniela Jaffe, 
in the psychologist’s later years. As Ellenberger has pointed out in his comprehensive 
history of psychonalysis, MDR leaves much to be desired insofar as it leaves wide gaps in 
Jung’s personal history and contradicts the accounts of many of Jung’s colleagues.2 
Nevertheless, the text is absolutely essential to gain a sense of how Jung viewed himself 
and how he framed his metapsychological project. MDR is filled with Jung’s self-analysis 
throughout his life, providing invaluable insight into the father of analytical psychology. 
While this inward focus was elaborated at the expense of cataloguing many of Jung’s 
external dealings, any discussion of his influences and encounters that appear in the 
following pages have been corroborated by outside sources to back up Jung’s own 
assertions. 
 
Mapping the Architecture: Determining Jung’s Discursive Positionality 
 If “power is everywhere as the moving substrate of force relations, which 
constantly engenders stages of power,”3 as Foucault declares, making these relations 
visible will allow for an informed decision regarding how to treat Jungian psychological 
interpretations of Tibetan Buddhism. Although shedding light on the discursive 
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architecture in which Jung produced his commentaries will not render the relations of 
power transparent or allow us to objectively view Jung’s stance, it can at the very least 
help us to change our perspective and reenvision the proper place of his commentaries 
within broader Western scholarship on Tibetan Buddhism. 
 As Eric Meyer has noted in his efforts to mitigate the intellectual damage that 
Romantic Orientalist accounts enact on their source material,  
…the individual can only exert agency as a subject from 
within the cultural narratives that frame him or her…but by 
strategically utilizing the transformative capacity that is 
written into the cultural narratives… critical practice might 
open a space for agency in the cultural field that mobilizes 
subject-formation towards more positive social ends.4  
 
In short, if we become aware of the ideological matrix, i.e. the discourse, in which we 
exist, it is possible to turn power back upon itself, allowing us to produce an 
interpretation less restrained by the dominant narrative of the time. If discourse 
necessarily shapes how we think and express ourselves, awareness of the narratives in 
which we are embedded opens up a space that can mediate between what we want to say 
and how the discursive forms available to us require us to articulate those sentiments.  
 In Jung we discover a psychologist who recognizes his existence within a 
particular culture at a particular period in history, but who remains unable to make 
explicit the implications of his positionality. In his Commentary on The Tibetan Book of 
the Great Liberation, Jung notes that his statements are a “product of a certain 
personality living at a certain time and in a certain place…to that extent it is chiefly 
subjective.”5 However, this statement reveals nothing more than an awareness of 
subjectivism in the first place and, aside from his ambivalent musings on empirical 
science and speculations on the spiritually damaging nature of modern civilization, Jung 
drew few specific conclusions regarding the impact that his zeitgeist had on his writings. 
 The closest that we get to an overall appraisal of Jung’s own positionality can be 
found in Memories, Dreams, Reflections. In the personal writings of his advanced old 
age, Jung recounts a vision that he had while recovering from a heart attack in which he 
imagines himself moving throughout the cosmos and coming upon a floating temple. He 
explains, 
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There I would at last understand-this too was a certainty-
what historical nexus I or my life fitted into…I had the 
feeling that I was a historical fragment, an excerpt for which 
the preceding and succeeding text was missing. My life 
seemed to have been snipped out of a long chain of events, 
and many questions had remained unanswered.6 
 
Unfortunately, these questions would remain unanswered as he awoke from his vision 
before entering the temple. Provided the apparent impossibility of ever coming to full 
awareness of our own subjectivity within a network of power relations, perhaps it is 
fitting that Jung believed he could only attain such knowledge through mystical 
experience, and it eludes him even then.  
As we look back on Jung’s corpus we find it easy to criticize the shortcomings of 
his scholarship because we are granted the gift of retrospection. Yet just as Jung 
struggled to make sense of his own subjectivity, we cannot fully grasp the discursive 
forces that dictate his or our own existences.  
 
A Man Divided Against Himself: Jung’s Contemplations on Internal Otherness 
Jung’s fascination with the human mind began and, as far as he was concerned, 
ended with himself. Much of his personal writings are concerned with discovering and 
making sense of the secret Other that lay within his own mind. In Jung’s view, the 
shadow is not merely an academic theory but the key to human life and development as a 
whole. Jung constantly wrestled with the shadow side of human existence, catching 
inklings of it as a youth that continued to manifest throughout his life and career. He 
found the shadow not only through his self-reflexive tendencies, but evident in the 
cultural institutions in which he was enmeshed as well. Jung’s desire for self-
understanding fueled his religious and intellectual hungers, which constitute the two 
primary streams that carried Jung through his exploration of the human personality. To 
consider Jung’s work without careful examination of these two intersecting threads is to 
take him for something that he did not intend to be, that is, a detached empirical 
psychologist.  
 Jung’s explicit interest in Tibetan Buddhism as a treasure trove of ideas that might 
help Westerners broaden their experience of life7 is ultimately part of his larger life’s 
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work, which he identified as the “one idea and one goal” that “permeated and held 
together” his entire life and works: “to penetrate into the secret of the personality.”8 
However, as Jung himself was painfully aware, modern Western society is deeply 
conflicted about the meaning of individual personality and its asymmetrical pursuit of 
rationality actively impedes individuation and realization of the Self. In The Spiritual 
Problem of Modern Man,9 Jung contemplates the spiritual ennui of European moderns, 
which he views as a derivation of a general dearth of meaning and religious outlook.10 
According to Jung, modern humans stand at the edge of the world, believing that they 
have outgrown tradition and have thus discarded history, only looking forward into the 
abyss of the future. They placed all their hopes in the advances of science and 
technology, replacing metaphysical speculations with the ideals of material security, 
general welfare, and humaneness.11 Yet, as the atrocities of World War I demonstrated, 
these ideals are far from secure, leaving moderns both spiritually and materially 
impoverished. Rather than standing at the precipice of the teleological advancement of 
history, modern humans are actually “the disappointment of the hopes and expectations 
of the ages.”12 
Beset with both the failure of material circumstances to meet their lofty 
expectations, as well as the denial of their inner, spiritual natures, European moderns are 
thus caught in a seemingly irresolvable tension. They have dammed up the unconscious 
world within them, preventing it from expressing itself in the world. As the pressure 
continues to build, “the current flows backward to its source; the inner man wants 
something which the visible man does not want, and we are at war with ourselves.”13 For 
Jung, this internal war was not merely a theoretical proposition, but a battle that waged 
within many of his patients, as well as within himself. It is ultimately this psychological 
turmoil that acted as the impetus behind much of his life’s work, constantly driving him 
onwards to make sense of how to reconcile his own divided personality. 
In his autobiography, Jung expresses that, throughout his entire life, he 
experienced an internal and seemingly irresolvable tension of personalities within 
himself. Although he was not able to fully articulate this internal turmoil until his later 
years,14 Jung identified two aspects of himself that were diametrically opposed, which he 
came to label as his No. 1 and his No. 2. No. 1 was associated with the outward 
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personality that he would manifest in daily life, that of an aspiring scientist and 
empiricist.15 He was young, ambitious, and gifted, yet simultaneously plagued with a 
constant sense of self-doubt at his own disagreeableness and limitations.16 Consequently, 
No. 1 would often fall into depression in recognition of something more expansive 
lurking behind the surface, Jung’s No. 2. 
Jung identified his No. 2 as an old man with a strong affinity for the eighteenth 
century.17 He represented Jung’s spiritual side, the aspect that sought meaning rather than 
facts. As his truly inner self, No. 2 was everything in one, a total vision of life that could 
never be fully defined but was always present.18 Whereas No. 1 regarded his counterpart 
with a sense of melancholy and dread, No. 2 viewed Jung’s surface personality as a 
difficult and thankless moral task, a realm of darkness and confusion with no discernable 
purpose.19 
Having arrived at a vague, yet nevertheless definite, sense of the inner 
contradiction of his conscious No. 1 and shadowy No. 2 as a young child, Jung sought to 
make sense of this conflict by means of the ideas most readily available to him, those of 
Christianity. Raised by a Protestant chaplain with minimal intellectual curiosity, Jung’s 
upbringing was undoubtedly skewed towards Western religious inquiry.20 Yet despite his 
deep immersion in the beliefs and practices of Christianity as a youth, Jung’s relationship 
with the religion was highly ambivalent, caught between a deep sense of personal 
communion with the divine and a strong distaste for the institutional apparatus designed 
to guide these feelings. One of his earliest memories is that of a visceral antipathy toward 
Christianity’s figure of Jesus, who Jung viewed as problematically ethereal, never fully 
acceptable, and, at his most extreme, a god of death.21  
As he approached Christian teachings that he was supposed to accept as beautiful 
and good, Jung was plagued with the sense that something was missing, a secret to which 
he was not privy. He judged the religion as a solemn masquerade that presented concepts 
as being clear that, for Jung, were far from simple. Christianity refused to recognize its 
own shadow, a denial that both baffled and deeply frustrated Jung. He was particularly 
troubled with the notion of the will of God. While the church demanded him to 
unquestioningly follow the will of God, Jung could not possibly discern what that truly 
meant. By his estimation, the Church merely put their religious doctrines in the place of 
	   107	  
God’s will in order to spare people the trouble of deciphering it for themselves. By 
denying the need for actual discernment, Christianity disguised the unquestionable nature 
of its dogma by suggesting that adherents simply have faith. God’s will, meanwhile, 
remained in the Church’s institutional shadow. Ever curious, Jung could not accept this 
sleight of hand and became increasingly skeptical of the religion that surrounded him. 
Christianity, the contemporary incarnation of a traditionally Western religion, simply did 
not meet Jung’s needs for self-discovery, driving him to find satisfaction elsewhere. 
This aversion toward orthodoxy drove Jung to develop a highly personal sense of 
God by which he would decipher the secrets of the divine himself. Until his final years, 
Jung was highly reserved about displaying his personal thoughts on God in his public 
writings. He recognized that any of his statements regarding God would be just that, his 
own, and would consequently be subjectively influenced by the powerful feelings and 
emotions that governed his inner world. As Aniela Jaffe points out in her introduction to 
Jung’s autobiography, “when Jung speaks of his religious experiences in this book he is 
assuming that his readers are willing to enter into his point of view.”22 Jung believed that, 
in the most decisive matters of his life, he was no longer among men but was alone with 
God. Since he viewed himself as an empiricist, “deal[ing] with [religion] from a purely 
empirical point of view, that is, I restrict myself to the observation of phenomena and I 
eschew any metaphysical or philosophical considerations,”23 Jung sought to restrict his 
claims to those that could be demonstrated and supported by evidence. Yet despite the 
fact that his academic writings do not feature extended meditations on God, Jung’s 
naturally contemplative nature is never fully absent from his professional endeavors.  
Due to the fact that orthodox Christianity as he experienced it in church scarcely 
advanced Jung’s understanding of how to develop a personal relationship with God, he 
delved into the theological works that filled his father’s library. But even after devouring 
volume after volume, Jung came away none the wiser.24 He found that, like the Church, 
Christian theologians problematically prioritized belief, forcing Jung to conclude that the 
arch sin of faith was that it obstructed actual experience.25 For Jung, neither belief nor 
logic could act as reasonable substitutes for a lived experience of the divine. Thus, he was 
forced to turn away from the contemporary Christian tradition with a sense of 
dissatisfaction. 
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Having found his hunger for self-knowledge unsatisfied by theology texts, Jung 
followed routes that might lead to more gratifying conclusions. Jung’s intellectual 
influences were tremendously eclectic, drawing from the works of philosophers, 
novelists, mystics, and poets.26 As a youth in the Swiss educational system, Jung received 
a classical education and was well read in the works of the Western canon, absorbing 
Homer, Schiller, Plato, Socrates, and Shakespeare. However, Greek philosophers left 
Jung just as irreverently skeptical as did theological texts due to his doubt of the “logical 
trickery” by which they reached their conclusions in lieu of actual experience.27 It 
seemed, then, that the ancient philosophers were little better than the theologians. 
Jung, however, did find a close kinship among Goethe (1749-1832) and Nietzsche 
(1844-1900). Goethe’s Faust and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra both presented Jung with 
fictional versions of his own No. 2, the shadow sides of their creators and the aspect of 
himself that was intertwined in the workings of the cosmos and the transcendent.28 The 
two figures of Faust and Zarathustra ultimately played a prominent role in his 
development of the concept of the Self and the creative power of the collective 
unconscious, serving as examples of the shadow side of the personality that had forced 
entry into the world clothed in the safety of literature. Although he did not fully agree 
with either Goethe or Nietzsche, Jung did believe that each of them had presented a 
vision of religion truer than the actual religion of his day, with which he had already 
formally dispensed. Consequently, they confirmed Jung’s longing for a truly meaningful 
form of religion after religion grounded in one’s own personal experience. 
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) also offered Jung a breath of fresh air through 
his direct acknowledgement of the suffering of the world, which the psychologist found 
was either reasoned away by other philosophers or forced into divine harmony by 
theologians. This candid appraisal of the darker sides of life struck a close chord with 
Jung’s own search for the shadow side of human experience. Through each of these three 
philosophers Jung found support for many of the conclusions he had already 
independently arrived at, driving him ever deeper in his theorizing. 
As Jung drew nearer to his graduation from Gymnasium, the Swiss equivalent of 
American high school, the matter of choosing a career path became increasingly pressing 
and he was forced to recognize the need to move onward in a pragmatic way. While 
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Jung’s exploration of philosophy, history, and philology all satisfied No. 2’s yearnings 
for meaning, his position as a child from a relatively poor background in the Swiss 
countryside forced Jung to choose a practical career path. Recognizing No. 1 as the light 
that allowed him to successfully operate in the world, Jung was determined to leave the 
shadow side of No. 2 behind. Jung, however, could never fully deny or forget No. 2, 
which he deemed an abhorrent act of self-mutilation.29 Thus indulging No. 1’s demand 
for concreteness and order, Jung opted for the practical and empirically grounded career 
path of medical science.30 
As with Christianity, Jung’s feelings on science and the scientific method were 
highly ambivalent. Early on in his time at the University of Basel, Jung came to the 
realization that, although science offered up tremendous quantities of knowledge, it 
ultimately yielded few satisfactory insights, and those that it did were often unpalatably 
specialized for Jung’s taste.31 Furthermore, science encouraged strict materialism that 
alienates humans from God’s world, sucking meaning out of existence and contributing 
to the spiritual suffering of European moderns.32  
Ultimately, Jung’s dominant feeling toward science was one of necessity. On its 
most basic level, this necessity was for professional legitimacy. As Jung puts it, “a new 
idea, or even just an unusual aspect of an old one, can be communicated only by facts. 
Facts remain and cannot be brushed aside… More than ever I found myself driven 
towards empiricism.”33 However, beyond Jung’s professional concerns, his dependence 
on science was also closely connected to the continual conflict between his No. 1 and No. 
2. Science’s grounding in empirically verifiable data and results provided Jung with a 
tool for staying in contact with the outer world.34 His communion with No. 2 may have 
offered Jung tremendous possibilities for self-knowledge, yet they drove him further 
away from the material and social worlds, leaving him in a state of extreme loneliness. 
Science was the lifeline that kept him anchored to something beyond himself.  
Recognizing the need to appease No. 2, Jung attempted to strike a more 
satisfactory balance between his multiple personalities by exploring works on 
“spiritualistic phenomena.”35 After stumbling upon a book on spiritualism in the library 
of a classmate’s father during his second semester at University,36 Jung became 
completely enamored with the topic, which would occupy him for the duration of his 
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career and life. He further explored the topic within the work of Emanuel Swedenborg 
(1688-1772) and Carl du Prel (1839-1899), both of whom sought to uncover the 
philosophical and psychological meanings behind spiritual phenomena.37 As with the 
philosophers, Swedenborg and du Prel offered Jung a vision of highly convincing 
alternatives to traditional explanations of the workings of the human mind, its neglected 
aspects, and its relation to the cosmos. Although these thinkers helped to satiate Jung, he 
remained caught between the two poles of scientism and spiritualism, and the conflict 
between No. 1 and No. 2 seeming destined to reemerge. 
However, as he neared the state examinations, Jung came across a book on 
psychiatry that drew him “irretrievably under its spell” and illuminated his path forward:  
[In psychiatry] alone the two currents of my interest could 
flow together and in a united stream dig their own bed. Here 
was the empirical field common to biological and spiritual 
facts, which I had everywhere sought and nowhere found. 
Here at last was the place where the collision of nature and 
spirit became a reality.38  
 
While psychiatrists may have their own personal biases and subjectivity, they stand 
behind the objectivity of their own experiences and those of their patients, using them as 
the raw data for constructing the theories that empirical science demands. Even if No. 1 
and No. 2 could not be fully reconciled through this career choice, Jung could, at the very 
least, pursue both and allow them to coexist. Psychiatry thus afforded Jung a field in 
which his scientific aspirations could be yoked to his spiritual and philosophical 
yearnings, allowing him to produce works that were empirically grounded while 
simultaneously serving as a form of subjective confession. This field, which was still 
finding its footing as valid scientific discipline when Jung entered University in 1900, 
would ultimately play a huge role in shaping his universalist pretensions and subsequent 
empiricism over the course of his career. 
 
Scientific Positivism in French Psychiatry: The Foundations for Jung’s 
Methodology 
 
 According to Foucault, “what we call psychiatric practice is a certain moral tactic 
contemporary with the end of the eighteenth century, preserved in the rites of asylum life, 
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and overlaid by the myths of positivism.”39 During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
France was central to the fields of mainstream psychology and psychiatry in Europe as a 
whole.40 Following the end of the French Revolution in 1799, the new regime pursued 
secularization in an attempt to dismantle the old social institutions that challenged the 
possibility of French citizens becoming fully engaged as participants in the emerging 
state. Divesting French society of its religious values became imperative to freedom from 
the authority of the Catholic Church and thus a cornerstone of the new social order. 
Consequently, there were tremendous developments in France in the social sciences over 
the nineteenth century, which many praised as the groundwork for the creation of a new, 
free man with autonomous and empowered selfhood. In particular, the work of 
psychologists at the Pitié-Salpêtrière teaching hospital, the Hôspital Bicêtre, and Collège 
de Sorbonne at the University of Paris played a substantial role in the emergence of a 
scientific psychiatry that could produce reliable and socially useful knowledge about 
man.41 
Far from occurring within a vacuum, the emergence of scientific psychiatry was 
closely tied into the economic, social, and political currents of nineteenth century 
France.42 Of particular importance is the personal conviction of individual psychiatrists in 
the scientific method, the professional trajectory of the field, as well as developments in 
the French state. Considering each of these threads in turn sheds light on the development 
of psychiatry as a field committed to empiricism and estranged from the unverifiable 
speculations of philosophy. This commitment to demonstrability would prove 
extraordinarily important to Jung’s particular way of articulating his theories in his 
academic work, largely confining him to a scientific perspective. Furthermore, given that 
Bleuler, Janet, and Freud, all of who were great influences on Jung, studied under 
Charcot, a key figure in French psychiatry, it seems reasonable to suggest that Jung’s 
own trajectory was closely guided by the following developments. 
 In his 1865 Introduction à l’étude de la médecine expérimentale (Introduction to 
the Study of Experimental Medicine), Claude Bernard (1813-1878) laid forth the 
following proclamation on the importance of science:  
the intellectual conquest of man consists in diminishing and 
pushing back indeterminism to the extent that he gains 
ground on determinism with the aid of the experimental 
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method. This alone should satisfy his ambition because it is 
through this that he extends and will extend his mastery 
over nature.43  
 
This hopeful statement reflects the general optimism of the time about the scientific 
method’s potential to bring man into a prosperous utopian future. While Bernard 
recognized that absolute determinism was impossible, and would in fact undermine the 
basis of man’s very existence, there was tremendous confidence in science to bring about 
both unprecedented technological advancement and social peace. Not only would humans 
achieve greater control of material circumstances as they furthered their understanding 
and consequent mastery of nature, but such methods could also yield a more systematic 
method for deciphering the human mind. Findings derived from the experimental method 
were believed to be more reliable than subjective speculations, offering tremendous 
promise for social stability. Thus, the very methods of science instilled individual 
psychologists and psychiatrists with great confidence in empiricism and the need to 
ground their emerging field in such practices. 
 Working alongside this personal conviction of psychiatrists in the scientific 
method was the practical need of the field of psychiatry to carve out a niche for itself in 
French society. Until the late 1870s and 1880s, care of the “insane” had been left 
primarily to the clergy. Prior to the rise of the French Third Republic, two-thirds of Paris 
public hospitals and hospices were employing religious sisters as nurses.44 Consequently, 
there was little room for a class of laic, i.e. religiously unaffiliated, nurses such as 
psychiatrists aspired to be. However, in 1883, a complete hospital laicization was carried 
out on the grounds that, “public welfare is different from Christian charity and is a 
national service which must be carried out in the civil sector.”45 The French state, with 
the full support of a cadre of psychiatrists with professional aspirations, had deemed that 
the metaphysical spirit of the Church and its clergy could not be trusted with such a 
serious matter as the care of society’s mentally unwell. As men armed with professional 
knowledge and the scientific method, psychiatrists were lauded as more capable of safely 
handling the “insane.” Yet as religion was formally driven out of mental hospitals, it was 
only its social feeling that bonded patients together that was banished; asylums retained 
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the moral enterprise of religion that carried its power of consolation and confidence, 
powers that were ultimately placed in the hands of psychiatry.46 
 This shift to laicize medical institutions should be understood as part of a larger 
movement of secularization occurring under the Third Republic. In order to consolidate 
its power, the new regime in France sought to wrest power away from the Catholic 
Church, a dominant force in French society. The leaders of the Third Republic 
increasingly relied on science to legitimize their efforts to reorganize the social order and 
optimize the rational and productive forces of society.47 Given that religion represented 
the height of irrationality for many of these men, science was viewed as instrumental to 
usurping the hold of the Church on many members of French society and establishing a 
rational and scientific basis for a newly secularized society. 
 Positivistic science in particular played a key role in this move towards 
secularization. According to Auguste Comte (1798-1857), the founder of sociology, 
society, like matter, is governed by certain general laws. He proposed a tripartite 
development of history in which the initial two stages of theology and metaphysics would 
be replaced by positivistic science as the human species progressed in its understanding 
of the world.48 By his estimation, knowledge and truth are attainable solely by means of 
conclusions drawn from observational evidence of experimental science, enabling the 
construction of discernable laws that govern social bodies.49 Given that positivistic 
science was proposed to supersede the theological explanations of the Church, it was 
integral to the secularization movement and the fields of psychology and psychiatry 
provided important battlegrounds for the state to conquer territory previously governed 
by religion.50 
 Aspiring psychologists and psychiatrists at this time were quick to get behind this 
move towards positivism as a way of aligning themselves with the Third Republic and 
gaining favor with the new ruling class. By supporting empirical science grounded in 
observation, psychiatry established legitimacy in the eyes of the political elite, an 
important move toward carving out a place in French society for itself. This strong 
support for positivism in psychiatry is especially evident in the work of Jean-Martin 
Charcot (1825-1893), regarded as the father of modern neuroscience. In the early 1880s 
he engaged in a project of retrospective medicine by pouring over paintings and 
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engravings from the fifth through eighteenth centuries that purported to depict cases of 
ecstatic religious experience and demonic possession.51 Having previously developed a 
system by which he could diagnose individuals with hysteria on the basis of external 
behaviors and mannerisms, Charcot proceeded to label these so-called religious 
experiences as nothing more than the outbursts of undiagnosed hysterics, consequently 
redefining the supernatural as the natural and backing up the state’s move towards 
secularization. Charcot’s retrospective application of modern psychological theories to 
religious phenomena closely parallels Jung’s own imposition of analytical psychology 
upon Tibetan Buddhism, marking a clear antecedent for cross-cultural psychological 
comparisons. Charcot’s use of psychologism to serve secularizing ends also prefaces later 
scholarly attempts such as those of Preece and Batchelor that employ psychological 
terminology for similar purposes. 
 However, while Charcot and many of his contemporaries demonstrated a strong 
affinity for positivism, there were also a number of eminent psychiatrists that could not 
wholly support the transformation of their field into a strictly objective science. Among 
those seeking to return an element of subjectivity to psychiatry were Eugen Bleuler 
(1857-1939), Pierre Janet (1859-1947), and Théodore Flournoy (1854-1920).52 Even 
though Jung appears rather dismissive of these men in his personal letters, his own 
interest in preserving an element of subjective confession in psychiatry necessarily 
encouraged him to support their work. 
Among his contemporaries, Jung was also especially influenced by the work of 
Alfred Adler (1870-1937) and Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). Despite the frequent 
mythologization of his relationship with Freud, Jung adamantly protested the popular 
view that his own views derived largely from his temporary mentor, insisting that, “I in 
no way exclusively stem from Freud. I had my scientific attitude and the theory of 
complexes before I met Freud.”53 Although these retrospective protests may seem 
exaggerated and likely reflect Jung’s desire to distance himself from his ex-mentor, there 
is also strong evidence that Freud really was merely one influence among Jung’s many, 
rather than the cardinal figure that he is often supposed to be. Particularly in the case of 
the concept of the collective unconscious, one of Jung’s most well developed ideas, it 
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seems that the psychologist’s ideas derived far more directly from the work of Carl 
Gustav Carus and Karl Robert Eduard von Hartmann than from Freud.  
Writing in the mid-nineteenth century, Carus (1789-1869) was one of the first 
people in Western academia to point out the existence of the unconscious as the space 
that contained the darker, shadow elements of the human mind.54 Von Hartmann (1842-
1906), a German philosopher, further developed this idea by subdividing the unconscious 
mind into a number of different sections, one of which was the metaphysical 
unconscious, which was transpersonal and collective,55 clearly laying the groundwork for 
Jung’s own theory of the collective unconscious that would guide his work with foreign 
cultures and traditions.  
While Jung and Freud may have initially been in close agreement on many of the 
central ideas of psychoanalysis, the founder of analytical psychology ultimately believed 
that his once-mentor was too clouded by his own biases, causing him to perform drastic 
revisions on a psychoanalytic map of the human mind. Furthermore, Jung was deeply 
frustrated by Freud’s refusal to take spiritualistic or religious phenomena seriously. As he 
delved further into these topics and began to incorporate them into his academic writings, 
Jung’s deliberate inclusion of religious phenomena was another means through which he 
could distinguish himself from Freud and move analytical psychology further away from 
its father tradition.  
Even if we trust Jung’s claims that his views derived largely from thinkers other 
than Freud, he did, at the very least, owe the founder of psychoanalysis an enormous debt 
for his expansion of what constitutes valid data in the positivist empirical method. Prior 
to Freud, observation of external phenomena was considered to be the sole valid method 
of scientific inquiry and affirmed that only the body is worthy of investigation for 
empirical data. Although observation of physical phenomena is still prioritized by the 
scientific method, Freud made a fundamental break with the modern scientific tradition 
by introducing the psychological products of patients as deserving serious consideration 
as well.56 The body was no longer the sole indicator of human psychology, but the 
subjective experiences of patients were treated as valid as well. Thus treated as forms of 
internal observation, thoughts and feelings became empirical data in their own right,57 
imposing positivism’s myth of scientific objectivity on subjective experiences. Given that 
	   116	  
Jung’s metapsychology draws not only from the verbal confessions of his analysands but 
also from the texts and iconography that emerged from individuals’ subjective 
experiences, his entire project would have been impossible had Freud not enabled such a 
groundbreaking shift in empiricism. 
This possibility of objectifying subjective experience and treating products of the 
psyche such as words and images empirically enabled Jung to participate in the 
positivism that dominated contemporary psychiatry, helping to validate his field as a 
legitimate professional discipline with potentially universal applicability. Problematic as 
Jung might have deemed positivism due to its role in Charcot’s negation of spiritualism, 
he clearly saw its instrumental necessity. Positivism enables universality, allowing for the 
possibility of making general statements about humankind as a whole, which Jung 
required in order for an overarching metapsychology of humanity to have any validity at 
all.  
 However, it seems that Jung also recognized the limitations of Western 
Universalist pretentions, which positioned white European men as humans in general. 
This perspective renders Europeans as Subject, forcing all others into the status of Other 
and, therefore, figures them as aberrations to proper humanity. According to the tenets of 
psychoanalysis, Subjects from a single culture cannot be representative of all of 
humankind since the shadow Other in one culture might appear as Subject in another. 
Without addressing the shadow forced into repression by socialization, European 
Universalist accounts therefore remained forever incomplete. Universalism is thus 
problematic in the same way as Christianity: it denies the validity of the experiences of 
the shadow Other. In order to construct a truly universal metapsychology, Jung required 
the psychological products of individuals in non-Western cultures as empirical data to 
expand upon his findings from analyzing himself and his analysands. Without this data, 
Jung could never fully discern the West’s shadow and confidently produce a 
psychological system that truly encompassed every aspect of the human mind. Although 
Jung claims that his interest in the East is primarily to expose his Western audience to 
new forms of knowledge,58 the stakes are far greater: if Jung was unable to find 
corroborating evidence to his theorizing in the psychological products of Asian religion, 
his entire metapsychology would have lost its foundation of universality and crumble.  
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In light of Jung’s inner turmoil and the professional demands laid upon him by 
historical circumstances, the apparent necessity of his Eastern endeavors is clear. On the 
one hand, his constant need for self-discovery and uncovering the shadow side of himself 
and Western society required some kind of Archimedean point outside of his European 
experiences. Even though Jung had an inkling of his inner shadow, Jung needed a truly 
“foreign” point from which he could survey himself and more clearly distinguish his two 
selves: only by encountering and digesting the Eastern Other could Jung gain a sense of 
who he truly was with any certainty. On the other hand, developments in French 
psychiatry that spread throughout the field in Europe necessitated acquiring data from 
non-European cultures that could validate the objective existence of the collective 
unconscious and its collection of archetypes as universal phenomena. As the personal and 
professional tied together, it seems Jung felt he had no choice but to travel East. 
 
Interiorizing the Buddha: Rendering the East Readable 
Although the prior archeology uncovers the factors that drove Jung East to 
analyze Tibetan Buddhism, it does not fully explain why he adopted the prevalent 
Orientalist discourse of his time and psychologism’s reductive methodology. Chapter one 
has already demonstrated that the widespread application of Orientalist discourse to all 
Western conversations on the East all but ensured that Jung would adopt its dominating 
rhetoric for his psychological commentaries. However, his psychologism is more 
troubling insofar as it seems to have far fewer precedents and appears more blatantly self-
serving than Jung’s ambiguous Romantic Orientalist stance toward Tibetan Buddhism.  
However, further consideration of common scholarly methodology for analyzing 
religion at the time and its ontological grounding in Cartesian dualism reveals that Jung’s 
intellectually dominating psychologism is not as much of an anomaly as it first appears, 
but is actually the logical extension of interpretive practices already in place. These 
interpretive strategies, the most pressing of which are linguocentrism and interiorization, 
reflect the general inability of American and European scholars to engage with Eastern 
religions on non-Western terms, resulting in distortions that are largely the result of 
misplaced emphasis. Combined with the inescapability of dominating Orientalist rhetoric 
in the twentieth century that pervaded all accounts of Asia, the trends of linguocentrism 
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and interiorization almost guaranteed that Jung would misrepresent Tibetan Buddhism by 
imposing his own understanding on the religion. 
 In this context, linguocentrism refers to the interpretive strategy common among 
scholars of relying almost exclusively on textual accounts of doctrines and practices in 
their constructions of Asian religions in the Western imagination. However, this 
hermeneutical approach dehistoricized and decontextualized the texts it claims to explain, 
which contemporary literary theorists have labeled as ‘intertextuality.’59 As authorial 
context is torn away, new meanings emerge in the interplay between the reader and the 
dehistoricized text. Consequently, Romantic Orientalist philologists were convinced that 
they could discern the ‘essence’ of Buddhism through its observable signs, i.e. its texts. 
This fallacious belief in the possibility of locating Buddhism’s ‘essence’ was furthered by 
the prioritization of the original text, one that had not been corrupted by superstition or 
the practical considerations of cultural context. It was within these original texts that 
scholars believed they could locate ‘authentic Buddhism,’ as opposed to its socially 
conditioned and therefore deviant forms, recalling the very reasons why Western scholars 
were initially attracted to Tibet. 
However, due to the fact that there was rarely an actual Asian voice to contradict 
their opinions, European and American intellectuals were able to find exactly what they 
were looking for in the Sanskrit and Pali texts that they encountered, never minding the 
fact that these are liturgical languages of the elites and would have had little bearing on 
the lives of the average practitioner.60 This resulted in a sense of textualized Asian 
religions in which canonical doctrines are prioritized over the actual beliefs and practices 
that guide practitioners’ lives.  
As with the concept of the Orient, this is not to say that ‘textual Buddhism’ is a 
complete fabrication but, rather, that it requires contextualization, a task that Romantic 
Orientalists largely neglected. The philological endeavors of these scholars certainly 
yielded information about Buddhism, but it is information that must be framed within the 
cultures in which the texts were written rather than by Western linguocentrism. 
Furthermore, the pervasiveness and implicit acceptance of Cartesian dualism 
exacerbated the already problematic nature of linguocentrism. Although dualistic 
ontology, which distinguishes between physical and non-physical phenomena, extends 
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back in history far beyond this particular construction, René Descartes (1596-1650) was 
the first to formulate the systematic account of the mind-body relationship that defines 
dualism in its current form.  
Descartes distinguished between material substance, which has the attribute of 
spatial extension, and mental substance, which is non-spatial.61 Although the material 
substance of the body and the mental substance of the mind are intimately related and are 
capable of influencing each other, they are, in the final analysis, independent and distinct. 
This sharp contrast that Descartes draws between mind and body also corresponds to the 
distinction between observing Subject and observed Object, which further reinforces 
Orientalism’s division of sovereign West and subjugated East. While these ontological 
distinctions frequently go unaddressed, Cartesian dualism is implicit in most Western 
forms of thought following Descartes and has exerted considerable influence on 
consequent ideas on the nature of reality and experience. 
As European and American scholars approached Asian religious texts, their 
specifically Cartesian assumptions guided their reading, producing the Western rhetoric 
of religious experience.62 This particular approach divides religion into its undiluted, 
universal, and experiential aspect, and its culturally conditioned manifestations, 
recapitulating the Cartesian bifurcation of mind and matter. From this perspective, 
Buddhism in Asia is largely distorted by the cultural biases of its practitioners, obscuring 
the ‘authentic Buddhism’ that lies under the surface in the minds of highly realized 
practitioners, a Buddhism that philologists claimed they could access through textual 
analysis. Buddhism thus became located not in action, but in thought, not in the material 
world, but in the mind.  
However, by adopting this perspective, European and American scholars 
committed the methodological error of treating religious texts as descriptive accounts of 
inner experiences rather than as ritualistic prescriptions. Their representations of Asian 
religions are therefore distorted by prioritizing inner experience over outer practice,63 
subjugating Eastern voices to distinctly Western forms of knowledge in the process. 
Robert Sharf has detailed this pervasive trend of interiorization, finding that this 
phenomological hermeneutic satisfied a number of Western scholarly needs when 
	   120	  
attempting to make sense of Buddhism and is ultimately more reflective of Western 
perspectives on the religion than of historical Buddhism in Asia.64 
This Western scholarly penchant for interiorizing religion suited Jung’s purposes 
for a number of reasons. For one, his experience with Christian theology as a youth 
impelled him to prioritize experience as the most direct route to psychological truth,65 
following the Cartesian assumption that “the phenomological transparency of 
consciousness is reproduced in the conceptual transparency of the category 
‘experience.’”66 This encouraged him to look to texts and images, which he viewed as 
more intimately related to the inner experience of practitioners than ritual behavior 
shaped by institutional forces, and are consequently better indicators of the contents of 
the mind.  
Furthermore, and far more pressing to Jung’s project of establishing and 
promoting his analytical psychology, was the fact that the term “experience” is so 
incredibly ambiguous. Although one cannot ever truly verify the experience of another, it 
is also impossible to ever conclusively demonstrate its falsity. While it seems that this 
would immediately disqualify experience as valid empirical data, Freud’s development of 
psychoanalysis helped to bring subjective experience into the realm of scientific 
inquiry.67 Following Jung’s opinion of himself as an empiricist that adhered to the 
phenomological standpoint,68 he was thus able to use the experiences of his Tibetan 
Buddhist objects of study, in the form of texts and images, as unfalsifable support for the 
findings of analytical psychology. 
 However, much as we have already criticized Jung’s acts of psychologism, it 
seems that they are ultimately just the logical extension of the already common practice 
of interiorization. Scholars had already determined that ‘authentic Tibetan Buddhism’ 
could be located in texts; it was thus but a small step for Jung to conclude that these texts 
were windows into the psyche and that, therefore, Tibetan Buddhism provided a similar 
glimpse into the human mind. In this light, deriding Jung’s psychologizing methodology 
merely uses him as a scapegoat for larger problematic trends in the nineteenth-century 
European intellectual milieu.  
 Furthermore, given the ubiquity of Orientalist rhetoric, empirical positivism, 
interiorizing methodology, we might raise the pressing question: how else could Jung 
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have written his commentaries? If these intellectual trends are really as pervasive as the 
previous analysis has demonstrated, it appears that Jung was caught in the movement of a 
zeitgeist that he could not possibly resist. Indeed, his interest in legitimizing his universal 
metapsychology seems to require that he adopt empirical positivism, Orientalist rhetoric 
and interiorization, thus damning him in the retrospective gaze of contemporary scholars 
that now regard themselves as more politically correct. 
 Having arrived at this awareness of the intellectual currents of the twentieth 
century that impelled Jung to participate in the Orientalist endeavor as he analyzed 
Tibetan Buddhism, we can now reassess the significance of his project. Although he 
undoubtedly commits the epistemological fallacy of formalist interpretation by 
prioritizing his own meaning over the actual cultural material with which he works, we 
have nothing to gain from wholly dismissing Jung’s commentaries. Rather, we must now 
reengage with Jung’s writings with new hermeneutics developed in light of his social and 
intellectual context, allowing us to deconstruct Jung’s texts and expose the broader 
potential of his writings that traditional critiques commonly overlook.  
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Chapter Six 
 
What’s Right With Jung:  
Reconsidering Psychologism and Deconstructing Orientalism 
 
You will say that I too am a dreamer; I admit it, but I do 
what others fail to do, I give my dreams as dreams, and 
leave the reader to discover whether there is anything in 
them which may prove useful to those who are awake.1 
        -Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
 
 Just as Jung ended up relying on Orientalist rhetoric without seriously considering 
its consequences, many interpreters of Tibetan Buddhism for popular audiences 
following Jung have similarly viewed the religion psychologically without actively 
addressing the implications of their positionality. Even when scholars warn of drawing 
cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary comparisons, they soon fall into the trap of treating 
analytical psychology as a totalizing system, leaving their interpretations one-sided and 
open to the invasion of unrestrained romanticism and psychologism.  
 Although our analysis has thus far focused on the dominant thread of Jung’s 
rhetoric that treats his Tibetan source material ambiguously and instrumentally, there is a 
second voice that has gone unaddressed. While Jung’s dominant voice speaks of Tibetan 
Buddhism with remarkable lucidity and certainty, the second voice has the potential to 
undermine all that Jung has constructed and is thus far more timid and less vocal in his 
commentaries. This voice qualifies Jung’s authority and the legitimacy of his statements 
on Tibetan Buddhism, ultimately demonstrating that we should not look through the lens 
of Jungian psychologism to more clearly discern Tibetan Buddhism, but that we can peer 
through psychologized Tibetan Buddhism to achieve a better understanding of Jung and 
his analytical psychology. Moreover, Jung’s marginalized voice reveals that, while his 
dominant rhetoric may appear to solidify and advance Orientalism, Jung’s very theories 
ultimately throw the entire discourse into doubt. Just as Jung’s own statements about 
Tibetan Buddhism are better treated as statements about his self and theories, Orientalist 
descriptions of the East and their accompanying conclusions are ultimately more 
revealing of the Western Subject than the Eastern Other they claim to expose. 
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Scouring the Margins: Putting Jung Back in Jungian Psychologism 
If we scour Jung’s commentaries on Tibetan Buddhism for his marginalized 
doubting voice, as well as the personal writings from his later years, we find that his 
project and its underlying epistemological premise is quite different from what successive 
scholars have assumed. By considering Jungian psychologism on its own terms and 
borrowing psychoanalysis’ subversive ideas, we will use the foundational premises of 
analytical psychology that Jung provides to undermine the contemporary tendency to 
treat it as a normative interpretive lens. 
Derridean deconstruction relies on locating the moments where the establishment 
of meaning is refused, using them as fulcrums for unraveling the text.2 Jung’s writings on 
Tibetan Buddhism largely abide by the laws of scientific positivism and Orientalist 
rhetoric that demand him to occupy an authoritative position as he makes objective 
statements about Tibetan Buddhism. This stance, however, is in direct conflict with the 
qualifying frame that Jung establishes for his larger corpus, which reconfigures his work 
as subjective confessions and as speaking solely of the psyche. Exposing this conflict 
enables us to reframe Jung’s commentaries in light of the laws that he himself proposes. 
Just as language carries the possibility of critique of its ability to fix or reflect meaning, 
so too Jung provides us with the tools to reappraise the significance of his work and 
reimagine a more profitable and less damaging manner of treating psychological accounts 
of Tibetan Buddhism.  
While Jung and his psychologizing followers often end up falling into dominating 
rhetoric by presuming to speak for Tibetans about their religion, we need not succumb to 
the same authoritative readings. Recognizing that the form of Tibetan Buddhism he 
presents us with is not the Other as such, but is rather the specularly inverted and effaced 
image of analytical psychology, allows us to refract the Jungian gaze back on observing 
interpreters. In doing so, we distance the text from the ideological matrix from which it 
emerged and can reorient it within the field of power. While such an inversion can hardly 
undo the harmful impact of Orientalizing psychologism on Tibetan Buddhism, it can, at 
the very least, lessen the damage moving forward by recontextualizing and decolonizing 
hegemonic interpretations of Tibetan Buddhism. 
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For Jung, the ‘East’ seems to refer to two distinct, yet interrelated, sights/sites of 
knowledge. On the one hand, his use reflects typical Orientalist usage, referring to Asia 
and its cultural productions. As we have just seen, psychiatric practices in the twentieth 
century demanded that Jung demonstrate the ubiquity of certain thought forms across 
both Western and Eastern cultures if he truly sought to establish his metapsychology as 
universal.  
On the other hand, the ‘East’ represents something of far greater personal 
importance to Jung, serving as the seat of the unconscious. According to his theory of the 
collective unconscious, our conscious egos are largely conditioned by the culture into 
which we are socialized, dictating which elements of personality are acceptable to 
express and those that are reprehensible and must be repressed. When Jung posits 
fundamental differences in the psychologies of ‘Easterners’ and ‘Westerners’ in works 
such as his “Psychological Commentary on the Tibetan Book of the Dead,” he refers not 
to the ultimate nature of their minds, but to their differing phenomological experiences. 
For Jung, the unconscious thus represents the ‘East’ as the shadow within. Conversely, 
the ‘East’ as Asia is the external Other to the European Subject and represents the 
‘Western’ shadow expressed as ego consciousness in a different cultural context. 
Consequently, Jung’s travels ‘East’ to Tibet were simultaneously a process of turning 
outward to cultures with different developmental trajectories to find supporting evidence 
for analytical psychology, as well as an act of turning inward to plumb the depths of his 
unconscious mind. 
This realization returns us to a consideration of the aspect of psychiatry that most 
appealed to Jung: its unique position as an empirical science that nevertheless allows for 
an element of the psychiatrist’s own subjectivities. Jung’s analytical psychology was not 
merely a set of scientific hypotheses, but a collection of lived experiences that he himself 
had undergone and for which he sought confirmation through his exploration of his 
theological, philosophical, and scientific predecessors and contemporaries. Referring to 
his life’s works, Jung admits that, “All my writings may be considered tasks imposed 
from within; their source was a fateful compulsion. What I wrote were things that 
assailed me form within myself. I permitted the spirit that moved me to speak out.”3 The 
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subjective element was thus of the utmost importance to the psychologist and should be a 
key determinant in evaluations of his psychological interpretations of Tibetan Buddhism. 
In addition to this qualifying frame that Jung viewed his writings as a form of 
subjective confession that was imposed on him from within, we must now also take into 
account the essential epistemological premise that underlies his entire corpus: all 
knowledge and experience are filtered through the psyche, which is consequently the 
only thing that we can truly claim to know. Jung is entirely unambiguous on this matter, 
asserting that, “all conceivable statements are made by the psyche,” and “the psyche 
cannot leap beyond itself. It cannot set up any absolute truths, for its own polarity 
determines the relativity of its statements.”4 On the one hand, these claims further 
demonstrate the psychologist’s recognition of the inescapable nature of subjectivity, 
while, on the other, they further demonstrate that Jung is never talking about anything 
other than the psyche. This does not imply that only the psyche exists, but that, as far as 
our experience of reality goes, “we cannot see anything beyond the psyche,”5 thus 
recognizing that he cannot make metaphysical statements with any authority.6  
 Having admitted that he can only speak of the psyche, Jung questions whether 
“psychology” is even a valid theoretical framework for considering Tibetan Buddhism. 
Given his belief that the mind cannot establish or assert anything beyond itself, he 
worries that treating phenomena with clear metaphysical, religious, and philosophical 
significances from a psychological point of view serves to reduce them to an 
impoverished form. For Jung, this reductionism highlights the “dubious applicability” of 
using modern psychology as a lens to analyze anything other than human subjectivity and 
the psyche itself, particularly cultural phenomena with religious pretensions.7 
Combined with Jung’s admission that the entirety of his writings are concerned 
with deciphering the secrets of the human personality, we may now finally see what Jung 
actually intended to talk about in his commentaries on Tibetan Buddhism. While 
subsequent scholars have taken Jung’s psychologizing interpretation of Tibetan 
Buddhism at face value, it seems that he did not intend to make any definitive statements 
about the religion but, rather, to learn something about himself. 
 In fact, Jung openly admits that anything he says about Asian religions is not 
intended as a faithful reflection of them as they exist within the cultures in which they are 
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practiced. Instead, his statements on foreign religions are “truth[s] particular to myself,” a 
sentiment that is further echoed in his claim that, “I studiously avoided all so-called ‘holy 
men’…because I had to make do with my own truth, not accept from others what I could 
not attain on my own.”8 His works are thus subjective confessions, mirroring the aspect 
of psychiatric writings that initially drew Jung to that particular field.9 In reading Jung, 
then, we must attempt to enter his subjective view as best we can. Although his 
commentaries are often read as an attempt to illuminate a facet of Tibetan Buddhism, 
Jung’s framing of his work as personal truths and subjective confessions reveals that he is 
not really discussing the religion at all but rather what it evokes within himself and 
illuminates about his psyche. Recognizing his active agency in the creation of the texts’ 
meaning, Jung willfully transforms Tibetan Buddhism from a phenomenon with 
culturally specific significance into a product of the psyche that is open to analysis.  
From this position of a new subjectivity that is less fettered by discursive forces 
than the currently dominant stance on the applicability of Jungian psychologism to 
Tibetan Buddhism we find that we should not use analytical psychology as a prism 
through which we can view a faithful image of Tibetan Buddhism, but should rather treat 
Tibetan Buddhism as a lens that illuminates Jungian psychology. This lens affords us 
alternative conceptualizations of analytical psychology’s theories of the collective 
unconscious, the archetypes, and individuation clothed in the language of Tibetan 
Buddhism. To treat his writings on the religion as having anything substantive to say 
about Tibetan Buddhism as it exists and is practiced in Tibet is therefore a misreading of 
Jung’s texts. While a far broader and more detailed analysis would be required to 
conclusively do so, we might further extend this conclusion by saying that we must 
reconsider all attempts of bringing modern psychology to bear on religion, treating them 
not as insights into the religious object that they examine, but into modern psychology 
itself. That so many subsequent psychologizing scholars of Tibetan Buddhism have failed 
to note Jung’s active imposition of new meanings onto the religion demonstrates just how 
greatly Jung’s authority has expanded beyond his control and the present need to 
reintroduce his voice into the discourse.  
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The Anxiety of Authority: Unraveling Jung’s Authorial Tensions 
By returning to Jung’s “Psychological Commentary on the Tibetan Book of the 
Dead” we discover a point at which we can pry open the text and his statements on 
Tibetan Buddhism in general and thus allow for the possibility of reevaluation. A closer 
look at Jung’s reflections on his authority to draw conclusions about Tibetan Buddhism 
reveals that the authoritative rhetoric required by Orientalist discourse that pervades his 
commentary is far from stable. As we consider this particular example of direct conflict 
between the voice of Jung’s ambitious No. 1 that speaks authoritatively on Tibetan 
Buddhism and No. 2, which recognizes the fact that Jung is totally unqualified to do so, 
we will notice a clear tension between these two rhetorical threads. These difficulties of 
Jung’s authorial presence are best brought to light through a comparison of the 
psychologist’s claims to that of the TBOD’s original translator and interpreter, Evans-
Wentz.  
Although both Evans-Wentz and Jung have both played an integral role in the 
transmission of Tibetan Buddhism to the West, they each occupy markedly different 
positions in relation to the religion. As the first translator of the TBOD and other Tibetan 
texts, Evans-Wentz performs an author-driven interpretation through which he believes 
he can determine the factual reality of Tibetan Buddhism and his statements are therefore 
intended to reflect the religion as it is practiced in Tibet. Jung, on the other hand, merely 
offers prefatory commentaries and consciously recognizes his active role in producing 
interpretive meaning that differs from the Tibetan perspective. Jung’s rhetoric and 
empirical methodology, however, enable and require Jung to occupy an assertive position 
that bestows him with authority far greater than what his reader-driven interpretations 
should carry. This expansion of authority has thereby produced the pervasive and 
problematic trend of Modern Tibetan Buddhist psychologism as explored earlier. 
Returning to the explicit claims of both Evans-Wentz and Jung regarding their 
relationship to the TBOD sharpens our awareness of the limits to Jung’s authority and can 
further remind future scholars of the need to qualify Jung’s conclusions differently from 
those of Evans-Wentz as they approach the Tibetan text. 
 Evans-Wentz did not hold any reservations regarding the possibility of producing 
conclusive statements about a Tibetan text from a European perspective. This confidence 
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in his interpretive capacity was bolstered by his relationship with his Tibetan translator, 
Kazi Dawa Samdup. Evans-Wentz opens the “Preface to the First Edition of the TBOD” 
with the claim that, “in this book I am seeking-so far as possible-to suppress my own 
views and to act simply as the mouthpiece of a Tibetan sage, of whom I was a recognized 
disciple.”10 On first glance, this appears to be an admirable admission: Evans-Wentz is 
actively recognizing the importance of his Tibetan collaborator in the production of the 
TBOD. Yet this admission also has the function of validating Evans-Wentz’s translation 
by citing a Tibetan as its source.  
 Evans-Wentz takes these claims of authority even further in the proclamation that, 
“I have been really little more than a compiler and editor of the Tibetan Book of the 
Dead. To the deceased translator…the chief credit for its production very naturally 
belongs.”11 Through this act of superficial humility, Evans-Wentz places his translated 
text on the side of the Tibetan tradition, derived from the insights of a learned Tibetan 
rather than his own Theosophical background. Elsewhere, in a footnote of his 
“Introduction” to the text, Evans-Wentz comments on Samdup’s desire to include 
exegetical comments in order to clarify certain points “in accordance with the wishes of 
his late guru.”12 Evans-Wentz thus attempts to cement the authority of his translation of 
the BTG even further, claiming that it was not only the product of a Tibetan sage, but of 
his guru as well. Evans-Wentz’s text thus appears to have the authorization of Tibetans, 
invoking the power of lineage in which teachings have been passed down in a direct line 
of gurus to disciples, a process of transmission that is completed in Evans-Wentz’s 
edition of the TBOD.13 Given that the European presents himself as nothing more than a 
“mouthpiece,” his Western audience is left with the impression that the TBOD is 
indicative of the knowledge of actual Tibetans.  
 Yet a closer examination of Evans-Wentz and Samdup’s relationship immediately 
reveals the difficulties of the European’s alignment with the Tibetan tradition. In his 
biography of Evans-Wentz, Ken Winkler remarks, 
 The few letters that have survived that they [Evans-Wentz 
and Samdup] exchanged show a surprisingly distant and 
formal tone. Even in Dawa Samdup’s diaries there is no 
word to suggest otherwise. There is nothing at all 
foreshadowing the later declarations that the Lama was the 
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guru of Walter Evans-Wentz, nothing about the ‘teachings’ 
the American was supposed to have received.14  
 
It seems, then, that the power of lineage that Evans-Wentz invoked to support his liberal 
translation was imagined in order to lend greater weight to his message. Yet this 
fabrication exploits his relationship with Samdup by transforming it into something that it 
clearly was not: “In Dawa Samdup’s silence, Evans-Wentz speaks in the Tibetan’s voice, 
in a language he never learned.”15 This unjust co-opting of his Tibetan translator’s 
authority enables Evans-Wentz to take unjustified liberties with the Tibetan text while 
simultaneously disguising the very fact that these interpretations are invalid from the 
Tibetan perspective. Appearing quite comfortable with his mastery of the TBOD, Evans-
Wentz’s exploits Samdup and enacts severe intellectual dominance on the Tibetan 
tradition by not merely ignoring the voice of Tibetans, but by actively claiming that his 
voice and the Tibetans’ are the same. 
 Jung is far more cautious in his claims of interpretive authority, recognizing that 
he is actively introducing new meaning to the text. Toward the end of his “Psychological 
Commentary,” Jung adopts a metanarrative position to examine his own project, in which 
he admits,  
The reversal of the order of the chapters, which I have 
suggested here as an aid to understanding, in no way 
accords with the original intention of the Bardo Thodol. 
Nor is the psychological use we make of it anything but a 
secondary intention, though one that is possibly sanctioned 
by lamaist custom.16  
 
This statement clearly draws out the tension between Jung’s professional desire for 
mastery of his Tibetan material and his awareness that he is wholly unable to have it. 
While Jung continues to grope for Tibetan authority by suggesting that “lamaist custom” 
might sanction his reading, he simultaneously recognizes that his reductive psychological 
lens is merely “a secondary intention” and is not the ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ meaning of the 
text. 
 Although we have already seen that Jung is clearly capable of occupying a 
metanarrative position of self-awareness from which he admits that he cannot accurately 
speak about Tibetan Buddhism as a religious or metaphysical system, he is unable to 
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occupy it throughout the entirety of his commentaries on Tibetan Buddhism and his self-
aware second voice is marginalized almost to the point of nonexistence. As we have 
already seen through statements such as “According to the Eastern view”17 and his 
adoption of Tibetan authority in his analysis of mandalas, Jung clearly views himself as 
capable of speaking for his objects of study to some degree. Indeed, if Jung’s claims are 
to be persuasive, he must take up a certain degree of authority regarding the content that 
he explicates and silence his awareness of the subjective nature of his statements. As an 
eminent psychologist of his time attempting to develop a universal theory of the mind, 
Jung is required to speak with a sense of mastery of his material in order to validate its 
inclusion in the foundations of analytical psychology as empirical data.  
 Yet, at the same time, Jung’s acknowledgement that his own reading is “but a 
secondary intention,” reflects the reader-driven nature of his interpretation. This claim, 
however, has the potential to undermine the persuasive power of his interpretation and its 
validity as evidence for analytical psychology, and is therefore marginalized within the 
text as a whole. Even Jung’s understanding of the psyche could not fully extricate him 
from the intellectual milieu in which he was writing and he was thus unable to fully 
abstain from attempts to produce definitive statements about the cultural text of Tibetan 
Buddhism. Caught up in Orientalist and positivist discourse, Jung could not confidently 
claim that his statements are not actually about Tibetan Buddhism and instead produced a 
commentary that has been taken as a reflection of the religion.  
 Consequently, it would seem that these moments of tension that subvert Jung’s 
authoritative voice are not neatly rectified. While it would be easy to reduce the issue of 
Jung’s violations of his foundational laws to a practical appeal to a distant authority for 
corroboration of the theories of analytical psychology as universal human truths, there is 
something more significant at work here. Caught in the tension of needing authority 
while simultaneously recognizing that the very authority he requires will always remain 
out of reach, Jung and his analytical psychology thus provide us with the tools to 
deconstruct the Orientalist episteme from within. 
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The Paradox of Position: Deconstructing Orientalism 
 Aside from this possibility of reconsidering psychologism in relation to religion, 
Jung further allows us to penetrate even deeper to the question of what sort of knowledge 
Orientalist discourse really imparts. Unraveling Jung’s psychological commentaries 
reveals that their contradictory elements are not merely a matter of Jung attempting to 
shore up the foundations of analytical psychology and overstepping the bounds of his 
authority by bringing Jungian psychology to bear on a realm to which it is not applicable, 
but are points that raise larger questions regarding the nature of the relationship between 
Self and Other. The conflict of voices that appears in Jung’s commentaries represents the 
tension and ambiguity that is inherent in all encounters between Self and Other in which 
we seek to fully understand that which is different from us while being forced to 
recognize that we can never fully do so. In Nietzsche’s estimation, this desire to make 
sense of the Other is a manifestation of the human will to power in which we seek to “fit 
new material into old schemas…making equal what is new.”18  
 However, these very means by which we make sense of the Other render it no 
longer as Other, but as a reflection of our own Self. Because all of our knowledge is 
necessarily conditioned by our unique subjectivity, to understand an Other requires 
drawing upon the past experiences and perceptions that are the basis of our Self. As we 
turn our gaze to the Other, then, we obtain insight not into the object of inquiry, but into 
our own positionality. Given that Jung was a great admirer of Nietzsche, it seems likely 
that he was well acquainted with these difficulties of engaging with Otherness. Indeed, 
his admission that, “I had often wished to be able for once to see the European from 
outside, his image reflected back at him by an altogether foreign milieu,”19 demonstrates 
a tenuous yet undoubtedly existent comprehension of subject-formation, allowing for the 
possibility of treating the Other as a refraction of the observing Self.  
 More to the point, Jung’s own theory of the collective unconscious is the germ for 
annihilating the duality between ‘Western’ Subject/Self and ‘Eastern’ Object/Other on 
which Orientalism rests. As we will recall, the collective unconscious, as the psychic 
substrate to the minds of all humans, contains many elements of the personality that are 
not expressed in our ego personalities. Those that do come to light are largely 
conditioned by cultural circumstances, meaning that the archetypes that rise to the surface 
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in the ‘West’ are different from those that emerge in the ‘East.’ Within psychoanalytic 
thought, consciousness is considered to be only the elements of personality that are 
permitted to emerge, created at the limits of social convention. It is not as autonomous as 
we might often like to think, but only exists as such by virtue of repressing the other 
manifold elements of personality. Consciousness is inscribed within these limits, standing 
at the border of what society allows and what must be repressed, dependent on both of 
these forces for its existence. By Jung’s estimation, the repressed elements of personality, 
which are the Otherized counterpart to our conscious Subject ego, “had become invisible 
under the influence and the pressure of being European…stand[ing] in unconscious 
opposition to myself.”20 The shadow Other that lays latent within the psyche thus 
represents the ‘East’ within, that which is undoubtedly constitutive of our being and yet 
goes unrecognized as such.  
 However, this consideration of subject-formation in psychoanalysis reveals a 
paradox inherent to Jung’s position. On the one hand, analytical psychology is grounded 
in the belief of a reciprocal relationship between the conscious Self and the repressed 
Other and thus maintains that it is impossible for an individual’s conscious ego to have 
full mastery of all the contents of the mind. This framework therefore denies any 
possibility for perfect objectivity, autonomy, or sovereignty. However, in order to 
validate these ideas, Jung needed to gather empirical evidence in support of the existence 
of the collective unconscious and was thereby required to occupy an authoritative 
position of mastery of materials belonging to foreign cultures. The system that he seeks 
to validate thus undermines the means of its own legitimacy by revealing the 
impossibility of objectivity (an ideal of empirical positivism) and of holding a position of 
authority (a foundational premise of Orientalism.) In short, the methods that Jung adopted 
to validate analytical psychology are necessarily and inherently subverted by the very 
ideas he employs them to prove. 
 Recognizing this paradox of Jung’s position provides us with the tools to 
undermine the fictitious authority and autonomy of the ‘Western’ Subject. As a discourse 
of the Master,21 Orientalism not only places the ‘West’ in a position of sovereignty from 
which it is capable of instrumentalizing the ‘East,’ but paradoxically complicates the very 
idea of sovereignty in the act of subject-formation. Although the ‘Western’ Subject may 
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set the ‘East’ in its gaze and thus intellectually dominate it, this position of power is not 
secure. The ‘West’ requires the ‘East’ as a baseline against which it can compare and thus 
define itself in a process of specular identification-in-difference.22 The ‘West’ is further 
reliant on the ‘East’ to satisfy its need for recognition as an acting Subject in its own 
right. While the ‘Eastern’ Other may thus appear to be subjugated by the ‘Western’ 
Subject, it is ultimately constitutive of it.23 Due to this definition by relationality, the 
distinctions between the two become blurred, revealing the deconstructive aporia over 
which the ideology of Orientalism is built. The ‘West’ as such is wholly dependent on the 
‘East,’ destroying the sovereignty of the Subject and the Orientalist episteme that it 
supports. 
 In summation, even as Jung perpetuates Orientalist discourse through his 
intellectually dominating treatment of Tibetan Buddhism, he simultaneously allows for 
the possibility of deconstructing it. Interpreters of Jung have not previously actualized 
this possibility and his writings have thus had a detrimental impact on popular intellectual 
perspectives of the religion in the West. Reintroducing Jung’s own voice to discussions 
on the application of his psychologism has enabled us to realize the deconstructive 
potential of his psychoanalytic lens and thereby reevaluate scholars that claim to offer a 
valid psychological perspective on Tibetan Buddhism. 
 
Concluding Comments: Repurposing the Jungian Lens 
Having completed our journey we may now raise the question once more: what 
should we do with Jung and his psychological interpretations of Tibetan Buddhism? 
Following traditional critiques, we could decry him for his dominating rhetoric and 
instrumentalization of Tibetan Buddhism that have ultimately contributed to long-
standing misrepresentative accounts of the religion. We might echo Frithjof Schuon who 
labels psychoanalysis as an imposture, “firstly because it pretends to have discovered 
facts which have always been known…and secondly and chiefly because it attributes to 
itself functions that in reality are spiritual, and thus in practice puts itself in the place of 
religion.”24 If we agree with this condemnation of psychoanalysis as an imposture and the 
current state of affairs in the wake of Jung is really as bleak as critics contend then we 
might cast psychologism aside entirely. 
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However, as our archeology has demonstrated, the situation is not quite so simple 
and discounting psychologism entirely is hardly profitable. Jung’s position as a Swiss 
psychologist writing in the early twentieth century shaped his personality, his academic 
works, and the resonance of his voice in contemporary portrayals of Tibetan Buddhism. 
Yet although Jung spoke from within this particular ideological matrix, his own system of 
beliefs is fundamentally at odds with its underlying assumptions regarding the possibility 
of sovereignty and objectivity. This tension between belief and the methods that are 
required to validate that belief is ultimately what is of greatest interest about Jung and 
discarding both the man and his psychologism ensures that the fruits of that tension will 
never ripen. 
Therefore, we should not treat Jung strictly as a man with a misguided agenda to 
instrumentalize Tibetan Buddhism, but also as a lens into larger issues concerning the 
nature of discourse and subject formation. This lens has helped us bring psychologism’s 
applicability to religion into focus as merely one strategy among many to discern the 
multiplicity of meanings contained within Tibetan Buddhism, as well as a lens that shines 
light back on Jung and analytical psychology. Furthermore, it is a lens into the 
(im)possibility of making statements about a foreign Other without simultaneously 
implicating ourselves in such statements. As such, it is also a lens that illuminates the 
contradictions of Orientalist epistemology as an inherently unstable system that claims to 
dominate an Otherized Object through the attainment of knowledge that the Other 
necessarily provides. 
Far from silencing Jung’s voice in conversations on Tibetan Buddhism, then, we 
must attempt to hear it in new ways. This thesis does not contend that it has offered all of 
the possibilities for repurposing Jung’s voice, nor does it even suggest that it has 
provided sufficient analysis of the two new applications that we have managed to cover. 
Analysis of each repurposing could undoubtedly be the subject of an entire thesis in and 
of itself. Nevertheless, we have opened up a space for conversation that scholars have 
previously tried to close off, prompting a Jungian-inspired vision for the future. This is 
not a vision in which unfamiliar thought systems are domesticated into our usual, 
comfortable schemas, but one in which difference challenges each of us as observing 
Subjects to draw out a new form of understanding from within ourselves. In the spirit of 
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Jungian individuation, these encounters with Otherness strive not towards a concrete, 
teleological goal of being, but are catalysts for a process of indeterminate sublation that 
respects and, ultimately, loves the difference of the Other both for its uniqueness and for 
its potential to construct a broader and better informed Self. 	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Appendix 
 
The Tibetan Mandala in Practice: Entering a Space for Transformation 
 
 The Kalacakra initiation ritual brings together a multitude of elements of Tibetan 
Buddhist practice, drawing upon connections between devotionalism, cosmology, 
physiology, and consciousness-altering soteriology. This in-depth exploration of these 
rites sheds light on the ways in which these elements are united, spacialized, and 
somaticized. These processes of spacialization and somaticization occur not only onto the 
cosmos and the human body, but within the sacred ritual space and visualized mandala 
palace as well. The initiation ceremony projects these four levels of the mandala onto 
each other and thereby creates an environment in which the mundane cosmos, body, and 
initiation grounds are divinized, presenting a unique opportunity for transforming 
consciousness.  
 In order to adequately undergo the Kalacakra initiation, practitioners are expected 
to have already attained a detailed conceptual understanding of emptiness, which enables 
them to adopt a non-dual-from-the-beginning approach.1 This approach allows initiates to 
theoretically move between mandalas at different levels of existence, freed from the 
illusion of having a discrete self that is bound to a gross form. Once the initiate has 
entered the mandala, they can transmute this conceptual understanding into an 
experimental one, thus allowing them to perform the necessary purifications that lead to 
awakening. 
 The initiation process starts with the purification of the ritual space in order to 
transform the empowerment site into the Kalacakra mandala itself. Initiation is conferred 
by a vajra master, who sets up a square mandala table in the center of the space upon 
which the actual sand mandala will be constructed, He performs the “purification of 
grounds” in which monks plant ritual daggers in the ten directions of the mandala in 
order to bind hindering spirits that might interfere with the initiation. Additionally, the 
vajra master must then persuade the earth goddess to consent to release the ground for 
the construction of the mandala.2 The master and monks each make devotional offerings 
to the twelve offering goddesses of the mandala, following which they populate the space 
with a number of vases and ritual implements, which are understood to each represent a 
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different deity in the mandala that will help initiates along the path to enlightenment and 
guard the sacred space from malevolent influences.3  
 Upon completion of purification of the grounds, the vajra master “claims the 
ground” by visualizing a transformation of his being into Kalacakra, creating a protective 
circle and mentally constructing the entire Kalacakra mandala in the air above the 
purified space. He then envisions that this meditated mandala is lowered and dissolved 
into the physical, spatially-bound conception of the mandala plotted out on earth, forging 
a union between mundane reality and the ideal of enlightened reality toward which 
practitioners strive. By dissolving the visualized mandala onto that of the sacred space of 
initiation, the mandala becomes a physical place in which the ideal teaching situation 
presented in the Kalacakra Laghutantra is created in ordinary space. It is within this 
space that all of the homologies described in the inner and outer aspects of the mandala 
come together, creating a Buddha Pure land in which initiates may be transformed.  
 Having completed the preparation and purification of the space, monks begin to 
draw the grid of lines from which the Kalacakra mandala will emerge. This grid is 
essential to aligning the specific mandala constructed within the space with its 
manifestation in the cosmos and within the individual. By creating a perfect similitude 
between the physical mandala created within the ritual space and those that exist within 
the cosmos and the human body, the vajra master invokes the divine forces of the 
mandala’s deities and invites them into the gross form that he has constructed.4  
 Having laid out the grid lines that form the foundation of the mandala, the vajra 
monster and monks begin to apply the grains of colored sand that will ultimately form the 
image of the Kalacakra mandala. Over the following four days, monks painstakingly 
place each grain in its appropriate place as the mandala gradually comes to light. Upon its 
completion, a curtain is lowered on all four sides of the base to shield it from the 
uninitiated and a celebratory dance is performed as an offering to the Buddhas and 
bodhisattvas of the mandala.5 
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A completed Kalacakra sand mandala.6  
 
 On the ninth day, initiates officially enter the mandala site for the first time and 
recite mantras (sacred sounds) and make a mudra (hand gesture) in an act referred to as 
the “mandala offering.”7 As initiates enter the sacred space, they offer up not only the 
entirety their being, but also offer the entire mandala as the universe, which are united in 
this reciprocal relationship. Through this act of devotion, the offering is purified, 
transforming the space into a Pure Land for the initiate and cleansing their consciousness 
of cognitive obscurations.  
 Entering the mandala marks the beginning of the generation stage of deity yoga, 
during which initiates develop a clear image of the Kalacakra mandala and its 722 
resident deities. This stage allows practitioners to familiarize themselves with the space 
and become accustomed to the final state at which their practice aims, as well as 
conditioned to the means by which they will enact the requisite changes. This entails 
achieving awareness of the innumerable homologies between their own being, the 
universe, and the mandala, which lays the foundation for conscious control of the forces 
operating within this holistic system. Having attained experiential awareness of these 
correspondences, initiates can free themselves from any illusions of ordinariness and 
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perceive their own being and the palace environment as composed of wholly pure and 
divine substances.8 
 The mandala palace is a square, multi-tiered structure composed of limitless 
quantities of various jewel substances that have been shaped by enlightened beings. An 
elaborate gateway that is intricately decorated with diamonds, gold, rubies, emeralds, and 
garlands of flowers faces each of the four cardinal directions.9 The Pure Land 
surrounding the palace is replete with gardens, lakes, charnel grounds, and mountains and 
is contained within protective rings composed of the five elements.10 Each floor of the 
palace itself represents a mandala in its own right, with the lowest level serving as the 
gross body mandala gradually ascending to the speech mandala, the mind mandala, the 
wisdom mandala, and, finally, the great bliss mandala.11 At the center and apex of the 
mandala resides the central deity, often with a consort, and represents the culmination of 
the initiates’ journey through the palace. There is not a single element of the mandala that 
is fortuitous: every aspect of its being has a symbolic meaning that the meditator must 
consciously attend to.  During the visualization of the mandala palace, initiates must use 
the one-pointed concentration developed through meditation to imagine all the details of 
the Pure Land and the palace in perfect detail, so much so that the structure becomes like 
a holograph that can be viewed from all possible directions without obstruction. This 
visualization must be so precise that the initiate can visualize the entire palace and all of 
its occupants within a single drop of seed on the tip of the genitals and be able to 
maintain such a degree of vividness for hours on end as the initiation progresses.12 The 
product of this visualization is not viewed as an intellectual construction, but as 
primordially true and as emergent from one’s own wisdom nature.13 Recognizing the 
purity of the mandala palace is thus not an artificial imposition upon the space, but an 
unclouding of perception that allows initiates to see things as they truly are:  
Perceiving the entire three worlds as illusory, and 
expanding his shining and pure emblem, the vajri creates 
[the mandala]…Moreover, O king, the entire generation of 
the mandala is by means of the wisdom and method 
beings.14  
 
Similarly, once the image of the mandala palace is precisely fixed in the initiates’ mind, 
that very same structure is consciously remapped onto their bodies, identifying parts of 
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the body, including the skeletal structure and internal organs, with various parts of the 
building and its resident deities15, thus reestablishing the human form as an ideal space 
for purification and enlightenment.  
 Once the mandala palace is perfectly fixed in the mind of initiates, they begin the 
process of mentally moving through the space, gradually spiraling from the periphery of 
the mandala on the lower levels toward its elevated center. On this journey, they visualize 
encounters with various divine, legendary, and historical enlightened beings that dwell in 
the palace. These deities are not viewed as having gross material bodies, but are 
composed of bodies of clear light to indicate their inherent emptiness. They are not 
treated as nothing but archetypes present in the human mind as a Jungian reading 
suggests but, rather, are representative of both cosmological and psychological 
relationships that come together in the psychophysical aggregates of sentient beings.  
 As initiates encounter these deities, they dissolve their own selfhood into 
emptiness, the foundation of all being, and reemerge as the deity, which is not viewed as 
different in kind from the initiate, but merely as another variation of emptiness and thus 
different only in degree. These encounters therefore serve as a way of familiarizing 
initiates with the possibility for self-transformation that arises from the fundamental 
emptiness of all phenomena. Different families of deities represent different phases of the 
development of a human fetus, which progresses from conception to birth as the initiate 
draws nearer to the center of the palace.16 This analogizing draws a strong parallel 
between the physical birth of a new human being and the emergence of a new conception 
of selfhood within an already-developed body. Each of the 722 deities that populate the 
Kalcakra mandala also corresponds to a different part of the gross human body, as well as 
to an energy center in the subtle body, forging further links between the Kalacakra 
mandala palace and the multiple dimensions in which the human body exists.  
 The apex and center of the palace is the dwelling place of the mandala’s 
eponymous deity, Kalacakra, and his consort, Visvamatr. While larger sand mandalas 
may offer a pictorial representation of these two deities in union, they are more 
frequently represented as two grains of sand in the interest of economy of space.17 As 
initiates come upon Kalacakra, they are directed to meditate directly upon him:  
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He consists of wisdom and method. At the end of darkness, 
he brings forth immutable bliss due to the obstruction of the 
moon and the sun in the channels…He is empty and unique. 
Kalacakra is meditated upon as being without beginning, 
end, and middle, and as the sense object that is without 
sense objects.18  
 
In this description, he is thus the final end towards which the Kalacakra path aims.  
     
Kalacakra in union with his consort, Visvamatr19 
 
 Kalacakra is concretely visualized as having “one body, two feet, three throats, 
four splendid faces of diverse colors, six shoulders, twelve upper arms, twenty four lotus 
hands, and 360 knuckles.”20 Each of Kalacakra’s hands wields a different ritual 
instrument. Not only do each of these ritual implements carry their own individual 
significance21, but Kalacakra’s body does as well, all the way down to the minute details 
such as the number of fingers and their distinct colors. As a brief illustration of these 
correspondences, Kalacakra’s six collarbones correspond to the six seasons of the year; 
his twenty-four arms symbolize the dark and light phases in a year; and his 360 phalanges 
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are analogous to the 360 days of the year and 360 units of the day, drawing a further 
parallel to the animals that occupy the lowest and outermost level of the mandala palace.  
 Kalacakra’s union with his consort, Visvamatr, serves as a symbol of unio 
mystica, the union of the wisdom of emptiness (in the form of the female deity) and 
compassionate method (represented by the male deity). As with the metaphors of 
conception and gestation posed by the other deities of the mandala, this unio mystica 
draws attention to the importance of the human body and sexuality within the Kalacakra 
initiation and Buddhist Tantric practice in general. These elements of life must not be 
denied, but accepted, loved, and treated as the foundation of the energetic movements 
that occur within the body and bring about drastic changes in consciousness. As such, 
Kalacakra and Visvamatr’s location at the center of the mandala is analogized to their 
positioning in relationship to human heart, which is the seat of the subtle mind and the 
space in which the individual will enact the final physiological changes corresponding to 
awakening enlightenment.22 
 Following the generation stage, initiates move onto the completion stage, which is 
the period during which they actually make use of the embodied and spacialized 
homologies between their body, the universe, and the mandala palace. Having 
successfully visualized their own bodies as mandala palaces, initiates move beyond 
reliance on the architectural structure and enter a form of body isolation in which their 
bodies are perceived as wholly divine.23 The coarse imaginings of the mandala palace and 
deity body that occurred in the generation stage allow practitioners to move beyond 
solely perceiving their bodies’ gross form and onto its more subtle energetic level. 
Playing on both the correspondences established in the Kalacakra Laghutantra and 
within the generation stage, initiates capitalize on this awareness of the subtle body to 
actively direct their internal forces and bring about the physiological changes in the 
subtle body that Tibetan Tantrism correlates with enlightened existence. This consists of 
harnessing one’s internal winds, arresting them within the body and directing them into 
the central channel. The winds then gather at the extremely subtle indestructible drop at 
the heart center,24 which is the Clear Light of Buddha-nature, marking the moment at 
which the initiate becomes fully divinized as Kalacakra. This divinization endows 
initiates with enlightened wisdom and allows them to experience the emptiness of all 
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phenomena and escape cyclical existence of samsara, as well as with enlightened 
compassion, which impels them not to exit samsara altogether but to remain for the sake 
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